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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A predictable and common European way forward for Ukrainians in the EU (COM(2025) 649 final)

EESC 2025/02613

OJ C, C/2026/884, 27.2.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/884/oj (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, GA, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/884/oj

Date of document:: 04/12/2025; Date of vote
Date of vote:: 04/12/2025
Date lodged:: 14/07/2025

Author:: European Economic and Social Committee
Responsible body:: Section for External Relations, EESC_REX
Rapporteur:: Mateusz SZYMAŃSKI
Co-rapporteur:: Krzysztof Stanislaw BALON
Form:: Opinion
Internal reference:: REX/608, AVIS-SECTION 2025/2613 FIN
Session:: 601

Treaty:

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Legal basis:

12016E304

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52025DC0649 ESC Opinion

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Subject matter:

Immigration and asylum policy

Directory code:

19.10.30.20 Area of freedom, security and justice / Free movement of persons / Asylum policy / Right of refugees and displaced persons (not eligible for asylum)

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C/2026/884

27.2.2026

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A predictable and common European way forward for Ukrainians in the EU

(COM(2025) 649 final)

(C/2026/884)

Rapporteur:

Mateusz SZYMAŃSKI

Co-rapporteur:

Krzysztof BALON

Advisor	Tetyana LEWIŃSKA, to the co-rapporteur, Group III
Referral	European Commission, 14.7.2025
Legal basis	Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
Section responsible	External Relations
Adopted in section	7.11.2025
Adopted at plenary session	4.12.2025
Plenary session No	601
Outcome of vote (for/against/abstentions)	212/2/5

1. Conclusions and recommendations

1.1.

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) once again condemns Russia’s unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. The EESC remains steadfast in its solidarity with the Ukrainian people and supports them in every way possible. Therefore, all decisions regarding the future status of Ukrainians in the EU are to be made taking into account the progress toward EU membership of Ukraine and in a close partnership with the Ukrainian government.

1.2.

In 2022, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine caused millions of Ukrainians to flee the danger. One of the decisions taken by the European Union (EU) at that time was to activate temporary protection. This was the first time this mechanism had ever been used.

1.2.1.

The EESC would also like to highlight the role played by civil society organisations when the greatest influx of displaced people (1) from Ukraine occurred. EU citizens and organisations deserve the utmost recognition for their solidarity and hospitality, which will be a great legacy for the EU.

1.3.

Ukrainians residing in the EU enjoy a number of freedoms, including, above all, the freedom to move within the EU and access to the EU labour market and public services. Temporary protection is proving to be a beneficial solution for them. At the same time, the conditions for returning to Ukraine do not yet exist due to the ongoing Russian aggression.

1.4.

Therefore, taking into account the current situation and the administrative challenges associated with changing the conditions of legal residence for such a large number of people, the EESC welcomes the decision to extend temporary protection for a further period.

1.5.

Nevertheless, given the economic and social challenges and the need to establish more predictable conditions for Ukrainians’ stay in the EU, the EESC calls on the European Commission (EC) and the Member States to make efforts to facilitate an easy transition to a more permanent basis for residence and a gradual move away from temporary protection. A long-term perspective is needed in this area. The European and national action plans and ways for residence to be legalised once the temporary protection has ended should be developed now.

1.6.

The situation related to the arrival of Ukrainians in the EU has increased pressure on the public service systems of the Member States. Therefore, the EESC is strongly in favour of increasing investment in high-quality services of general interest, including housing, to be available on an equal footing to all people legally residing in the EU.

1.7.

At the same time, efforts should be made to ensure the successful integration of Ukrainians in the EU. This can be achieved through support for learning the languages of the host countries, support for local community initiatives, the education of Ukrainian children within the common education systems of the Member States, and countering disinformation and Russian intelligence activities.

1.8.

It is also necessary to build strong social ties based on trust. The role of civil society is therefore crucial. It is important for Ukrainian citizens to get involved in organisations operating in their local communities

1.9.

