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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Report from the Commission - Report on Competition Policy 2023 (COM(2024) 115 final)

EESC 2024/01290

OJ C, C/2025/118, 10.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/118/oj (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, GA, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/118/oj

Date of document:: 23/10/2024; Date of vote
Date of vote:: 23/10/2024
Date lodged:: 29/05/2024

Author:: European Economic and Social Committee
Responsible body:: Section for the Single Market, Production and Consumption, EESC_INT
Rapporteur:: Giuseppe GUERINI
Form:: Opinion
Term of office:: 2015-2020
Internal reference:: INT/1066, AVIS-SECTION 2024/1290 FIN
Session:: 591

Treaty:

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Legal basis:

12016E304

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Earlier related instruments:

52024DC0115 ESC Opinion

Instruments cited:

EUROVOC descriptor:

Subject matter:

Competition

Directory code:

08.10.00.00 Competition policy / Competition principles

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Official Journal
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C/2025/118

10.1.2025

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee

Report from the Commission - Report on Competition Policy 2023

(COM(2024) 115 final)

(C/2025/118)

Rapporteur:

Giuseppe GUERINI

Advisor	Samuel CORNELLA (for the rapporteur)
Referral	European Commission, 29.5.2024
Legal basis	Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
Section responsible	Single Market, Production and Consumption
Adopted in section	1.10.2024
Adopted at plenary session	23.10.2024
Plenary session No	591
Outcome of vote (for/against/abstentions)	246/0/5

1. Conclusions and recommendations

1.1.

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) stresses the importance of the work done by the European Commission in 2023 on the communication regarding a crucial concept of competition law, namely relevant markets, which plays a fundamental role with regard to cases of abuse of a dominant position, the analysis of mergers, and to State aid control.

1.2.

The EESC believes that the current Temporary Crisis and Transition Frameworks (TCTF) should be thoroughly evaluated in order to determine whether it would be appropriate to phase them out in 2025, as currently planned, or if it would be useful to incorporate some of the elements that have proven beneficial for the green transition into the regular State aid rules, particularly procedural improvements.

1.3.

The EESC notes the need to reflect on how to preserve the single market, avoiding any harmful distortion of competition that may be brought about by State aid, while at the same time ensuring that European undertakings are globally competitive. On this specific point, the EESC calls for a reflection on an important part of the Much More Than a Market Report drawn up by Enrico Letta: ‘We should develop bold and innovative solutions that strike a balance between, on the one hand, the need to quickly mobilise national targeted public support for industry, in so far as it addresses in a proportionate way market failures, and, on the other hand, the need to prevent the fragmentation of the single market [...]. A way to overcome this dilemma could be to balance a stricter enforcement of State aid at national level and the progressive expansion of EU level funding support. Specifically, we could envision a Stade aid contribution mechanism, requiring Member States to allocate part of their national funding to the financing of pan-European initiatives and investments’.

1.4.

The EESC welcomes the long-awaited adjustment of the thresholds for de minimis aid granted for both the ordinary sectors and services of general economic interest (SGEI), from EUR 200 000 to EUR 300 000 and from EUR 500 000 to EUR 750 000 over three years, respectively. The de miminis threshold was also increased for the ‘fisheries and aquaculture’ sector in October 2023 (from EUR 30 000 to EUR 40 000 over 3 years) by Regulation (EU) No 2023/2391 (1).

1.5.

The EESC calls on the Commission to conduct an in-depth reflection on another significant point in Enrico Letta’s single market report, which states that ‘in order to realise the full potential of the social economy, several policy measures need to be considered. First, we need to facilitate access to finance for social economy players throughout their life cycle. This could include adapting the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) for State aid to social enterprises and reassessing the rules on aid for the recruitment of disadvantaged workers’.

1.6.

The EESC considers the idea of possibly establishing a pan-European State aid sovereign fund in the future – as suggested by the Letta report – very interesting, given that it could be beneficial for preserving social cohesion and for the proper functioning of the single market.

