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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Communication from the Commission on Nuclear Illustrative Programme presented under Article 40 of the Euratom Treaty for the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee (COM(2025) 315 – final)

EESC 2025/02173

OJ C, C/2026/883, 27.2.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/883/oj (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, GA, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/883/oj

Date of document:: 04/12/2025; Date of vote
Date of vote:: 04/12/2025
Date lodged:: 13/06/2025

Author:: European Economic and Social Committee
Responsible body:: Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society, EESC_TEN
Rapporteur:: Dumitru FORNEA
Co-rapporteur:: Alena MASTANTUONO
Form:: Opinion
Internal reference:: AVIS-SECTION 2025/2173 FIN, TEN/856
Session:: 601

Treaty:

Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community

Legal basis:

12016A040

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Earlier related instruments:

52025DC0315 ESC Opinion

Instruments cited:

EUROVOC descriptor:

Subject matter:

Nuclear common market

Directory code:

15.10.20.10 Environment, consumers and health protection / Environment / Pollution and nuisances / Nuclear safety and radioactive waste

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C/2026/883

27.2.2026

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee

Communication from the Commission on Nuclear Illustrative Programme presented under Article 40 of the Euratom Treaty for the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee

(COM(2025) 315 – final)

(C/2026/883)

Rapporteur:

Dumitru FORNEA

Co-rapporteur:

Alena MASTANTUONO

Advisors	Véronique CHAPPELART (to the rapporteur, Group II) Yves MARIGNAC (to Group III)
Referral	European Commission, 13.6.2025
Legal basis	Article 40 of the Euratom Treaty
Section responsible	Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society
Adopted in section	12.11.2025
Adopted at plenary session	4.12.2025
Plenary session No	601
Outcome of vote (for/against/abstentions)	197/45/33

1. Conclusions and recommendations

1.1.

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) believes that the role of nuclear energy plays and will continue to play a crucial role in decarbonising the European continent, especially given that the European Union (EU) needs to consolidate its strategic autonomy in the fields of energy and technology.

1.2.

The EESC regrets the lack of any thorough assessment meant to determine the causes preventing the ambitious investments stipulated in the previous Nuclear Illustrative Programme (PINC) from being delivered. It therefore calls on the European Commission to include in the PINC regulatory and financial measures supporting the planned investments. The goal is to promote the development of innovative fuel cycle facilities and propose specific figures on the investments required by the nuclear fuel cycle. This is more necessary than ever given the geopolitical turmoil which is forcing the EU to develop EU-based capacities, and consequently the nuclear value chain should be supported in terms of skills, research and the fuel supply chain.

1.3.

The EESC recommends that the same facilities apply to investments in the nuclear energy sector as they do to renewables. The nuclear energy and renewables complement each other, and the Member States are responsible for choosing their own energy mix.

1.4.

The EESC recommends speeding up investment through specific measures, such as a streamlined State aid process and fiscal measures, licensing processes and faster decisions at EU and national level. It also calls for the PINC to include a commitment to open up access to EU cohesion funds when Member States choose so and long-term financing.

1.5.

The EESC considers that dialogue with civil society is pivotal in building trust, ownership and societal acceptance. It highlights that decisions on new projects in the nuclear sector, including the development of new technologies, should be taken following the outcome of a broad and transparent dialogue with civil society on the technical, economic, social and environmental aspects. Regretfully, there is no funding available for meaningful civil society participation on these matters.

1.6.

The EESC recommends including hydrogen in the PINC, as this low-carbon energy source can also be produced by the nuclear sector and offer an alternative solution, diversifying supply pathways, reducing dependence on fossil-based hydrogen and strengthening sector coupling between energy, industry and transport.

1.7.

It also recommends taking into account the role played by nuclear energy in stabilising the grid and calls for a calculation of systemic costs avoided thanks to nuclear energy to be added to the PINC. It draws the European Commission´s attention to the fact that use of the measure of Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) in its calculations is biased against long-lived, capital-intensive technologies and the exclusion of systemic costs and security aspects.

1.8.

The EESC takes note of the recommendations issued by the EU SMR Industrial Alliance and asks the European Commission to consider them in the PINC and relevant legislative proposals. It also recommends that the Commission propose in the PINC ways and means to enhance cooperation among Member States in the field of Small Modular Reactors (SMR).