It is also important to establish fair working conditions for Ukrainians. This applies both within the EU and in Ukraine. Member States are expected to combat exploitation and unequal treatment of Ukrainians in employment, while the Ukrainian government is expected to restore favourable solutions for workers and trade union activities through dialogue with the social partners.

1.10.

It is important for Ukrainians to be economically active. The EESC therefore advocates measures that will promote activeness, in particular by reducing administrative barriers, while at the same time protecting the most vulnerable people who, for reasons beyond their control, cannot or are unable to take up employment.

2. Background to the opinion, including the Commission document concerned

2.1.

Russia’s unjustified and illegal full-scale aggression against Ukraine in 2022 triggered an unprecedented influx of people from Ukraine to the European Union. The EESC has stood firmly against this aggression since day one and calls on Russia to withdraw from Ukraine and recognise its territorial unity.

2.2.

Initially most people fleeing the Russian aggression arrived in neighbouring countries. As of 31 May 2025, 4,28 million people who fled Ukraine as a result of Russia’s military aggression had found shelter in the European Union, mainly in Germany and in Poland (2).

2.3.

The first ever use of the temporary protection mechanism, which made it possible to significantly simplify the process of legalising Ukrainian citizens’ residence in the EU, was an unprecedented event. The EESC supported this measure (3).

2.4.

The temporary protection mechanism is an EU instrument that aims to provide immediate and collective protection (i.e. without the need to process individual applications) to displaced people who are not able to return to their country of origin. The objective of this mechanism is to enable them to benefit from harmonised rights throughout the EU. Employment and education are at the heart of the rights that displaced people from Ukraine are enjoying in the EU, in addition to accommodation, healthcare and social assistance (4).

2.5.

The EESC shares the EC’s view that maintaining a common EU approach on this issue is essential for ensuring that responsibilities are shared and coordinated between Member States in a balanced way. In its Communication, the EC concluded that it is necessary to prolong temporary protection by one additional year, while preparing to offer more stable and long-term prospects to people enjoying temporary protection, including supporting safe, voluntary and dignified returns to Ukraine (5). The EESC welcomes this decision.

2.6.

The EESC would also like to highlight the role it played and that played by civil society organisations when the greatest influx of people from Ukraine occurred. This role was also important at a later stage when it became necessary to implement measures to help Ukrainians to integrate. EU citizens and organisations deserve the utmost recognition for their solidarity and hospitality, which will be a great legacy for the EU and for the joint future of Ukraine in the EU.

2.7.

Further efforts to support Ukraine and its citizens must be the subject of solidarity-based cooperation and coordination between all EU Member States and its institutions. This is not an issue faced solely by the eastern part of the EU.

3. General comments

Temporary protection and long-term vision of residence in the EU

3.1.

A predominant group of Ukrainians staying in the EU are prolonging their status under the temporary protection mechanism. No significant movements to national systems can be identified, which means that the temporary protection mechanism still satisfies the legitimate needs in a proper way. This, however, also means that the conditions for Ukrainians to return to their country have not yet been created in Ukraine. The main problems are the sense of insecurity and the lack of economic and social infrastructure as a result of Russian aggression. Recent Russian attacks may increase the number of Ukrainians seeking temporary protection in the EU.

3.2.

It should be noted that this mechanism is temporary and has to be renewed on annual basis. This undoubtedly creates uncertainty for people covered by this status, while also calling into question the very idea of the instrument as a mechanism for a designated exceptional and short-term situation. The lack of a clear long-term perspective or the possibility of obtaining permanent residence may foster a chilling effect for both professional and personal life as for integration or a decision to return. A predictable future status creates the opposite. In addition, differences in the scope of support from country to country might increase incentives for secondary movements. In this context, the EESC welcomes the recommendation that Member States should avoid the possibility for the same person to obtain temporary protection in different Member States.

3.3.

The European and national action plans and ways for residence to be legalised once the temporary protection has ended should be developed now. A situation in which the protection ends and new instruments are implemented suddenly and all at once should be avoided, as it could lead to administrative paralysis and put displaced Ukrainians at risk of not meeting certain formal requirements in a timely manner.

