

# CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE MATERIAL (CSAM): DEFEATING ITS ILLEGAL STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION ON THE INTERNET

Paul Durrant
EuroISPA Council Member and
General Manager of ISPA Ireland

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#### **EUROISPA**

- Pan-European association of European ISP associations
  - Established in 1997 and predominantly funded by its members
  - Largest ISP association in the world: over 1500 ISPs represented
- EuroISPA's structure
  - Council: 11 representatives of national ISP associations
























**EuroISPA Forum:** 8 members, major international Internet companies (The Forum acts as an advisory body to the Council)

















- Secretariat: 3 team members based in Brussels
  - Instructed by Council to carry out and coordinate priorities
  - Role as "eyes and ears" re. EU policy and regulatory affairs



### EUROISPA DEPLORES CSAM

- The ISPs whom EuroISPA represents:
  - Abhor the use of Internet services for storage and distribution of CSAM
  - Do not want this material on their Internet systems in any form
  - Forbid customers to use their systems for storage or distribution of CSAM in their Terms and Conditions
  - Will act under T&C when verified notice of illegal CSAM given
- Operate the systems and know <u>best ways</u> to fight abuse of their networks
- ISPs cannot monitor for CSAM (due to law / global scale)
- ISPs rely on public reporting to Hotlines and police, who in turn can rapidly notify us to "takedown" of the CSAM
- Result: <u>definitive removal</u> of the illegal material <u>at source</u>



#### EUROISPA POSITION ON BLOCKING

Blocking is mostly ineffective and should be considered as an action of last resort within a suite of preferable actions aimed at combating Internet CSAM distribution

- Blocking does not remove the CSAM: it remains on the Internet
- DNS blocking is easily circumvented
- Allows the paedophiles who present the greatest danger to children - to carry on uninhibited
- Blocking does not work against p2p systems
- Accurate hybrid blocking: complex, expensive, slows network
- Blacklist distribution required for blocking is a security nightmare
- Operating blocking systems is a diversion of scarce resources
- Blocking does not <u>bring the criminals to court or protect victims</u>



## REMOVING CSAM AT SOURCE

- EuroISPA believes removing material at source must be the #1 priority to combat Internet CSAM because it:
  - Makes known sources truly inaccessible to everyone
  - Protects abused children from repeat view victimisation
  - Protects general public by reducing incidence of encountering CSAM
  - Seriously disrupts the activities of paedophiles
  - Definitively disrupts commercial CSAM websites and the criminal exploitation of children used for production of their "merchandise"
  - Preserves "taken down" data and logs (for police investigation to trace and prosecute perpetrators)
- EuroISPA calls for EU diplomatic action to strengthen international "Notice and Taken Down" communication
  - Make it work faster, work every time and thereby really protect children



#### INTERNATIONAL NTD ACTION

- Applicability: Majority of CSAM hosted in EU's main trading partners in the developed world
- Proven method: INHOPE has facilitated fast transnational alerts between hotlines and onward to national LEAs since 1999
  - EuroISPA advocates growth of INHOPE to more countries as a priority
- Improvement: Countries must ensure mechanisms that LEAs will rapidly notify hosting ISPs of CSAM
  - This is not always working as efficiently as it can and must be fixed
- Get convictions: Countries must harmonise procedures for preserving the data and securing transfer of evidence
  - Key to ISPs being able to effectively assist police investigation



#### CONCLUSION

- Concentrate on actions that are truly effective
  - CSAM must be removed at source to disrupt the paedophiles/criminals
  - Develop the LEA/public/industry coalitions to follow the money trail
- Blocking is an admission of failure, puts a "veil" in front of continuing abuse and child revictimisation by CSAM users
- Proven mechanisms for alert and takedown exist today
  - Currently delays can occur due to actions being "not fully joined up"
- Effective takedown procedures must be achieved
  - Forge national and international protocols "to join up existing actions"
- Take-down can work as quickly as any blocking process
  - Taken down CSAM is gone at source, not just hidden from casual view