1.9.

The EESC calls for the PINC to be updated more frequently in line with the National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs), given the importance of the sector in the EU’s decarbonisation.

2. Background

2.1.

Communication COM(2025) 315 final refers to the 2025 Nuclear Illustrative Programme (PINC 2025) presented by the European Commission on 13 June 2025 under Article 40 of the Euratom Treaty for the opinion of the EESC. It outlines the role and trajectory of nuclear energy in the EU’s decarbonisation, energy competitiveness and security plans up to 2050. It serves as a vision for the nuclear sector in the EU’s energy policy.

2.2.

It positions nuclear energy as a critical clean energy source for some EU Member States, providing reliable baseload electricity that facilitates further integration of renewables and supports decarbonisation efforts.

2.3.

Article 40 of the Euratom Treaty states that in the nuclear field, the Commission shall periodically publish illustrative programmes indicating in particular nuclear energy production targets and the investments required, including information on effective decommissioning, the circular economy and responsible waste management, and shall obtain the opinion of the EESC before their publication. Since 1958, six PINCs have been published, the last one being in 2016. This clearly fails to comply with the aim declared in the 2007 PINC: to ‘increase the frequency of publication of the Nuclear Illustrative Programme’ (1).

2.4.

In accordance with TFEU Article 194, Member States have the right to determine the conditions for exploiting their energy resources, to choose between different energy sources and to determine the general structure of their energy supply, while avoiding imposing undue burdens on future generations. EU and Euratom energy policy should facilitate those decisions while maintaining EU and Euratom policy goals, such as climate neutrality by 2050, as set out in the European Climate Law, facilitating investment and ensuring the establishment of basic installations needed for the development of nuclear energy in the Community, as set out in the Euratom Treaty.

2.5.

EU policy-making requires a clear, analytical process and methodology which can offer a coherent framework for national decision-making. The PINC potentially offers an opportunity to do this for those Member States considering nuclear energy, as well as for those who already have nuclear energy and are planning to expand it.

2.6.

The 2025 PINC points out that EU-wide installed nuclear large capacity reactors could reach up to 144 Gigawatt electric (GWe) by 2050, with a base scenario estimated at 109 GWe, provided there is timely investment and nuclear reactor lifetime extensions. This scenario more or less reflects the goal of 150 GWe of installed nuclear capacity in the EU by 2050 set by the Nuclear Alliance of 16 EU Member States.

2.7.

EUR 241 billion in present value of overall investment has been estimated as necessary to make these capacity aims a reality by 2050, plus an additional EUR 300 billion for the overall EU-wide management of all radioactive waste. Emphasis is being placed on the full nuclear lifecycle: from extending the life of existing plants to constructing new large-scale reactors to safe decommissioning and disposal.

2.8.

The development and deployment of SMRs is a key focus, with the potential to reach up to 53 GWe by 2050. PINC 2025 brings a strong focus on innovation, including the European Industrial Alliance on SMRs, which aims at early 2030 commercial deployment of this technology. It states that a dedicated EU Fusion Strategy will back ITER and prioritise the acceleration of commercial fusion through public-private partnerships.

2.9.

Different SMR designs are suited to different applications: some are optimised for electricity generation only, others for cogeneration of electricity and heat (CHP), and others primarily for supplying high-temperature heat for industry or district heating. This diversity should be recognised as a strength, since it allows SMRs to contribute not only to grid decarbonisation but also to industrial competitiveness and heating decarbonisation. Moreover, SMRs can be operated flexibly, particularly when integrated with thermal energy storage or with Power-to-X (PtX) systems for hydrogen and synthetic fuels. This flexibility could make them a valuable complement to variable renewable sources in a balanced European energy mix.

2.10.

At the end of 2024, there were 101 nuclear reactors operating across 12 Member States (2). Their installed net capacity totalled about 98 GWe. In 2023, nuclear energy provided 22,8 % of the EU’s electricity generation (3). The reactor fleet in the EU includes three new units recently connected to the grid and three more under construction (4); a number of new units are being considered in nuclear programmes under development in some Member States (5).

2.11.

