Anastasia Karagianni from VUB (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) explores how digital technologies increasingly influence how people are judged and treated, from online images to access to jobs and public services. Although these systems are often presented as neutral, they can reinforce existing inequalities and cause real harm to marginalised communities, showing why EU digital regulation must move beyond technical compliance and take people’s lived experiences seriously when addressing algorithmic discrimination.

Algorithmic discrimination refers to automated systems producing outcomes that systematically disadvantage particular groups, not due to technical 'errors' alone but because of how data, design choices, and historical patterns of inequality shape machine decision‑making. These effects are especially pressing where gender, race, class, disability, or other identity axes intersect, undermining equality, privacy, and non‑discrimination.

For example, beauty filters encode normative, often Eurocentric and gendered ideals of attractiveness by algorithmically 'correcting' faces toward lighter skin tones or feminised features, disproportionately affecting women and people of colour and reinforcing existing hierarchies of social value. Similarly, smart wearable technologies, such as Ray-Ban Meta AI glasses, raise concerns about surveillance, privacy, and image-based sexual abuse, as biased vision and speech systems can misidentify marginalised groups and expose bystanders to recording without their consent, reinforcing existing power imbalances in public spaces.

In the EU, where digital systems increasingly determine access to public services, employment opportunities, and social support, addressing these harms is central to protecting fundamental rights and democratic accountability.

EU frameworks, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) represent important steps towards a rights‑based approach to data and automated systems. The GDPR’s emphasis on transparency, human oversight, and mechanisms for individuals to contest automated decisions gives civil society tools to challenge discriminatory practices and to demand accountability from both private and public actors. The AI Act adopts a risk-based approach to regulating AI, with explicit obligations for high-risk systems ─ AI applications considered likely to significantly affect people’s rights, safety, or access to essential services, such as healthcare or employment. This creates avenues for oversight and structured scrutiny of technologies that could produce harmful outcomes.

Civil society organisations have played a key role in bringing these frameworks to life. Forums such as the CPDP (Computers, Privacy and Data Protection Conference), Privacy Camp, and FARI engage activists, researchers, and policy-makers in evaluating algorithmic systems and shaping best practices. Successes achieved by European Digital Rights (EDRi) and the Digital Freedom Fund (DFF) demonstrate how sustained civil engagement can improve transparency obligations, strengthen enforcement, and widen public understanding of digital harms. These initiatives show that EU regulation can empower civil society, fostering participatory approaches to regulation rather than leaving oversight solely to state or corporate actors.

Despite these positive developments, significant gaps remain that limit the capacity of EU regulation to address structural discrimination and algorithmic harm in a comprehensive way. At the heart of this critique is the nature of the AI Act’s risk classification system. The Act’s reliance on a top‑down model, where regulators pre‑define categories of high‑risk systems, leaves little space for bottom‑up identification of emerging harms discovered through lived experience or civil society monitoring. Once systems are deployed, there are limited mechanisms for affected communities to trigger risk reassessments or demand remediation outside predefined categories.

The Digital Omnibus Proposal illustrates another worrying trend. By allowing providers of AI systems to self‑register and determine whether their technology qualifies as high‑risk, the proposal risks delegating critical regulatory judgments to the very actors whose commercial interests may conflict with public safety and rights protection.

Even where bias-mitigation obligations (efforts designed to reduce discrimination in AI systems) exist, they often require the processing of sensitive data. Yet gender and LGBTQIA+ characteristics, such as non-binary, transgender, or intersex identities, are frequently not recognised as protected categories and therefore remain insufficiently safeguarded. This creates blind spots in understanding how AI systems can reinforce overlapping forms of discrimination.

These gaps become most apparent  with emerging harms, such as sexualised deepfakes. While it is likely that such technologies could fall under Article 5’s prohibited practices, the regulatory text leaves ambiguity around classification and enforcement. In the absence of clear obligations on platforms to prevent or remediate image‑based abuse and deepfake dissemination, victims may find limited legal recourse, despite substantive harms to privacy, dignity, and safety.