1.7.

From a general perspective, the EESC notes the need to reflect on how to preserve the internal market, avoiding harmful distortion of competition while at the same time ensuring the international competitiveness of European undertakings. This would include, where necessary, appropriate adjustments following targeted supporting measures implemented by other global players, such as the Inflation Reduction Act adopted in the United States.

1.8.

The EESC encourages the Commission to further explore the ongoing evaluation regarding a possible amendment of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (2) and its implementing act, Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 (3), in order to continue to secure the original objectives of such regulations, which were adopted in the early 2000s with a view to making the application of competition rules more uniform and more efficient across the EU.

1.9.

The EESC encourages the Commission to focus on the general trend indicating a decline in the number of leniency claims relating to violations of Article 101 TFEU in the last few years, suggesting that this issue be addressed in the annual competition report to be published in 2025 regarding competition policy in 2024, although leniency cases have slightly increased recently. Market sharing, customer allocation, and bid rigging are significant obstacles to both free competition and economic growth, and leniency programmes have been very useful in uncovering cartels in the past, until the decline in leniency applications witnessed in recent years, possibly due to the increased facilitation of ‘private competition law enforcement’, which reduces leniency incentives in the first place.

1.10.

The EESC welcomes the simplification package for merger cases that do not appear to raise any critical competition concerns. By reducing the amount of information required to notify transactions, these simplifications meet the proportionality criterion. These rules reduce the compliance burden for businesses and the administrative burden for competition authorities for cases that do not appear to be seriously harmful to competition.

2. Introduction and context

2.1.

On 6 March 2024 the European Commission published its Report on Competition Policy. The report is addressed to the Council, the European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee. It describes key elements in competition policy during 2023.

2.2.

In the introduction to the report, the Commission stresses that competition and State aid rules had to take due account of the increasing global geo-political tensions and, in particular, Russia’s continued invasion of Ukraine, as well as the growing digitalisation of the economy and markets.

2.3.

The Commission also points out that, at the request of the Council, it conducted an investigation into the impact of the current State aid rules on the integrity of the single market and on the EU’s competitiveness, with a specific analysis of State aid granted under the successive temporary frameworks in recent years.

2.4.

The Commission also notes that, since May 2023, the new rules of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) have been applied to keep digital markets open and contestable. A full account of the activities undertaken by the Commission in the context of the DMA was published in parallel with the report on competition policy as required by Article 35 of the DMA.

2.5.

Other key developments are described and explained by the Commission, such as, for example: i) the work carried out on the new communication on the concept of relevant market; ii) the reflection underway on the potential modernisation of the system for enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU as set out in Regulation (EC) No 1/2003; iii) the simplification of the rules for notifying mergers between businesses that appear at first glance to be unproblematic from the point of view of competition and can be authorised in Phase 1.

2.6.

A further relevant development mentioned above concerns the entry into force, starting on October 2023, of the notification obligations under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR), which was introduced to address market distortions caused by public subsidies granted to certain undertakings outside the European Union.

2.7.

Finally, it is worth noting that the report on competitiveness presented by Mario Draghi on 9 September confirms that current competition rules have maintained a good level of competition within the European market, playing a fundamental role in this respect. However, these same rules could be progressively adapted in order to both ensure the competitiveness of European companies on the global scene, and take into adequate consideration the evolving structure of several digital service markets.

3. General and specific comments

3.1.

The EESC stresses the importance of the work done by the European Commission in 2023 on the communication on a crucial concept of competition law, namely relevant markets. The concept of ‘relevant product market’ and ‘relevant geographical market’ plays a fundamental role in relation both to cases of abuse of a dominant position and to the analysis of mergers between undertakings and State aid control.

3.2.

