Georgia – another front for Russia

The end of 2023 will be a dangerous moment for Georgia: in December, the European Council is due to decide whether or not to grant the former Soviet Republic EU candidate status

In June 2022, the Council denied candidate country status to Georgia, in contrast to its response to Ukraine and Moldova, due to the manifestly hostile – and thus pro-Russian – policy of the Georgian government towards the West. While acknowledging that Georgia had a “European perspective”, the Council made candidate country status contingent on the implementation of 12 priorities, relating to, for example, improvements to the media environment and independence of the judiciary.

The context for this country is hallmarked by major internal socio-political tensions due to the divergence of views between the party in power, the “Georgian Dream” party of the oligarch Bidzina Ivanichvili (who has amassed a fortune of EUR 4.5 billion in Russia), and the 3.7 million Georgian people. On the one hand, there is a government that has been in power since 2012 and which has progressively put in place a policy that today seems resolutely pro-Russian; on the other, there is a population that, according to the latest opinion polls, is 81% in favour of joining the EU.

If the situation is tense, it is also because the Russian government is perceived to be manipulating the Georgian government. How can we otherwise explain why the “Georgian Dream” party tried to have a so-called “foreign agents” law adopted, inspired by the 2012 Russian law, which could only annoy Georgians who see that this bill might mean they would permanently lose their chances of moving closer to Europe?

The Russian government is also working to support the “Ivanichvili” government in its policy of breaking with the West. While the Georgian government is systematically undermining links with Western partners (through constant controversy with European and American representatives and propaganda about alleged Western intentions to open a second front in Georgia to weaken Russia), the Kremlin is praising the “Ivanichvili” government’s decisions and is taking steps to mollify public opinion in Georgia – steps such as restoring direct flights between the two countries (suspended since 2019) and abolishing the need for visas for Georgians travelling to the former colonial power.

This is an explosive “cocktail” a few months away from the European Council’s decision, perceived as historic by many Georgians. A part of Georgian public opinion has not forgiven Mr Ivanichvili’s team for bringing the country back into the Russian sphere of influence. Another part, perhaps the majority, likes to think of itself as pro-European, but does not know what to think when faced with caustic criticism of the West in government communications, and appears concerned not to irritate a Russia that is more aggressive than ever. Security risks are very high in a country which, we should remember, was the scene of the beginning of the trial of strength between Moscow and the West, marked by the Russian-Georgian war in 2008.