The European nuclear industry sustains more than 1,1 million jobs in the EU (6). The nuclear value chain is a significant economic sector with a major footprint in terms of jobs, supply chain capacity and advanced R&D. It is a net-zero value chain based almost entirely in the EU.

3. General comments

3.1.

The 2025 Nuclear Illustrative Program (PINC) provides an updated overview of Member States’ plans for nuclear energy under Article 40 of the Euratom Treaty. It estimates total investment needs in a base case scenario of net electricity generation capacity from large-scale nuclear reactors without small modular reactors of approximately EUR 241 billion by 2050, projecting an increase of 12 000 MW in EU nuclear capacity. Although intended as a descriptive rather than prescriptive document, the PINC raises several issues regarding feasibility, cost, and alignment with broader EU energy objectives.

The economic rationale of large-scale nuclear investment requires careful analysis including the benefits of providing carbon-free baseload energy and stabilising the grid and on the other hand the record of cost overruns and delays in recent projects. New projects require significant public and private financing. The impact of subsidy schemes such as contracts for difference should be taken into account when assessing the potential of new built nuclear power stations to reduce electricity prices.

The commercial readiness of Small and Advanced Modular Reactors is still uncertain. If successfully scaled, SMRs and AMRs can provide benefits such as serial production and faster deployment.

The growth outlook depends on delivery schedules that are exceeded based on the past European experience. Attention should be paid into overcoming challenges in supply chains, skilled labour, and fuel-cycle resilience in order not to undermine confidence in execution.

Moreover, as overall EU-wide management of all existing and future radioactive waste is estimated to cost EUR 300 billion in total, long-term waste management and decommissioning frameworks are financially challenging. This underlines the need to maintain robust long-term funding schemes, such as nuclear waste management funds, to ensure potential future liabilities are not unaccounted for.

Overall, the PINC’s calculation might not be met because of different challenges stated above.

That’s why the EESC asks the European Commission to

—	Strengthen evidence-based assessment – Ensure investment, technology, and capacity projections are supported by transparent, independently verified data and sensitivity analyses.

—	Prioritise cost-effectiveness – Systematically compare nuclear investment with other low-carbon technologies to identify the most efficient pathways toward EU climate targets.

—	Address structural bottlenecks – Develop coordinated measures to continue to decrease the nuclear supply chain dependence on Russia, without creating one elsewhere, and train skilled personnel.

—	Clarify waste and decommissioning frameworks – Integrate realistic cost planning and liability management into long-term investment strategies.

—	Ensure policy coherence – Align nuclear planning with the Clean Industrial Deal and REPowerEU objectives to develop a cost-effective technology-neutral approach to energy security and decarbonisation.

3.2.

The EESC welcomes the fact that the 2025 PINC underscores the potential for nuclear energy to provide low-carbon electricity and heat for households and industry, as well as to advance the production of medical radio-isotopes (7) and to ensure the flexibility and stability of the energy grid. However, it regrets that it does not propose specific enablers and lacks a real action plan. It calls on the European Commission to propose support measures for the investment planned under the PINC, to establish or promote the development of innovative fuel cycle facilities and to propose specific figures on the investment to be made in the nuclear fuel cycle. It stresses the importance of an integrated fuel cycle and the development of EU-based capacities for the EU’s decarbonisation, as well as security for this decarbonisation.

3.3.

The 2025 PINC concludes that, since the last PINC was published in 2017, ‘the Commission has not observed a significant change in envisaged investment amounts’: it does not appear to be consistent with the 2025 PINC’s projections of installed capacity, which reach the opposite conclusion. The Commission’s analysis should not be limited by formal requirements such as reliance only on final National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs), but should take into account the broader picture. The EESC points out that the amount of investments mentioned in PINC hardly reflects the level of ambition.

3.4.

The 2025 PINC illustrates the development potential of nuclear energy, confirming its contribution to the energy transition and its key role in energy systems. It is therefore necessary that it be clearly confirmed that nuclear energy is one of the target sources of the energy transition and one of the key elements of a net-zero economy, providing secure, dispatchable energy supplies at competitive and affordable prices. Nuclear energy should be treated as a target energy source, not a transitional one. Therefore, appropriate adjustments should be made in EU policy, including in the taxonomy regulation.

