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Приети on 18/06/2026 - Bureau decision date: 20/01/2026Референтен номерREX/614-EESC-2026Opinion TypeOptionalCommission ReferencesPlenary session number606-18Jun2026
European Economic
and Social Committee
Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council strengthening EU economic security (JOIN(2025) 977 final)
Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council strengthening EU economic security (JOIN(2025) 977 final)
Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council strengthening EU economic security (JOIN(2025) 977 final)
EESC 2026/00590
OJ C, C/2026/4658, 23.9.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/4658/oj (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, GA, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)
| Official Journal | EN C series |
| C/2026/4658 | 23.9.2026 |
Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee
Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council strengthening EU economic security
(JOIN(2025) 977 final)
(C/2026/4658)
Rapporteur:
Milena ANGELOVA| Advisors | Tellervo KYLÄ-HARAKKA-RUONALA (to the rapporteur) Anna COLOMBO (to Group III) |
| Legislative procedure | |
| Referral | European Commission, 14.1.2026 |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| European Commission documents | (JOIN(2025) 977 final) |
| Relevant Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) | |
| Section responsible | External Relations |
| Adopted in section | 22.5.2026 |
| Adopted at plenary session | 17.6.2026 |
| Plenary session No | 606 |
| Outcome of vote (for/against/abstentions) | 180/0/1 |
1. RECOMMENDATIONS
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE (EESC):
| 1.1. | considers economic security (see 2.2-2.3 about the concept) to be a crucial objective of the EU and calls for urgent and integrated action across policy fields, particularly innovation, energy, transport, digital, industrial, economic, trade and international partnership policies, not forgetting the contribution of education, employment and social policies; this requires close and results-oriented and cross-sectoral cooperation, clear allocation of responsibilities and effective coordination between the EU and national levels; |
| 1.2. | points out the increasingly close links between economic security and the other policy dimensions of comprehensive security and highlights the need for the EU to prepare for multiplied risks by strengthening its global role on the basis of a strong economy, solid defence capacity, democratic resilience, effective diplomatic capabilities for conflict resolution and prevention, and cooperation with like-minded third countries to promote geopolitical stability; |
| 1.3. | appreciates the efforts to better address the identified high-risk areas but finds it crucial to also focus on horizontal high-impact measures, such as improving the EU’s overall competitiveness, investment attractiveness and resilience, and enhancing the openness of both the internal and external markets, recognising its specific importance to small economies and making a clear distinction between low- and high-risk dependencies; |
| 1.4. | emphasises the role of strong internal economic foundations, notably macroeconomic stability, solid innovation and production capacity and a well-functioning single market, in line with the EU social market economy model, and including social dialogue foundations, as strategic enablers of economic security, and calls for measures to nurture a more favourable environment in which EU companies can innovate, invest, employ, produce and trade, and everyone can benefit from economic growth; |
| 1.5. | highlights the need for a substantial increase in private and public investment and financing in order to strengthen the EU’s economy and its security, covering research and innovation to full-scale deployment and production, and calls for action to be taken to decisively enhance the EU’s financial markets and to integrate economic security as a guiding objective in mobilising public and private funding in a way that encourages innovation and investment in better economic security, in line with social and environmental objectives, including social dialogue foundations; |
| 1.6. | calls for measures to facilitate the development of a strong, innovative and diverse production and technological base, by improving secure access to all key inputs, including critical raw materials and affordable and clean energy, and by boosting the development of labour-market-compatible skills and competences, and top-tier know-how in key technologies such as AI and life-science-based solutions, along with targeted and proportionate measures to strengthen critical or strategic sectors and to ensure a just transition for workers, citizens and businesses alike; |
| 1.7. | emphasises the need to ensure the security and sustainability of supply chains and infrastructure as an integrated whole and calls for the removal of the single market barriers for goods and services and for the safeguarding of all types of infrastructure, including energy, water, transport and digital infrastructure, through an appropriate combination of private and public action to secure and enable the vital functions of the economy and society; |
| 1.8. | considers it imperative for the EU to continue strengthening and widening its international trade relations with reliable partners, aiming at opening and expanding export markets for European businesses, including SMEs, and diversifying and de-risking import sources, while implementing all action points from the EC communication The power of trade partnerships, and at the same time promoting an open, sustainable and rules-based multilateral trade system; |
| 1.9. | encourages the EU to proactively establish new and mutually beneficial international partnerships in areas such as natural resources, technology and infrastructure, and the clean and digital transition, ensuring that such partnerships contribute to economic security and sustainable development, while actively enhancing multilateralism and sustainable global progress through the UN system; |