The previous (1997) communication on relevant markets has been appropriately adapted to an economic and technological situation that has changed, especially in terms of digitalisation. The adapted definition of ‘relevant market’ makes the Commission’s approach more modern, especially with regard to digital markets and markets with significant investment in research and development.

3.3.

As already stated in previous opinions, the EESC has welcomed the Commission’s adoption and subsequent extensions of the State aid Temporary Frameworks for first the COVID crisis and then the Ukraine crisis. The Temporary Frameworks have been fundamental in supporting European undertakings, and especially small and medium-sized enterprises, during two consecutive, unprecedented periods of economic downturn.

3.4.

The EESC notes the extraordinary speed with which the European Commission originally adopted the decisions authorising aid schemes in the most acute phase of the COVID crisis and the administrative efficiency also shown during 2023, when as many as 220 decisions were adopted under the Ukraine Temporary Crisis Framework (TCF) and Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework (TCTF), although aid granted by Member States had fallen sharply compared to the initial phase of the application of the temporary frameworks.

3.5.

At the same time, the EESC takes note of the fact that, as has been pointed out by several parties, the considerable flexibility allowed in the application of State aid rules may lead to distortions of competition between undertakings from different Member States, thereby possibly undermining the consolidation of the single market.

3.6.

The EESC therefore considers that TCTFs should be thoroughly evaluated in order to decide whether it would be appropriate to phase them out in 2025, as currently planned, or if it could be useful to incorporate some of their elements that have proved to be beneficial for the green transition into the regular State aid rules, especially as concerns procedural improvements.

3.7.

Reading the Competition Policy Report, we see that data on State aid granted under the two recent temporary frameworks highlights a concentration of aid provision by some Member States. However, the same analysis shows that the aid approved under the temporary frameworks was proportionate to the harm caused by the crisis. The aid was spent differently across the EU, firstly, because the harm relating to the war in Ukraine was not felt uniformly across the Member States; secondly, owing to the differences in fiscal capacity between Member States; and, finally, owing to the fact that Member States have been affected differently by the energy crisis.

3.8.

The EESC notes the need to reflect on how to preserve the single market, avoiding harmful distortion of competition, while at the same time ensuring that European undertakings are competitive worldwide. This would include, as necessary, appropriate adjustments following targeted supporting measures implemented by other global players, such as the Inflation Reduction Act adopted in the United States.

3.9.

On this specific point, the EESC calls on the Commission and all the European institutions to reflect on two important parts of the Much More Than a Market report drawn up by Enrico Letta on behalf of the Council and published on 17 April 2024. This report notes that ‘We should develop bold and innovative solutions that strike a balance between, on the one hand, the need to quickly mobilise national targeted public support for industry, in so far as it addresses in a proportionate way market failures, and, on the other hand, the need to prevent the fragmentation the single market [...]. A way to overcome this dilemma could be to balance stricter enforcement of State aid at national level and the progressive expansion of EU-level funding support. Specifically, we could envision a State aid contribution mechanism, requiring Member States to allocate part of their national funding to the financing of pan-European initiatives and investments.’ The establishment of a pan-European State aid sovereign fund might prove to be beneficial both in preserving social cohesion and in ensuring the proper functioning of the single market.

3.10.

The EESC welcomes the adjustment of the thresholds for de minimis aid granted for both the ordinary sectors and services of general economic interest, from EUR 200 000 to EUR 300 000 and from EUR 500 000 to EUR 750 000 over three years, respectively. The de miminis threshold was also increased for the ‘fisheries and aquaculture’ sector in October 2023 (from EUR 30 000 to EUR 40 000 over 3 years) by Regulation (EU) No 2023/2391. The adjustment of the ceilings, introduced by the Commission on account of past inflation and inflation forecast for the coming years, had long been requested by European undertakings and is therefore welcome. The EESC also supports the transition, from 2026 onwards, towards a national register of aid in the Member States, and hopes that this register can gradually ensure both greater legal certainty for administrations and smaller compliance burdens for European undertakings.