3.5.

The EESC considers that:

3.5.1.

Nuclear energy is a key element in diversifying the EU’s energy supply because it delivers safe, low-carbon and reliable electricity. This ensures the grid remains stable most of the time, regardless of the weather or time of day, with less pressure on systemic costs. Economic analysis, when it integrates full costs (system costs), demonstrates the major financial value of developing nuclear power within the mix. Reference studies (IEA, RTE, Fraunhofer, Lazard, IRENA, Bloomberg) converge on this point: a diversified mix including nuclear is more competitive than a 100 % renewable mix. Integrating nuclear power helps limit the additional costs linked to storage and grid oversizing. In the absence of a dispatchable base, the higher the share of variable energies, the more the cost of the energy needed to bridge periods of low production tends toward an ‘infinite price’. Nuclear power acts as insurance against this cost explosion during periods of system stress.

3.5.2.

The EU must imperatively anticipate a massive ‘cliff effect’ regarding its dispatchable power over the 2040-2050 decade. Projections indicate the scheduled closure of nearly 200 GW of conventional thermal power and 80 GW of existing nuclear power. This structural deficit is aggravated by the growing vulnerability of hydropower to climate change and by the increased occurrence of ‘Dunkleflaute’ episodes (periods with neither wind nor sun). The EESC highlights it is vital to compensate for these approximately 300 GW of missing dispatchable power. No electrical system – let alone one supporting an industry that requires a very high quality of supply – can do without dispatchable power. As highlighted by RTE, falling below the 40 % threshold of dispatchable power in the mix would cause us to ‘enter a risk zone’, exposing Europe to blackouts and unsustainable price volatility.

3.5.3.

It bolsters resilience against supply disruptions, complements renewables and reduces dependence on imported fuels, all essential for the EU’s climate, competitiveness and security goals (8). A rigorous control of EU’s vulnerabilities requires the maintenance of an incompressible baseline of dispatchable power (primarily nuclear and hydropower). While projections for 2050 count on a nuclear capacity of approximately 110 GW within a total fleet of about 2 500 GW, this volume – although modest in terms of installed capacity – is critical in terms of systemic value. Beyond mere production, the European power system cannot function without the essential services provided by these plants: inertia (via rotating machines), which is indispensable for frequency stability, and capacity guarantees.

3.5.4.

By serving as a dependable electricity source, nuclear energy can complement the growth of renewables, smoothing fluctuations and supporting further integration of clean energy sources into the system. Nuclear energy can also provide existing EU industries (steel, cement, chemicals, etc.) as well as new industries (such as data centres) with a constant stream of decarbonised electricity. It can therefore play an important role in supporting the EU’s overall industrial transition.

3.5.5.

Member States should send recent updates to the European Commission in order to provide a clear picture of the current situation. Indeed, some national plans have not been reflected in the PINC, and the role of candidate countries is also to be considered – in terms of crisis preparedness, alternative fuels, shared facilities (such as for radioactive waste management – RWM) and construction plans. Ukraine, with its nuclear expertise, could increase the PINC plans for total net capacity by 24 GWe to 186 GWe by 2050.

3.5.6.

Chapter 4.2 of the 2025 PINC refers to growth of intermittent energy capacity accompanied by substantial grid investment needs and networks management costs. The EESC considers that the deployment of nuclear energy could reduce these investment needs and costs, if incentives and support mechanisms are also made available for nuclear installations. The PINC should emphasise this, list specific mitigation opportunities (new energy sources, networks, accumulation, ancillary services and system resilience) and take into account the impact of different energy sources on systemic costs of the network.

3.5.7.

It is deplorable that hydrogen production has been completely omitted from Chapter 5 in the 2025 PINC, especially in relation to current European discussions on low-carbon hydrogen. In the EESC’s view, green hydrogen projects have not yet been sufficiently developed in Europe; they lag far behind expected development levels. In particular, nuclear energy should be explicitly recognised as a strategic contributor to Europe’s hydrogen economy.

3.5.8.