| 1.10. | calls for more robust, structured and meaningful involvement of social partners, civil society organisations and academic institutions, in an advisory role in the development and implementation of economic security policies and measures, thereby ensuring better understanding of the practical needs and constraints and a broader-based legitimacy of the reforms. |
2. EXPLANATORY NOTES
Horizontal aspects (definition and approach)
| 2.1. | Economic security has not been clearly defined in the Communication, but it has been considered from the point of view of tools and measures to better identify, assess and manage risks in certain high-risk areas. |
| 2.2. | In this opinion, economic security is considered to be the EU’s preparedness, resilience and response capacity to address a diversity of risks and disruptions caused by geopolitical and geoeconomic developments to the EU economy, and consequently to people and society. |
| 2.3. | The EESC emphasises the need to strengthen the horizontal foundations of economic security, to better manage diverse and unprecedented risks. It also highlights that economic security must be grounded in effective and coherent governance and democratic oversight, and encompass the foundational values and core objectives of the EU, established by Articles 2 and 3 of TEU (1). |
R 1.1 (urgent and integrated action)
| 2.4. | Given the developments since the launch of the European economic security strategy in 2023 and considering the messages set out in the EESC opinion (2) on the strategy, it has become increasingly important to take urgent action to strengthen the EU’s economic security by completing and implementing the projects and processes going on in several policy fields and by embedding economic security as a central objective in all upcoming initiatives. |
| 2.5. | An integrated approach to economic security calls for close cross-sectoral cooperation within the political and administrative structures, as well as effective use of the wide range of tools and instruments, without creating additional bureaucracy. EU institutions should make the best possible use of existing information exchange and cooperation structures and mechanisms instead of creating new ones. For example, the EU SME envoy network should be tasked with devising and implementing an EU-level start-up monitoring mechanism. |
| 2.6. | More effective and results-oriented coordination between the EU and national levels is necessary to ensure coherent implementation of economic security measures in practice. Political unity, based on shared and clear priorities, is increasingly vital, given the need to cope with coercive and divisive foreign actions. |
R 1.2 (comprehensive security)
| 2.7. | In today’s world, it is necessary to consider the many links between economic security and other policy dimensions of comprehensive security, ranging from defence capacity to food, health, social and climate security. While economic security helps to enhance security in other fields, developments in other fields also affect and contribute to economic security. Both the possible multiplied risks and the positive synergies should be duly assessed and addressed in efforts to improve economic security. |
| 2.8. | The war in Ukraine and those in the Middle East imply serious consequences to economic security through disrupting energy supply and other supply chains and through increasing inflation. Economic security risks and threats, including economic coercion, are also used as a wider geopolitical tool by major global players, with the aim not only of affecting economic security but also of weakening rules-based multilateralism and liberal democracy and replacing them with power politics and transnational influence. |
| 2.9. | It is thus crucial for the EU to strengthen its efforts to be an influential global actor on the basis of a strong economy, solid defence capacity, unwavering democratic resilience and effective diplomatic capabilities for resolving conflicts, accompanied by cooperation with like-minded countries to promote peace, democratic values, international law and legal certainty. |
R 1.3 (high-impact measures)
| 2.10. | Preparedness for and better anticipation of economic security risks is an approach to be welcomed, instead of only reacting to realised risks. It is also appropriate to strive to focus on specific key risks. |
| 2.11. | However, the geopolitical and geo-economic environment is changing very quickly and is ever more unpredictable. This requires strengthening the general foundations of economic security, thereby addressing many kinds of risks simultaneously. To this end, a concerted effort should be focused on the ‘promotion’ pillar of economic security aiming to increase the EU’s overall competitiveness and resilience, especially through measures that are in the hands of the EU itself. |
| 2.12. | Likewise, proactive and ambitious measures are needed under the ‘partnering’ pillar of economic security with the aim of not only tackling risks but also creating and making use of opportunities through international trade and partnerships. This would require a systematic analysis of the EU’s strengths, linked to the opportunities that may be provided across the entire landscape of geopolitical, geo-economic, demographic and environmental developments. |
R 1.4 (internal economic foundations)
| 2.13. | The economic security of the EU is dependent on the strength of the overall economy, based on a solid innovation, technological and production capacity and an open and well-functioning internal market, as well as on macroeconomic and financial stability. Social cohesion and well-functioning labour markets and social dialogue are also important elements that contribute to economic security. Besides providing a domestic base for creating jobs and prosperity, the internal foundations also provide a springboard for external economic relations, including exports and international partnerships. |
