The EESC welcomes this legislative proposal which ensures the effective resolution of failing financial institutions within the EU, and supports the introduction of harmonised rules regarding intra-group financial support. The Committee also stresses that the Central Banks, including the ECB, have to be involved in the assessment of the recovery and resolution plans, while remaining independent. Professional advice of consumer organisations, trade union representatives, etc., should also be sought. The Committee encourages a greater degree of certainty for the institutions by introducing explicit and more clearly defined rules. The opinion demands more clearly defined rules for the Special Manager (SM) as a highly intrusive early intervention measure, and points out the need for additional clarifications regarding both the bail-in tool and the Resolution Authorities (RAs).
The Committee maintains that lessons need to be learned from recent economic and financial crises and a fresh approach adopted to ensure more effective supervision by national, European and international authorities and increased accountability of financial institutions.
The Committee supports the measures aimed at strengthening banks' capital structure and their ability to finance the economy.
The opinion makes a contribution to analysis and proposals on an issue that the European institutions should deal with more energy, cohesion and above all with a clear and definite will to eradicate the phenomenon.
The opinion deals with European Venture Capital sector, which is closely linked to Europe's global competitiveness. The growth of this sector is an objective of the overall Europe 2020 Strategy and also one of the key priorities of the SME action plan. The EESC welcomes the regulation but draws attention to several limitations, which may weaken the anticipated impact.
..."Meanwhile, the financial and economic crisis has changed into a sovereign debt crisis because of the daily speculation against the euro, which has shifted its focus and targeted the debt of a number of European countries. The only reason for this is that the economic and political instruments to protect the euro are piecemeal, totally inadequate and, until a year ago, downright non-existent. These are the paradoxes that come from having a single monetary policy and 17 debt policies, 17 budget policies, 17 (or rather 27) economic and industrial policies, and so many voices, often contradictory, having their say and offering recipes for resolving the crisis. This is why there must be a commitment to redouble and continue the efforts made recently by the EU. It is useful, therefore, to draw up a few proposals, ..."