Beyond electricity-driven electrolysis, advanced reactors can supply high-temperature steam electrolysis or even thermochemical cycles, which offer higher efficiencies and lower costs. Linking nuclear energy generation to hydrogen production would diversify supply pathways, reduce dependence on fossil-based hydrogen, and strengthen sector coupling between energy, industry and transport. The PINC should therefore include nuclear-enabled hydrogen as a priority option alongside renewable-based hydrogen.

3.5.9.

Integrating circular economy principles into radioactive waste management (RWM) practices is no longer optional. By embracing reprocessing, recycling and trailblazing technologies, such as transmutation, the EU could reduce both the long-term risk and the footprint of radioactive waste. This should feature more prominently in the PINC.

3.5.10.

Where this option is not possible for financial, societal or technological reasons, long-term disposal solutions should be established, including deep geological repositories. The European Commission should therefore financially support research, development and demonstration of advanced waste-reduction options, including partitioning and transmutation of long-lived isotopes. These technologies could significantly reduce the volume and radiotoxicity of final waste streams. Given that not all Member States can develop geological repositories independently, the PINC should explore options for shared or multinational disposal solutions, ensuring equitable access to safe and secure waste management across the Union, as detailed in TEN/842 ‘Radioactive waste management: a civil society perspective’.

3.6. The EESC firmly believes that nuclear energy supports energy security, independence and crisis resilience because:

3.6.1.

It reduces dependence on fuel imports. The EU is heavily reliant on energy imports, especially fossil fuels. Nuclear energy reduces this dependence because fuel can be stockpiled for years, reducing exposure to volatile external suppliers (9).

3.6.2.

While uranium is mostly imported, nuclear energy is considered almost a form of ‘indigenous’ supply, since the EU can cover a significant share of the conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication stages. This makes it strategically important for safeguarding energy sovereignty.

3.6.3.

Nuclear energy has proven its value in energy crises by maintaining steady energy generation when other sources have become unreliable or expensive. However, it does not benefit from tax exemptions as do renewables and, in some cases, even fossil fuels.

3.6.4.

Investing in nuclear energy supports a robust, safe, technologically advanced European supply chain, contributing to broader economic resilience. Nevertheless, it should provide competitive and predictable prices over the long term, cushioning against fossil fuel price shocks. If these new reactors could be financially and technically feasible, repurposing retiring coal power plant sites for SMR deployment could be considered as part of the just transition, supporting regional development while leveraging existing grid connections and skilled labour pools.

3.6.5.

Facing the ‘investment wall’ in power grids (EUR 1 500 to EUR 2 000 billion by 2050 according to the IEA and the EC), nuclear power offers a unique optimisation opportunity. These colossal investments aim to modernise the grid and connect new, dispersed capacities. In this context, Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) represent a rational solution for territorial planning. By deploying these SMRs on the sites of former fossil fuel thermal plants (coal/gas), Europe could capitalise on pre-existing connection infrastructure. This site reuse strategy (‘repowering’) saves substantial connection costs and avoids the construction of new high-voltage lines, thereby reducing the overall bill of the transition.

3.7. The EESC sees nuclear energy as helping to achieve the decarbonisation commitment, since:

3.7.1.

It generates about a quarter of the EU’s total electricity and nearly half of its carbon-free electricity, making it critical for achieving climate targets and replacing fossil-based generation; and the EU’s climate and electrification strategies depend on a diverse mix of renewables and nuclear energy to decarbonise energy systems cost-effectively and reliably.

3.7.2.

The above frameworks should, in particular, incorporate the principle of technological neutrality (and thus treat nuclear energy and renewables equally, in a way that takes into account their respective characteristics). This approach would be consistent with Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council (10), the Net-Zero Industry Act.

3.7.3.

Moreover, in order to ensure that nuclear energy can develop in line with its potential and make a full contribution to the energy transition, the EU’s climate and energy policy targets should fully reflect the aforementioned technological neutrality principle. Here, consideration should be given to reaching the 2050 target with all low-carbon resources available in line with Member States’ competence to define their domestic energy mix.

3.8.