| 2.14. | Achieving strong economic foundations requires a favourable operating environment for EU companies to innovate, invest, employ, produce and trade in, and for everyone to benefit from economic growth. In general, global competitiveness should be based on innovation and sound and fair competition rather than on public subsidies. Correspondingly, policy-makers should provide an enabling and encouraging policy framework, instead of intervening in business operations. |
R 1.5 (investment and financing)
| 2.15. | Strengthening the EU’s innovation, technological and production capacity requires a substantial increase in investments by both the private and the public sector. To realise these investments, the integration and functioning of the EU’s financial markets need to be significantly enhanced, including by developing the Savings and Investments Union. |
| 2.16. | Moreover, relevant EU funding, especially the ECF and Horizon Europe, should be used in a way that encourages innovation and investment in economic security. Public procurement and joint purchases, in turn, provide a demand-side tool to enhance markets for domestic products. At the same time, EU funding needs to follow transparent general award criteria that apply to all and link to innovation, social, and environmental objectives with incentives for companies to respect collective bargaining and comply with labour and environmental regulations. |
| 2.17. | EU funding should support the creation of thriving European innovation and business ecosystems and quality jobs and encourage cross-border cooperation, to anchor value creation, employment and key know-how in the EU. Specific attention needs to be paid to ensuring access to finance for innovative start-ups and scale-ups, to enable them to grow and stay in the EU and avoid predatory acquisitions. |
| 2.18. | Foreign investment should be considered as a complementary resource to provide added value to the EU economy and its security, while the risks associated with investment and technology cooperation with third parties need to be effectively managed. It is also necessary to ensure that distortive foreign subsidies are properly identified and addressed, including in small markets with smaller projects. |
R 1.6 (production and technological base)
| 2.19. | Domestic production capacity, together with the single market, is crucial for decreasing harmful dependencies and vulnerabilities. This requires secure access to all production resources, including energy, raw materials, data and capital. To make the best use of domestic natural resources, enabling conditions for exploiting critical minerals and other raw materials should be put in place. It is also crucial to strengthen water resilience and energy security, with due attention to their interdependences. Moreover, energy security should be enhanced together with the affordability and decarbonisation of energy, which requires improved energy efficiency, replacement of fossil fuels with renewables and other clean energy, and effective integration of the EU electricity market. |
| 2.20. | Access to skills and competencies, and ensuring a just transition, is one more element of economic security, considering the changing needs in the labour market. Lack of proper skills and talent poses a serious risk to the development of advanced technologies and production systems and to their implementation in practical work. |
| 2.21. | A resilient production base relies on a diverse business landscape comprising companies of different sizes operating across a range of sectors and in different markets. Favouring or promoting certain sectors or companies contradicts this view. Specific and targeted measures are however justified when necessary for securing the vital functions of the economy and society, including defence capacity and essential services. |
| 2.22. | The same goes for technological capacity. While the principle of technology neutrality should be followed in policy-making, strategic or critical technologies warrant specific efforts to achieve top-tier EU know-how. This applies, for example, to AI, quantum computing, biotechnology and other advanced technologies with a deep and broad impact throughout the economy and society. |
R 1.7 (supply chains and infrastructure)
| 2.23. | To achieve secure and sustainable EU-based supply chains that serve domestic production and enhance access to end products, it is necessary to remove the barriers that hinder the single market, bearing in mind that its fragmentation constitutes a structural economic security risk. At the same time, the single market must be kept globally connected, to ensure access to indispensable global supply chains. |
| 2.24. | Interventions by policy-makers regarding the diversification or organisation of supply chains should be avoided, as this would blur responsibilities. Instead, the focus should be on removing administrative obstacles and enhancing the implementation of common rules and standards, including those on sustainability (3) and due diligence. Moreover, free movement of production resources and end products requires well-functioning physical connections, with due attention to the security of logistics, especially in terms of international aviation and maritime transport. |
| 2.25. | The security of supply chains and the vital economic and societal functions are strongly dependent on energy, water, transport and digital infrastructure, including physical constructions and networks and their operation. The importance of infrastructure security is amplified by the fact that its various parts are closely interconnected and vulnerable to geopolitical tensions and should therefore be developed as an entirety. Any liberalisation policy initiative should be scrutinised against the economic security lens of fundamental services such as ports, airports and a global maritime and aviation network. |