3.4.

An important issue when it comes to planning return policy and further legalisation of stays is how to finance recovery and planned return initiatives. The EESC supports the solution of mobilising Russian assets located in the European Union for this purpose (6).

3.5.

The current gaps in the communication on a clearer outlook for the most vulnerable groups such as people in care, the elderly, people with disabilities and others who – within their families or alone – should not have to face additional insecurities must be rectified.

A challenge for the public services system

3.5.1.

Temporary protection set out a common EU approach, giving predictability and legal certainty both to displaced persons from Ukraine and to the Member States. However, it has had an impact on public services in many EU countries. The need to provide housing has affected housing markets, which had already been under great pressure. The situation is similar in other key sectors such as education and health.

3.6.

The above is not without significance for social relations in the host countries (7). Therefore, the EESC is strongly in favour of increasing investment in high-quality services of general interest, including housing, to be available on equal footing to all people legally residing in the EU.

3.7.

Further efforts to support displaced Ukrainians and their integration should include financial assistance to the countries most affected. The vast majority of the support offered so far has been limited to redeployment of existing funds and increased flexibility in the way EU funds are disbursed. This is at odds with European solidarity.

The importance of civil society and social partner organisations

3.8.

The EESC calls for continued support for civil society organisations and social partner organisations in Ukraine. Their work on the ground, in local communities, is of considerable importance and provides significant support for the measures taken by the public authorities.

3.9.

The experience and knowledge of civil society organisations are invaluable. The EESC therefore takes the view that if specific bodies such as the proposed Solidarity Platform Ukraine are set up, representatives of these organisations should be involved in the work. The EESC is ready to take part in work at EU level. Civil society initiatives will help to make the process of Ukraine’s accession to the EU easier, similarly to the previous accessions of new Member States.

3.10.

Participation of Ukrainians in civic organisations and local initiatives, including membership of associations and trade unions, has a positive impact both on integration in the Member States and on creating the conditions for returning to Ukraine while maintaining contact with the communities that provided shelter. Furthermore, the social activity of displaced Ukrainians helps to build trust between them and the local communities in which they live on a daily basis. It must therefore be supported on all levels, including via participation in EU networks. Local authorities should be strongly supported in facilitating such initiatives.

3.11.

The EESC welcomes the references to the instrument supporting youth empowerment, and calls for this to extend to supporting youth civil society organisations, including those that promote youth participation in decision-making and young people’s development as active citizens. The Ukrainian youth sector should also be a key stakeholder in and beneficiary of post-war recovery support to Ukraine.

Economic activeness and labour rights in Ukraine

3.12.

The EESC would like to acknowledge the contribution Ukrainians have made to the European economy and public finances. Evidence from the countries most affected shows that the economic benefits resulting from their integration can fully offset the initial public expenditure on reception and support.

3.13.

It should, however, be noted that while the economic activity of displaced people from Ukraine has had an overall positive impact on the economy, on social security systems and, in particular, on the demographic situation in the EU, in some Member States, bureaucratic conditions may be unfavourable to labour market integration. Efforts should be made to support the economic activity of people from Ukraine, but in such a way as to take into account the situation of the most vulnerable groups, such as single parents, older people and the infirm.

3.14.

The EESC notes that a growing number of Ukrainians are choosing to establish businesses in EU Member States. This positive development should be actively supported and facilitated through access to business registration, financing, training and advisory services. Strengthening trade and economic relations between Ukraine and EU Member States will not only foster mutual economic growth but also lay the groundwork for Ukraine’s post-war recovery and reconstruction. In this context, the EESC encourages continued EU support for initiatives that promote cross-border cooperation.

3.15.

The EESC strongly opposes any situation in which displaced Ukrainians could become victims of exploitation, abuse and circumvention of the existing rules related to employment. Member States are called upon to step up their monitoring efforts and properly enforce laws protecting workers. Successful initiatives to ensure that Ukrainians are aware of employment rights and obligations in different EU countries should continue. To this end, promoting trade union membership among Ukrainian citizens residing in the EU would be useful.

