By Alberto-Horst Neidhardt

A month after the end of Bashar al-Assad’s brutal rule, the official EU response remains largely confined to the announcement of assistance for development and economic stabilisation. It remains unclear whether and when sanctions on Syria will be lifted. European support will hinge on protections for minorities and other guarantees, the prospects for which remain uncertain. Syria’s complex political, security and humanitarian dynamics suggest that any democratic consolidation will be long and challenging. This will test the EU’s ability to speak with one voice and act jointly on the country’s future. Instead, several European countries showed no hesitation in highlighting an immediate and common priority: returning displaced Syrians. In December, just days after the Assad regime lost Damascus, Austria – where FPÖ leader Herbert Kickl received a mandate to form a new government – announced a ‘return bonus’ and a deportation programme for those with criminal records. In the Netherlands, the coalition government led by right-wing nationalist Geert Wilders plans to identify safe areas for returns. Germany also announced that protection granted to Syrians will be ‘reviewed and revoked’ if the country stabilises. Other European countries have made similar declarations or are watching the situation closely. In this light, even the decision on lifting sanctions may be driven by the goal of implementing returns rather than by a shift in views about Syria’s new leadership.

With support for far-right and anti-immigration parties growing across Europe – and the German federal elections looming – the Member States’ vision for Syria is at risk of being dictated by domestic priorities and short-term electoral calculations. Between 2015 and 2024, over one million Syrians were granted protection by EU Member States, most of them in Germany. Their presence has become a contentious political and societal issue. Amidst widely publicised security incidents, high inflation, and rising energy costs, public sentiment in many refugee-hosting countries has grown less welcoming. This shift has normalised hostile rhetoric and policies. Despite calls by the European Commission and UNHCR to take a cautious approach to returns, this dynamic could push European governments to accelerate them, even unilaterally.

Since the fall of the Assad regime in December, over 125 000 refugees have already returned to Syria, mostly from neighbouring countries. However, their prospects are grim. Even before recent events, more than half of Syria’s population faced food insecurity, with three million suffering severe hunger. With many houses destroyed by the conflict, hosting facilities are already at full capacity. According to the UNHCR, close to EUR 300 million is needed for those going back, for shelter, food and water. While the EU and the Member States should develop coordinated approaches to facilitate Syrians’ safe and voluntary repatriation in the long term, the immediate priority should be to address the country’s humanitarian needs in this context. Pressuring refugees to return rapidly to a war-torn and unstable country could actually backfire, further limiting access to food, energy and shelter. Large-scale returns could also disrupt the ethnic and socio-economic fabric of already fragile regions. A balanced and sustainable approach is further justified by the potential contribution of the Syrian diaspora to reconstruction efforts. The country will need engineers, doctors, administrators and teachers and manual workers at various skill levels. Syrians have gained valuable skills and experience in Europe across relevant sectors, including education, construction, and healthcare, but recruiting the right profiles will not be easy. A permanent return would also not be a pre-condition for contributing to the reconstruction: remittances from Europe could play a crucial role in poverty reduction and sustainable development. Through diaspora engagement, Europe-based Syrians could also help strengthen diplomatic and cultural ties between the EU and post-Assad Syria.

Yet, the Member States may struggle to adopt a balanced approach and fail to pursue a coordinated agenda. Some countries might prioritise long-term stability and Syria’s reconstruction, allowing returns to occur spontaneously. Others may hasten to offer financial incentives for voluntary repatriation or even systematically review Syrians’ status as soon as the humanitarian situation improves, even slightly. Yet, implementing a systematic review of refugee status will face significant legal hurdles, and involve considerable financial and administrative costs. Meanwhile, any incentives for return will have to account for the fact that most Syrians displaced in Europe are now settled, with over 300 000 having acquired EU citizenship. At the same time, the country’s bleak economic and labour prospects may discourage even the most motivated from going back. A fundamental question in this context will be if Syrians will be allowed to engage in so-called ‘pendular movements’ – returning for limited periods, with European host countries continuing to offer sustainable opportunities for a more permanent return. These questions will inevitably be intertwined with broader discussions on EU migration policy. The future negotiations on the reform of the EU Directive governing returns, for which a proposal is expected soon from the European Commission, could gain decisive momentum depending on evolving discussions about Syrians’ returns. But the Directive’s reform could similarly see further divisions emerging among the EU Member States. With migration policies in need of a fundamental rethink to address today’s challenges effectively, the EU’s approach to displaced Syrians is likely to constitute a first critical turning point in the new cycle.