Another limitation lies in standardisation obligations, which apply only to high‑risk AI systems. This leaves vast swathes of widely deployed technologies, including generative AI and content moderation applications, without systematic safety, fairness, and discrimination safeguards. For civil society, this means that many discriminatory or harmful systems may never be subject to robust conformity assessments or accountability pathways.

Finally, the way EU law handles intersectionality ─ the idea that people can face overlapping forms of discrimination ─ shows that current regulations don’t always reflect people's lived realities. While the Directive on Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (GBV Directive) introduces the concept of 'intersectional discrimination', its practical scope remains limited in the text of the (GBV) Directive. It also does not fully account for the concerns of LGBTQIA+ communities across EU equality policy. Academic analysis of the AI Act shows that references to 'gender equality' are sparse, and inclusive terminology for diverse gender identities is largely missing. As a result, the regulatory framework still remains rooted in binary understandings of gender.

These critiques point to a broader issue: simply following procedural safeguards is not enough to tackle algorithmic discrimination in society. What is needed are approaches that start from people's experiences and identify harms early, assessments that consider how different forms of discrimination overlap, and participatory oversight that meaningfully includes civil society in decision-making. Tools such as gender‑responsive impact assessments and community‑driven evaluation frameworks ─ which involve testing systems for bias and listening to affected users ─ can help make sure that regulation actually protects those most vulnerable to algorithmic harms. Without such mechanisms, EU digital regulation risks enshrining a 'neutral' approach that obscures the inequalities people face in everyday life, instead of confronting them.

Anastasia Karagianni is a doctoral researcher at the Law, Science, Technology and Society (LSTS) research group of the Law and Criminology Faculty at Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) and former FARI scholar. Her thesis focuses on the 'Divergencies of Gender Discrimination in the EU AI Act Through Feminist Epistemologies and Epistemic Controversies'. She has been a visiting researcher at the iCourts research team of the University of Copenhagen and the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission in Seville as well as a visiting lecturer at the ITACA Institute of the UPV Universitat Politèchnica de València.

By Rudolf Kolbe

With the AI Act, Europe has established an important framework. Now it needs to put it into practice: are we going to be able to deploy AI across the board – in businesses, in public administrations and in strategic sectors – and still remain human-centric, trustworthy and competitive? That’s what the European Commission’s Apply AI Strategy is all about: it shifts the focus from regulation to application, so as to increase productivity, improve public services and make us more resilient.

There are three central elements to this.

Firstly, the sectoral flagships: targeted measures for healthcare, industry and construction, robotics, energy, mobility, security, agri-food, culture and the public sector could create real demand for European solutions. 

In the health sector, AI-powered screening centres and competence networks can enable earlier diagnoses and reduce paperwork – but only if data protection, transparency and clinical validation are taken into account from the outset. In industry and construction, digital twins and AI-enabled automation can improve quality, safety and efficiency, while at the same time addressing skills shortages. Across all sectors, fairness, non-discrimination and fundamental rights must remain guiding principles.

Secondly, cross-cutting measures for SMEs and for people working with AI. 

AI use in Europe is still too low, especially among small businesses. It is therefore a good idea to strengthen the European Digital Innovation Hubs and turn them into ‘Experience Centres for AI’. However, SMEs need actual tangible support: easier access to finance, less red tape, workable rules for data use and intellectual property, and hands-on support to commercialise solutions and scale them in the single market. This includes building regional clusters of skills, based on existing strengths, so that every region can benefit – not just those that are already the strongest innovation hubs.

The world of work is just as crucial. AI literacy needs to be clearly defined and taught in practice in a sector-specific way for workers, managers and the public service. The aim of upskilling and reskilling is not just to reduce risks, but also to enable job transformation, improve job quality and increase productivity gains. Where algorithmic management and automated decision-making affect human beings, transparency, explainability and effective complaint and redress mechanisms are non-negotiable if we are to build trust.

Thirdly, governance that is inclusive and implementation-oriented. 