3.16.

It appears that learning the language of the host country is a key factor for social activity, successful integration and beyond. Although temporary protection is intended for emergency situations, it should not be used as a justification for neglecting the development of Ukrainians enjoying temporary protection language skills. The EESC calls on the EC and individual governments to provide programmes for learning the languages of host countries.

3.17.

The EESC would also like to point out that in many cases, displaced people from Ukraine perform work below their skills and formal qualifications. However, it is important that these skills and qualifications do not become obsolete. The EESC therefore proposes programmes whereby public employment services – with the support of civil society organisations and social partners – offer continuing education opportunities to people legally residing in the EU.

3.18.

Swift and effective mutual recognition of qualifications by EU Member States and Ukraine will be an important factor for supporting Ukrainians working in the EU labour market and those joining the Ukrainian labour market when they return to their country. In this context, the EESC welcomes the 25 June 2025 adoption by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of rules on the recognition of learning outcomes obtained abroad. Updating existing skills and knowledge is also important. In this regard, intensive exchanges of experience and good practices between the public employment services of the Member States and Ukraine, supported by the EU, could also be helpful.

3.19.

In the context of the EC’s strategy for returns to Ukraine, it is important to consider the country’s recent negative developments in labour legislation and their implications for alignment with international and EU standards. While certain measures introduced during wartime are motivated by defence needs, close attention should be given to ensuring that Ukraine’s labour policies remain consistent with the EU social acquis and the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine. Therefore, the EESC welcomes the conclusion of the tripartite memorandum on labour market reform and the ongoing efforts to develop a new labour code aimed at bringing Ukrainian legislation closer to internationally accepted labour standards. It also values the financial and technical support provided by the International Labour Organization and the EU to support these reforms. In addition, both Ukraine and the EU should continue working together to facilitate the labour market integration of those returning to Ukraine, helping to promote stability and sustainable economic recovery.

Education

3.20.

Including the children of displaced people from Ukraine in Member States’ education systems is an important factor for integration. It has a positive impact on children and young people’s future educational and professional paths and builds ties in the local communities of the host countries. Support for social and educational integration programmes for Ukrainian children at different levels of pre-school and school education in EU countries is needed here. In this context, the EESC shares the EC’s view that returning to Ukraine should not interfere with children’s education. It is important to ensure that children attending schools are allowed to complete their education in a stable environment, together with their families.

3.21.

Moreover, it is important to support initiatives aimed at promoting Ukrainian culture and language, both among the Ukrainian community and in host societies. This type of social activity will also reduce the risk of alienation of immigrants from Ukraine. Furthermore, Ukrainians residing in the EU may have knowledge on how to function in wartime conditions. This could be invaluable in building European preparedness in the event of a threat but also when discussing improvement in e- and distance learning.

Mutual relations – social challenges

3.22.

Despite efforts to combat corruption, Ukraine remains a country where this problem persists (8). Measures to increase the transparency of the system will be challenging, as events in recent months have shown. In the context of return policy, this may pose a significant social challenge. The withdrawal of the unfavourable changes proposed in July 2025 is a positive sign.

3.23.

Another important issue is the public perception in some EU Member States of Ukrainian citizens avoiding military service by emigrating, including illegally (9). The issue of evading military service is a matter of public concern in some Member States. Cooperation between the Ukrainian authorities and EU Member States is necessary to address it.

3.24.

Another problem faced by displaced people from Ukraine is the increased fear among the populations of some Member States about high levels of immigration. It is therefore necessary to strengthen efforts to counter disinformation about Ukrainians in the EU, including by funding civic organisation projects on monitoring and responding to fake news, and carrying out educational and information activities.

3.25.

Furthermore, the information campaign aimed at Ukrainian migrants warning against Russian recruitment for sabotage and espionage activities should be stepped up. Campaigns, including through social media, should warn people about offers to earn fast and ‘easy’ money, stressing the legal consequences and exposing mechanisms used by Russia to exploit migrants to destabilise societies and to reinforce social tensions based on concerns about migration.

