European Economic
and Social Committee
ARE YOUNG EUROPEAN MEN MORE LIKELY TO VOTE FAR RIGHT THAN YOUNG WOMEN?
Although research on the gender gap in young people's political preferences is still limited, recent studies suggest that far-right parties in Europe attract substantially more support from young men than from young women, with noticeable differences among countries. In a pessimistic scenario, a deepening divide in political values could affect everyday social relations ─ shaping how people form and maintain relationships, potentially increasing loneliness and making it harder for some to find a partner. EESC Info discussed this trend with Đorđe Milosav, postdoctoral researcher at the University of Bergen, whose work focuses on gendered patterns in politics.
Your recent article highlights a significant divergence in far-right support between young men and women. Could you briefly outline the core findings of your research and how this gender gap compares to historical trends in youth political engagement?
In our recent article, we find that far-right parties in Europe are attracting noticeably more support from young men than from young women. In 2024, support among young men in Europe reached just over 21%, compared to about 14% among women of the same age group.
It’s important to note, however, that this gender gap isn’t the same everywhere. When we looked at countries individually, the pattern varied: the gap appears quite large in Spain and Poland for example, more moderate in Germany and Italy, and seems to be nonexistent in Sweden and the Netherlands.
This is an area of very active research, and there’s still a lot to understand. For example, in ongoing work with co-authors, I am exploring whether economic shocks affect young and older men (and women) support for far-right parties differently, and whether the importance young people place on their gender identity in this context plays a role in shaping their political choices.
Beyond just voting numbers, are there specific ideological shifts that you have observed in how young men versus young women interpret far-right narratives? Are there particular issues where this generational and gender divide is most pronounced?
It’s still difficult to draw firm conclusions, as research in this area, specifically focusing on the younger cohorts, is still relatively limited. What we do know for instance is that sexist attitudes are an important factor in explaining support for far-right parties in Spain (see paper here). As men are more likely to have sexist attitudes, they might find far-right parties promoting such stances more appealing. We also know that young women, on average, tend to hold more progressive or liberal views, which may make them less receptive to far-right narratives. A recent study for example points that the gender gap among Generation Z is particularly pronounced on affirmative action issues and anti-discrimination policies such as gender quotas in politics and school reforms for less gender-stereotypical teaching (see paper here).
If this trend persists, what are the long-term consequences that you see, in particular when regarding democratic stability and social cohesion in Europe?
If we take a more pessimistic view, growing differences in attitudes between young men and women could lead to wider social effects. For example, stronger polarisation might make it harder for people to form and maintain relationships, potentially affecting family formation, increasing loneliness, and lowering the overall quality of personal relationships.
Over time, these shifts could also influence broader demographic patterns, such as birth and divorce rates. If these trends become widespread, they could weaken social cohesion which in turn may pose challenges for the long-term health and stability of democratic systems. As research is still developing, much of this remains uncertain.
As academics and members of civil society, we need to approach these issues with care and avoid scapegoating any group in the process.
In your working paper with Hanna Bäck and Emma Renström, you explore the role of male influencers in combating misogyny and reducing intergroup threat. Could male influencers serve as a bridge in digital spaces that currently amplify polarising narratives?
Our initial hunch is that the answer to this question is yes, but our results paint a bit of a bleaker picture. In our working paper, we conducted a survey experiment where participants were shown the same message (an Instagram post) from a hypothetical male influencer, but we varied how his political background was described. What we found is that this background mattered: people were more likely to say they would like or share the post when the influencer was presented as being politically aligned with them. So, left-leaning respondents responded more positively when the influencer was described as left-leaning, and the same pattern held for right-leaning respondents when the influencer was described as right-leaning.
What’s striking is that this happened even though the message itself was identical in all cases. In other words, who delivers the message matters much more than what is being said.
At the same time, we didn’t find evidence that these messages changed people’s underlying misogynistic attitudes. Taken together, I think this hints at a broader point: gender issues are highly politicised today, and messages about them can act as signals of political identity, rather than simply being evaluated on their own terms.
Đorđe Milosav is currently a postdoctoral researcher at the SUCCESS project at the University of Bergen. Previously, he held a postdoctoral position in Political Behaviour at Humboldt University of Berlin and received his PhD in Political Science from Trinity College Dublin. His current work is looking at gendered patterns of political attitudes and behaviour among both voters and politicians in Europe.