A coordinated mechanism – with an AI observatory that develops KPIs, monitors impacts and reports publicly – can keep the strategy on track if stakeholder engagement is balanced and time-efficient. Social partners, SMEs and civil society must be part of the solution from the outset. Additionally, Europe should use strategic public procurement to bring innovative, safe and sustainable AI solutions to the market – solutions that are transparent, competitive and technology-neutral.

Finally, ambition requires reliable investment. ‘Apply AI’ needs predictable, long-term resources for research, computing and data infrastructure, and upskilling and reskilling – particularly for SMEs and regional innovation clusters – in the 2028–2034 multiannual financial framework. Following the withdrawal of the AI Liability Directive, future measures also need to create legal certainty for innovators while at the same time protecting consumers and workers in the single market.

‘Apply AI’ could become Europe’s implementation strategy, translating our values and rules into measurable impact – but only if we pick up the pace, simplify access and make trust our central concern.

On 1 November 2024, a newly renovated concrete roof collapsed on the railway station in Novi Sad in Serbia, killing 16 people and seriously injuring another one. The tragedy, widely blamed on construction negligence and government corruption, sparked what would become one of the largest civic movements in Serbia’s recent history. Students were the first to respond, taking to the streets and organising vigils, protests and blockades of roads and universities as they called for change. Many were beaten or arrested by the police. In 2025, Serbian students were nominated for the European Parliament's Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. During the award ceremony in Strasbourg, we spoke with student protester Stefan Tomić, who was among those detained by Serbian police.

During the panel organised with civil society organisations when the Sakharov Prize was awarded in Strasbourg, you mentioned that the student protests in Serbia were in fact initiated by just one young woman after the terrible tragedy in Novi Sad. In your opinion, how and why did the protest grow to such massive proportions?

Until now, protests in Serbia have been organised by opposition parties or other interest groups. This time it’s different: the tragedy stirred emotions that were strong enough for us to take action on our own, without any other interests. That’s why the young woman started the first blockade, that’s why, after seeing her, we jumped in, and that’s why Serbia trusts us. That’s why the protests are massive.

Your fellow student Dimitrije Dimić said in Strasbourg that your student movement has in fact no leader. How do you gather and organise? What would have to happen for you to decide to end the protests?

We hold assemblies at the faculties, then there is a kind of coordinating structure above that and decisions are made democratically. We trust those decisions the way someone would trust a leader, and that is why we don’t even need a leader. In answer to your question about ending the protests, it’s simple: our demands must be met.

How have the authorities and police of the Republic of Serbia responded to the student protests? You yourself were arrested and placed under house arrest. How did your arrest happen, and what exactly were you charged with?

They arrested me out of the blue. They didn’t give me a summons or a lawyer. After five hours, I assume the outside pressure became strong enough that they had to grant me my basic rights. I then found out that I was being charged with inciting a violent change of the constitutional order, and I was detained for two days. After that, my house arrest began. The police have not been gentle at all; they have beaten us many, many times over the past year.

Some of your lawyers were with you in Strasbourg. What kind of legal help are the students receiving from the lawyers? Who else has supported you? How are you portrayed in the Serbian media?

The lawyers were among the first to go on strike, and now, when we are arrested, it means a lot to have a good lawyer. We have received support from practically every group in Serbia, although the most visible have been teachers and professors, the IT sector, taxi drivers and bikers. But this is not thanks to the media. All TV stations holding nationwide broadcast licences claim that we are paid mercenaries and terrorists. Nova S and N1 are the only TV stations that report objectively, and the government is doing everything it can to shut them down. Social media saved us.

Some critics still claim that no one actually knows what the student protesters’ programme is or what you stand for. How would you respond to that?

More than a year has passed. Earlier, I could attribute such statements to ignorance; now I am sure they are malicious. We are fighting against theft, murder, corruption… We are fighting for democracy, equal rights for all. We are fighting for the fulfillment of our demands. We have been fighting for the same things since the beginning. There wouldn’t be so many of us if we didn’t have a clear goal, and people wouldn’t support us if we didn’t.

Serbian students have been nominated for the 2025 Sakharov Prize. What does this nomination mean to you personally and to the other students?