| 2.26. | Infrastructure security needs to cover both physical security and cybersecurity, including the protection of sensitive data and information. With this in mind, concerted efforts are needed to enhance European cloud services, digital platforms and digital payment systems. Due attention also needs to be paid to resilience against the exploitation of digital platforms to distort markets, undermine public trust or influence decision-making, e.g. through algorithmic manipulation and foreign information interference. |
| 2.27. | Moreover, a high-level and secure research and technology infrastructure is necessary for achieving technological excellence and for promoting high-level talent. It also enhances the single market of research and innovation and contributes to international cooperation. At the same time, critical knowledge and know-how, as well as intellectual property rights must be duly protected. |
R 1.8 (international trade)
| 2.28. | Expanding export opportunities for EU goods and services plays a significant role in strengthening the EU’s overall economy and growth. Specific attention should be paid to facilitating the internationalisation of SMEs. Moreover, the diversification of both imports and exports is necessary to avoid high-risk dependencies in either of them. |
| 2.29. | Widening the network of EU trade agreements with like-minded and trusted partners means concluding ongoing negotiation processes, with Australia as a recent example, and opening new ones, with due regard to the objective of strengthening economic security and implementing the 2022 communication on trade and sustainable development. Older generation agreements should also be modernised to meet new benchmarks. Moreover, the EU should persistently promote an open, sustainable and rules-based multilateral trade system, to enhance a level playing field and work as a counterforce to protectionism and economic fragmentation. |
| 2.30. | The primary purpose of developing trade protection measures and countermeasures should be to build a strong deterrent effect and prevent the realisation of risks created by foreign players. This should include proper monitoring and control of risky activities and setting clear red lines, while avoiding stimulating increased protectionism or trade conflicts. Any trade measures should also take account of the impact on the whole value chain, including downstream businesses. |
| 2.31. | While the basic approach to economic security should not be defensive, it is necessary to address unfair competition from third countries, taking place through state subsidies, non-market practices or differing standards. Such distortions should be tackled in a proportionate, targeted and WTO-consistent manner. |
R 1.9 (international partnerships)
| 2.32. | International partnerships are a significant tool for achieving mutual benefits in several fields of cooperation. The changing geopolitical and geo-economic conditions, accompanied by environmental and demographic developments, provide opportunities to make use of the EU’s and partner countries’ strengths in enhancing economically, socially and environmentally sustainable development, while contributing to the expansion and diversification of economic partnerships. Alternative partnerships can also act as a deterrent against harmful measures by other players. |
| 2.33. | Multiple benefits can be achieved through partnerships with countries of the Global South, such as African and Latin American countries and India, in the fields of water, other natural resources, energy and climate, among others. The opportunities provided by the Global Gateway should be fully harnessed for creating business ecosystems, including through better, non-fragmented governance, increased transparency and upfront civil society involvement, and accompanied by support from the Global Europe and other funding instruments. |
| 2.34. | This kind of cooperation entails significant potential for enhancing economically, environmentally and socially sustainable development, while contributing to the expansion and diversification of economic partnerships. On top of bilateral partnerships, the EU should also position itself at the forefront of the UN Summit of the Future and the post-2030 agenda, with the aim of enhancing sustainable global progress through multilateral cooperation, including forward-looking governance reforms. |
| 2.35. | Economic cooperation with the candidate countries involves steps towards widening the internal market, thereby strengthening the EU’s economic security. Cooperation with and support for Ukraine is crucial from the point of view of wider geopolitical security and with a view to the post-war reconstruction of the country. It is also important to recognise the specific and acute economic security vulnerabilities faced by the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine (4). |
R 1.10 (involvement)
| 2.36. | Strengthening the EU’s economic security requires a whole of society approach. This calls for robust, structured and meaningful involvement of social partners, civil society organisations and academic institutions at European, national, local and sectoral levels, in assessing risks and opportunities and in developing, implementing and monitoring economic security policies and measures, instead of creating additional new trusted advisory groups. This kind of cooperation enables better anticipation of the risks and more comprehensive understanding of the practical needs and constraints. Consequently, it also provides broader-based legitimacy for the reforms. |
Brussels, 17 June 2026.
The President
of the European Economic and Social Committee
Séamus BOLAND
(1) OJ C 236, 7.8.2012, p. 17, ELI: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2012/art_2/oj.
(2) OJ C, C/2024/2489, 23.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2489/oj.
(3) OJ C 228, 29.6.2023, p. 22.
(4) https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/communication/eastern-border/communication-eastern-border-2026.pdf.
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/4658/oj
ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)