3.11.

The EESC welcomes the targeted amendment to the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) adopted in June 2023 to simplify and speed up support for the green and digital transitions. That said, the EESC believes that State aid rules should also encourage a third, no less important transition – social transition. We therefore call on the Commission to conduct an in-depth reflection on another significant point in Enrico Letta’s internal market report, which states that ‘In order to realise the full potential of the social economy, several policy measures need to be considered. First, we need to facilitate access to finance for social economy players throughout their life cycle. This could include adapting the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) for State aid to social enterprises and reassessing the rules on aid for the recruitment of disadvantaged workers.’

3.12.

The EESC encourages the Commission to continue exploring a possible amendment of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 and its implementing act Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 in order to continue to secure the original objectives of these regulations, which were adopted in the early 2000s to make the application of competition rules more uniform and more efficient. More than 20 years after moving to a decentralised system for the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU replacing the previous centralised pre-notification system under Regulation No 17/62 (4), a reflection on modernisation – taking into account the current set-up of digitalised markets and the increasing complexity of antitrust investigations – is therefore justified and certainly positive.

3.13.

As for the current legal framework regarding the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU, the EESC notes that the annual Competition Report does not focus deeply on the relationship between leniency applications and cartel cases. Given the recent trends indicating a decline in the number of leniency claims in the last few years, this issue should hopefully be addressed in the 2025 report (even though leniency cases have slightly increased recently). Market sharing, customer allocation, and bid rigging are significant obstacles to both free competition and economic growth, and leniency programmes have been very useful in uncovering cartels in the past, until the decline in leniency applications seen in recent years. Such a decline is possibly due to the increased facilitation of ‘competition law private enforcement’, which possibly reduces leniency incentives in the first place.

3.14.

The EESC supports the entry into force of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) as of May 2023, which harmonises the obligations of gatekeepers across the EU with the dual aim of making the digital sector more contestable and reducing unfair practices in the online platform sector. Specialised legislation for the sector, such as the DMA, therefore has a role to play that complements the enforcement of antitrust rules, making the legal framework more effective for the benefit of the single market and the well-being of end-users.

3.15.

A further positive development is the simplification package for the review of what appear at first glance to be unproblematic mergers, which reduces the amount of information required to notify transactions as of 1 September 2023. The changes to the rules appear to be proportionate and efficient, as they reduce the compliance burden on undertakings and the administrative burden on competition authorities for cases which are not critically detrimental to competition.

3.16.

The EESC points out that the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, which entered into force in early 2023 and has had a dedicated implementing regulation since July 2023, could possibly close a regulatory gap, providing the regulatory framework and legal bases needed to tackle aid granted by countries outside the EU that could distort competition, harming the competitiveness of the single market and its undertakings.

3.17.

Finally, the EESC notes that competition is not always possible, especially in some markets and some rural or peripheral areas, where the scarcity of resources and profitability brings about market inefficiencies (if not market failures), resulting in a significant social impact that should be better considered and measured. This is the case, for instance, with growing energy poverty in some areas, or the lack of fundamental services in some rural areas. Such market inefficiency conditions should be taken into account with regard to their impact on social cohesion.

Brussels, 23 October 2024.

The President

of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

(1) Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/2391 of 4 October 2023 amending Regulations (EU) No 717/2014, (EU) No 1407/2013, (EU) No 1408/2013 and (EU) No 360/2012 as regards de minimis aid for the processing and marketing of fishery and aquaculture products, and Regulation (EU) No 717/2014 as regards the total amount of de minimis aid granted to a single undertaking, its period of application and other matters (OJ L, 2023/2391, 5.10.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2391/oj).

(2) Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance) ( OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1).

(3) Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (Text with EEA relevance) ( OJ L 123, 27.4.2004, p. 18).

(4) EEC Council: Regulation No 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty (OJ 13, 21.2.1962, p. 204).

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/118/oj

ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)

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