It’s an incredible feeling. We are still young, and it is terrifying to do something on the scale of an entire nation without any confirmation that we are doing things the right way. Such recognition is necessary ─ for us and for everyone in the world who finds themselves in a similar situation. Thank you. From me and from all the students.

Stefan Tomić is a 20-year-old student in the Faculty of Physics, University of Belgrade. 

By Irma Dimitradze

2026 did not arrive quietly. In Georgia, it arrived with a growing number of political prisoners, a frozen European future, and a country sliding toward authoritarian rule.

For me, that reality has a name: Mzia Amaglobeli. One year ago, my mentor and close friend became Georgia’s first female journalist political prisoner. She was abused, assaulted, denied justice and held through a 38-day hunger strike that cost her most of her eyesight. From that moment on, my life and my country changed forever.

The collapse of Georgia’s democracy did not happen overnight. Nor was it an isolated assault. It is part of a larger war, visible when Russia launched Europe’s largest war since WWII in Ukraine, and even before that, through disinformation, propaganda and hybrid warfare.

This is a war against the rule-of-law world order itself – one that seeks to re-draw borders, crush democratic institutions and reshape our lives.

Western democracies, like Georgians, underestimated its power. They believed they were too strong, too democratic; we believed we were too resilient. We were wrong.

In Georgia, propaganda tells people that the European Union is weak in this global struggle, and that pursuing EU integration will bring Russian tanks and rockets, as in 2008. Fear has been weaponised.

However, the result is over 410 days of continuous protest. People are demanding their stolen country back after rigged elections, captured courts, mass surveillance and repressive laws. The regime grows more inventive in crushing dissent, but resistance continues.

Georgia was never perfect, but it built a vibrant civil society, a growing free media and liberal laws. After receiving EU candidate status, it was suddenly thrown off a cliff, transforming into a repressive state where people are jailed for protesting, journalists are criminalised, civil servants are fired for dissent, and protesters are allegedly poisoned with chemicals.

Since 28 November 2024, when the ruling party ‘Georgian Dream’ froze Georgia’s EU path, the country has been rapidly refashioned into a laboratory of authoritarian rule. Destruction is always faster than building.

Europe may feel sympathy, but this is not just Georgia’s loss. It is yours too. This is how authoritarianism spreads, country by country, until it reshapes the world order itself.

As 2026 begins, one thing is clear. The old rules no longer protect us. While Europe hesitated, authoritarianism advanced. Now the question is no longer whether the world will change, but whether it will be shaped by those who defend democracy or by those who destroy it.

Tonight, in the last hours of 11 January, together with my colleagues, I stood in the freezing air outside Rustavi women’s prison, where Mzia Amaglobeli, now a Sakharov Prize laureate, remains unjustly imprisoned. Exactly one year ago, at this same hour, she was first unlawfully detained for putting up a poster in protest against arbitrary arrests for the same form of expression.

Less than one month ago, I was in Strasbourg, attending meetings and giving interviews on Mzia’s behalf. Her message to the EU was urgent and simple: act now and act effectively. Use all tools at your disposal. We live in a new reality that allows no luxury to delay.

Mzia ended her letter with the words, ‘I believe in a democratic, strong Europe’. For Georgians, this belief is not symbolic. It costs freedom, safety and lives. Europe must now decide: honor it, or abandon those who hold it.

Irma Dimitradze is a journalist and Communications Manager at Gazeti Batumelebi, a Georgian media organisation co-founded in 2001 by Sakharov Prize 2025 laureate Mzia Amaglobeli. She led an investigative report exposing the ruling party’s access to tens of thousands of voters’ sensitive personal data, which should only be collected by state institutions. Ms Dimitradze advocates internationally for Georgian press freedom and for Mzia Amaglobeli, the country’s first female journalist political prisoner since 1991.

Although AI could make European agriculture more competitive and sustainable, most farmers are being left out: under the current CAP, only around 3-4% of EU farms are expected to receive funding for digital tools, writes Stoyan Tchoukanov, president of the EESC's section for Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment.