4. Specific comments

4.1.

The EESC welcomes the decision to abolish roaming charges for calls between the EU and Ukraine as of 1 January 2026, and the Commission’s support for Ukraine’s efforts to join the single euro payments area (SEPA). Measures such as these are a significant help in bringing displaced people closer to their relatives and friends in Ukraine.

4.2.

Support for initiatives aimed at maintaining contact with displaced Ukrainians should take into consideration the role of social partners and civic organisations in implementing the action plans of the institutions involved. This will ensure the actions are more effective and have greater social legitimacy.

4.3.

Mental health and the psychosocial needs of adults and children who have experienced war trauma and who managed to flee are also a significant and growing problem among Ukrainian enjoying temporary protection, with 23 % reporting mental and psychosocial health problems that impact their daily lives, and 36 % of households having at least one member experiencing such difficulties. Women systematically report higher levels of mental health problems than men. Of those reporting mental or psychosocial health problems that affect their daily lives, roughly half (46 %) continue to seek support. This points to a need to act to address challenges such as low awareness and lack of trust in services, stigma, language issues and limited accessibility (10). Support programmes should therefore also include low-threshold and accessible psychological support carried out in cooperation with Ukrainian community organisations abroad and civic organisations of host countries.

4.4.

The EESC recommends that the EC expand the Fleeing Ukraine: Your rights in the EU webpage into a joint, multilingual EU information portal providing country-specific guidance on application procedures, required documentation, rights and contact points, supported by an interactive and regularly updated interface. Such a platform would ensure transparent and consistent access to reliable information, facilitate the exercise of rights under the Directive and strengthen coordination and solidarity within the Union. Such a platform could also be used as an information tool for Ukrainians in the EU, when participating in future free elections in Ukraine.

Brussels, 4 December 2025.

The President

of the European Economic and Social Committee

Séamus BOLAND

(1) When referring to the term ՙdisplaced people՚ or ՙUkrainians՚ or ՙdisplaced Ukrainians՚ in the opinion it is used in the meaning of the Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022 establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC, and having the effect of introducing temporary protection (OJ L 71, 4.3.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2022/382/oj).

(2) EU data: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Temporary_protection_for_persons_fleeing_Ukraine_-_monthly_statistics.

(3) Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA’ (COM(2021) 782 final — 2021/0411 (COD)) — ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on automated data exchange for police cooperation (“Prüm II”), amending Council Decisions 2008/615/JHA and 2008/616/JHA and Regulations (EU) 2018/1726, (EU) 2019/817 and (EU) 2019/818 of the European Parliament and of the Council’ (COM(2021) 784 final — 2021/0410 (COD)) — ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum’ (COM(2021) 890 final — 2021/0427 (COD)) — ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders’ (COM(2021) 891 final — 2021/0428 (COD)) ( OJ C 323, 26.8.2022, p. 69).

(4) COM(2025) 649 final.

(5) COM(2025) 649 final.

(6) See also Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Mid-term revision of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027 (COM(2023) 336 final) (OJ C, C/2023/867, 8.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/867/oj).

(7) Eurofund, https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/en/publications/all/support-ukraine-still-high-among-eu-citizens-some-fall-apparent-among.

(8) According to a 2024 study carried out by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, corruption is the second most serious problem for Ukraine, just after Russia’s full-scale aggression, https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1512&page=1. Persistence of the problem despite the efforts is confirmed by the OECD report, OECD Integrity and Anti-Corruption Review of Ukraine, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/7dbe965b-en, and the Corruption Perceptions Index of the Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2024/.

(9) According to data from the Border Service of Ukraine, since the beginning of 2022 almost 30 000 people have been apprehended when attempting to cross the border illegally and a further 44 900 have crossed the border illegally, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2025/05/21/7513302/.

(10) Navigating health and well-being challenges for refugees from Ukraine (2025).

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/884/oj

ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)

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