The EESC considers that, to fulfil its purpose, the PINC should be accompanied by a set of measures, such as:

—	implementing the principle of technological neutrality in all EU policies, for instance in future EU policy measures on hydrogen and electrification, and in the above-mentioned 2040 framework;

—	proposing how Net-Zero Industry Act provisions and future Important Projects of Common European Interest on innovative nuclear technologies can contribute to strengthening the EU supply chain and continuously work to enhance and expand its capacities and capabilities;

—	enhancing regulatory cooperation between Member States, particularly in the field of SMRs;

—	improving nuclear financing, through long-term sustainable financing and financial institutions such as the European Investment Bank, and through access to EU funding such as research & development and waste management;

—	supporting the nuclear value chain, in terms of skills, research and the fuel supply chain, as well as key initiatives relating to the sector, such as the SMR Industrial Alliance;

—	supporting research and innovation through international cooperation research programmes (11);

—	drafting technical proposals for the adoption of widely recognised codes and standards for SMRs in order to simplify the exchange of technology between the EU Member States. Creating a framework for SMR demonstration pilot projects and work on common standardisation;

—	fostering the development and value chain of medical radioisotopes through EU projects and cooperation and supporting the European Radioisotopes Valley Initiative project; and

—	speeding up investment through specific measures (e.g., a streamlined State aid process for nuclear projects, more efficient licensing processes), without distinguishing between old and new power plants.

3.9.

The EESC suggests updating the PINC more frequently, since the importance of the sector is growing, as demonstrated by recent Member State decisions (extending the lifespan of nuclear power plants, returning to the use of nuclear energy and building new nuclear capacity in Member States with and without nuclear energy).

3.10.

While 62,37 % of the EU population supports nuclear energy according to a survey compiling polls across the Member States (12), the EESC considers that dialogue with civil society – which is important for building trust, ownership and societal acceptance – is not covered in detail by the PINC. Some environmental NGOs express their concerns about future deployment of nuclear energy. Public engagement and dialogue with civil society are essential to ensure that energy strategies reflect societal priorities such as sustainability, reliability, land-use and responsibility for long-term waste management. This early involvement strengthens trust and legitimacy for nuclear energy alongside other low-carbon technologies.

Brussels, 4 December 2025.

The President

of the European Economic and Social Committee

Séamus BOLAND

(1) ‘Development of nuclear energy will need to be governed in line with the rest of EU energy policy (…) In order to provide a more regular updated picture of the situation in the EU, the Commission will – in accordance with Article 40 of the Euratom Treaty – increase the frequency of publication of the Nuclear Illustrative Programmes.’ – p. 24.

(2) Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Spain, France, Hungary, Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia (Croatia), Slovakia, Finland and Sweden.

(3) Slight increase in nuclear power production in 2023 – News articles – Eurostat.

(4) Mochovce 3 in Slovakia was connected to the grid in January 2023; Olkiluoto 3 in Finland started commercial operations in May 2023; and Flamanville 3 in France was connected to the grid in December 2024. One reactor in Slovakia (Mochovce 4) and two others in Hungary (Paks II) are under construction.

(5) Including Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, France, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden.

(6) Impact Report – Vision to 2050, prepared by Deloitte for Foratom, April 2019.

(7) Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan: Driving forces for the security of medical radioisotopes supply (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C, C/2024/4661, 9.8.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4661/oj).

(8) https://www.europeanfiles.eu/energy/current-and-future-contributions-of-nuclear-energy-to-energy-security.

(9) https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/european-union.

(10) Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology manufacturing ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724 (OJ L, 2024/1735, 28.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1735/oj).

(11) Proposal for a Regulation establishing Horizon Europe 2028-2034, COM (2025) 543 final, 3 16 July 2025.

(12) Except Lithuania, Luxembourg and Malta where polls were not found. https://www.voicesofnuclear.org/campaigns/open-letter-to-the-new-european-commission-and-parliament/.

ANNEX

Annex to the opinion of the Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society

LEGISLATIVE FOOTPRINT

LIST OF INTEREST REPRESENTATIVES FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

The following list is drawn up on a purely voluntary basis under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur and co-rapporteur. The rapporteur and co-rapporteur have received input from the following interest representatives (organisations and/or self-employed individuals) in the preparation of the TEN/856 Nuclear Illustrative Programme:

Organisations and/or self-employed individuals

Chalmers

EDF

Framatome

Institut Terrawater

Nucleareurope

ORANO

weCARe

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/883/oj

ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)

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