At the EU AgriFoodDays in December 2025, an important reality became clear. Out of more than 400 participants discussing the future of digital farming, only six were farmers and only two were digitally connected to their farms. This underlines a critical gap: Europe cannot design a digital future for agriculture without farmers being actively involved.

Although digitalisation has been discussed for decades, real support on the ground remains limited. Under the current EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for 2023-2027, only about 3-4% of EU farms are expected to receive funding specifically for digital farming technologies. Even when broader farm modernisation measures are included, the figure reaches only around 7.6%.

There is also a clear divide between basic digital use and real digital transformation. While more than 90% of farmers use at least one IT or software tool, far fewer can afford or access advanced technologies such as precision farming, sensors, or AI-based systems. Dedicated public support for these investments remains low.

This is reflected in the data. According to the EU Joint Research Centre, only about one in five farmers uses farm-management software or satellite-based tools, and drone use remains minimal across most Member States.

Digital tools and AI can make European agriculture more competitive, sustainable, and resilient, but only if farmers are connected, supported, and involved in shaping these solutions. Without them, digital innovation risks remaining a policy ambition rather than a reality in the field.

Stoyan Tchoukanov has been president of the EESC's NAT section since October 2025 and an EESC member since 2020. Within the EESC, he represents the Beef Breeders Association of Bulgaria, where he also runs his own cattle farm.

In this issue, our surprise guests are Georgian journalist Irma Dimitradze and Serbian student Stefan Tomić.

At the award ceremony for the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought organised by the European Parliament in Strasbourg, Irma Dimitradze stood in for 2025 laureate Mzia Amaglobeli, Georgia’s first female journalist to become a political prisoner, now jailed for more than a year.                  

For EESC Info, Irma writes about the collapse of Georgia’s democracy and the rise of a pro-Kremlin authoritarian regime that imprisons protesters, targets journalists and crushes the country’s European hopes. However, Georgia’s democratic decline is no isolated event; it is part of a wider push by authoritarian forces that edge closer to Europe each day.

Also nominated for the Sakharov prize were journalists and humanitarian workers in Palestine and all conflict zones, along with Serbian students who have been protesting against government corruption and impunity at home. Student Stefan Tomić spoke to us in Strasbourg about the massive student-led protests that have been shaking Serbia since November 2024.

WE MUST STAND UP FOR THE VALUES THAT UNITE US

Dear readers,

The opening days and weeks of 2026 have certainly further demonstrated that we are living in very challenging and unnerving times.

Many of the things that we took for granted are no longer guaranteed. Geopolitical fundamentals including territorial integrity and respect for international organisations are being questioned. And we are rapidly approaching the fourth year of war on the European continent.

But my strong message to you for the year ahead is this: Do not abandon positive thinking and hope. We must stand up for what we believe in, for the values that define and unite us, and which provide the foundations for the European project. For freedom and peace. For democracy, which we know is not possible without a strong and active civil society. For human rights and dignity. 

These are topics I had the great honour to discuss with His Holiness Pope Leo XIV during a private audience on 10 January.

It was a true privilege to hear first-hand the insights that underpin Pope Leo's moral leadership and to have the opportunity to convey the EESC's vital role in European democracy, and our priorities: the need for poverty eradication, safeguarding democracy and protecting the most vulnerable.

In a European Union of immense wealth, the fact that 21% of people remain at risk of poverty or social exclusion is simply not acceptable. Tackling poverty and related challenges such as the affordable housing emergency will be key priorities in 2026.

My exchange with Pope Leo XIV also addressed the profound challenges facing the younger generations, shaped by the isolation of the COVID-19 pandemic and mental health pressures amplified by social media.

This is linked to the advance of artificial intelligence. Ensuring that AI does not become a runaway train when it comes to workers' rights is a priority in 2026. It must serve as a tool for empowerment rather than displacement. On this topic, I share a commitment with Pope Leo to ensuring that humans – not machines – remain in control of decisions that affect people's lives.

My strongest reflection from my meeting with Pope Leo is the absolutely vital role of civil society in not only strengthening democracies but building and nurturing communities. Civil society organisations, including the social partners, are the fabric of our societies, knitting together individuals and building bridges across groups.

Civil society therefore remains essential to renewing hope and building a Union of opportunities, security, and resilience. 

This is a message that I have also been sharing in meetings with countless EU high-level figures since becoming president. These include European Council President António Costa, European Parliament President Roberta Metsola, several key Commissioners, and numerous vice-presidents and committee chairs in the European Parliament.  

I am grateful to Pope Leo for using his powerful voice to spread a message of inclusion globally and of the need to protect the most marginalised. Irrespective of religious views, what great moral and political leaders have in common is their fervent belief in hope and human dignity and their respect for others.

Together, let us carry this outlook with us in the year ahead. In our efforts to put civil society at the heart of Europe, let us choose hope over fear.

Séamus Boland

President of the European Economic and Social Committee

The EU must shift from reactive ‘firefighting’ to long-term disaster foresight if it wants to protect its citizens effectively, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) warned in a new opinion adopted in December. The call comes as Europe faces more frequent climate extremes, growing cyber-physical risks and geopolitical instability.

According to rapporteur Florian Marin, the EU still treats disasters as isolated shocks rather than predictable, interconnected threats. ‘Prevention is no longer optional’, he said, arguing it is Europe’s most cost-effective and humane form of defence.

While the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) has been strengthened in recent years, most notably with the rescEU reserve after devastating wildfires, the EESC says the system remains overly focused on emergency response rather than risk reduction. Fragmentation between civil protection, climate adaptation and security policies continues to limit coordination.

The Committee calls for less red tape, modernised data and early-warning systems, more trained staff, streamlined procurement and stable funding for professionals and volunteers. Disaster-risk reduction should also become a core pillar of the EU’s 2028-2034 regional planning.

Recent cross-border flood responses show what is possible. ‘A prepared Union is a stronger Union’, Mr Marin concluded. Europe cannot afford to wait for the next crisis. (ks) 

by the EESC Civil Society Organisations' Group and the EESC External Relations' Section

Following Brexit and the United Kingdom's withdrawal from Erasmus+ projects, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) joined forces with young people and civil society organisations in the UK who believed that the programme was not merely a cost for the UK but a vital investment in the future of its young people.

In April 2024, the EESC adopted an own-initiative opinion on EU-UK Youth Engagement, drafted by Cillian Lohan (EESC Civil Society Organisations' Group), urging the European Commission to step up negotiations for the UK’s full reintegration into Erasmus+. This stance had the firm support of the European Youth Forum, the British Youth Council and numerous youth organisations across both the UK and the EU.

The EESC also partnered with the Scottish Advisory Forum on Europe (SAFE) to launch a joint leaflet — 'Youth Participation: Connecting Youth, Creating Change in Europe and the UK'. Business groups, trade unions and civil society organisations, members of the EESC's Domestic advisory group under the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, echoed this call in a statement issued on the 2025 EU-UK Summit, advocating for forward-looking initiatives to promote youth exchanges and opportunities for young workers, including renewed engagement with Erasmus+ and Creative Europe.

In a landmark development, December 2025 saw the EU and UK agree that the UK would re-join Erasmus+ from 2027. This breakthrough promises to reinvigorate international mobility and cooperation, especially for young people. The achievement stands as a testament to the EESC’s influence, its ability to involve and engage with civil society and the far-reaching impact of its advocacy at international level. It also proves that civil society can make a difference.

Background information:

Erasmus+ is the European Union’s flagship initiative for education, training, youth and sport, fostering opportunities for study, training, volunteering and cross-border partnerships. Before Brexit, the United Kingdom played a full and active role in the programme, with thousands of students from both the UK and the rest of the EU benefitting from exchanges and collaboration.

However, following Brexit, the UK opted not to participate as an associated third country in Erasmus+. This decision drastically reduced the UK’s access to Erasmus+ projects, leaving only a handful of opportunities open to British institutions and individuals: those available to participants worldwide. Simultaneously, EU students found their prospects for studying in the UK significantly reduced. By 2019, the number of EU students in the UK had already decreased by more than half, with a similar decline observed among British students heading to the EU.