**EU-GEORGIA CIVIL SOCIETY PLATFORM**

**Eastern Partnership - Georgian perspective**

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**Background**

The Eastern Partnership (EaP) launched in 2009 established a multilateral political dialogue (summits every two years, annual meetings of foreign ministers) between the EU and its six Eastern partners, offered opportunities for deepening institutional **bilateral cooperation** of mentioned countries with the EU, including signing of the Association agreements and establishing intensive visa dialogue aimed at substantial liberalisation of the movement of persons including visa-free travel to the Schengen area. The four Thematic Platforms cover **multilateral cooperation** areas of:

* Democracy, good governance, security and stability;
* Economic integration and convergence with EU policies;
* Energy, transport, environmental protection;
* Mobility and people-to-people contacts.[[1]](#footnote-1)

Other inclusive formats of cooperation within EaP’s multilateral track are thematic panels and flagship initiatives. Thematic platforms bring together high and medium-ranking officials to discuss legislative harmonization, institutional development, deepening links between countries, developing infrastructure or projects for economic co-operation as well as joint initiatives. Panels study the most important topics raised during the thematic platforms, and make a series of recommendations. The flagship initiatives carry out important and large-scale joint projects.

The EaP, parallel to which the Union for the Mediterranean[[2]](#footnote-2) was created for ENP partner countries from the Mediterranean Basin, has encouraged the solving of two important tasks: a) separation into two different formats two large and practically incompatible regions Eastern Europe and southern Mediterranean; b) creation of a space for a two-track – differentiated policy towards Eastern European countries with distinct ambitions and levels of achievement, enabling the countries to work and develop relations with the EU according to their individual agenda and independently from their neighbours. Economic integration as foreseen by the EaP implies the creation of deep and comprehensive free trade areas between the EU and its partner states that remove tariff and non-tariff barriers of trade in goods or services. Thanks to these free trade arrangements, partner states will enjoy the benefits of privileged and free access to internal EU markets. Political association, on the other hand, signifies the alienation with EU values, inclusion of partner states in the EU’s common foreign and security policy, and their access to and participation in EU programmes and agencies.

A declaration adopted during the EaP founding summit in Prague on 7 May 2009,[[3]](#footnote-3) triggered the creation of the Civil Society Forum (CSF)[[4]](#footnote-4) establishing a civil society dimension of the EaP. CSF is entitled to present recommendations, address demands directly during ministerial meetings to the members of Eastern Partnership summits, and to take part in the meetings of thematic platforms and panels. After signing their association agreements (AA) with the EU, the three EaP countries have created bilateral civil society platforms with EU (paragraph 142 EU-Georgia AA) whose support became an institutional obligation.

Due too still remaining regional approach in EU’s policies towards the EE the EaP is hindered from satisfying all the potential ambitions and European aspirations of some of its partner countries (currently Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) due to the relative lack of progress made towards Europeanization and lack of ambition for further integration by other partners (e.g. Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan). As a result the EaP is limited in both multilateral and bilateral formats.

**Countries perspectives**

Over the past few years, obvious differences between the aspirations, ambitions, values and achievements of the various countries of Eastern Europe have become apparent in their foreign policy orientations and other important areas.

For example, **Belarus** has made little consideration for the EU’s dictated requirements for political reform in course of initial five years of the EaP. Later, there was some progress achieved, especially over the past few years. Therefore, bilateral co-operation has been practically frozen and participation of Belarus in the multilateral track of EaP was rather formal. Since few years Belarus has been participating more actively in the multilateral formats of EaP, some progress has also been achieved in bilateral relations too, especially as regards the freedom of movement, in particular, “negotiations on a [Mobility Partnership](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3426_en.htm) were concluded and [negotiations on a Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2014/20140130_01_en) are underway.”[[5]](#footnote-5) The annual [EU-Belarus Human Rights Dialogue was established in July 2015](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/6079/The%20EU%20and%20Belarus%20hold%20a%20dialogue%20on%20human%20rights) and the last meeting took place in June 2018.  There is an important potential for cooperation in trade and the country intends to join WTO.

For **Azerbaijan,** the cooperation agenda has been reduced due to the country’s shortcomings in terms of guaranteeing human rights and basic freedoms.[[6]](#footnote-6) Bilateral economic rapprochement with Azerbaijan is also problematic due to the country’s reluctance to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), which precludes the possibility of the country signing an association agreement with the EU and the creation of a deep and comprehensive free trade area. Still in February 2017, the EU and Azerbaijan began negotiations on a new framework agreement expected to give new impetus to political dialogue and cooperation. Azerbaijan is an important energy partner for the EU and plays a pivotal role in bringing Caspian energy resources to the EU market. Indeed, there are no expectations Azerbaijan to be ready in the coming years to upgrade importantly (Up to association level) its institutional relations with EU.

In 2014, **Armenia** refused to sign its AA with the EU despite having concluded two years of negotiations almost simultaneously with Georgia. Armenia’s decision to join the Eurasian Economic Union instead completely excluded the possibility of creating a free trade area with the EU, and therefore that of signing an AA centred upon trade and other related issues. Armenia later, 2015 entered into negotiations with the EU on a new agreement and signed Cooperation and Enhanced Partnership agreement with EU (2017). The agreement contains many similar to EU-Georgia AA agreement provisions, but does not establish a Free Trade area and nor commitments for regulatory and legal approximation in trade related areas (as this is impossible due to Armenia being part of another customs union) consecutive promise of the stake on EU market. Nor the country’s “geopolitical choice” in favour of Russia leaves enough space for political manoeuvres. Still the Revolution of Dignity of 2018 with the overture of the prospects for important democratic changes improved possibilities for the country to continue rapprochement with EU in areas of political and sectoral cooperation.

In 2013, **Ukrainian** civil society, on the other hand, enjoying the support of large parts of the population, decided to pursue an extreme form of protest when the government of the time refused to sign the country’s association agreement with the EU. At the cost of lives and supporters, the country’s civil society has managed to maintain sustainable European aspirations and orientations. The association with the EU gave to Ukraine real chance for extension of the political cooperation and economic integration with its greatest economic partner. Apart from the high trade turnover (raised with annual rate of 24% in 2017) between the countries – 42% (for Ukraine) and EU’s continuous support in reforms, many formats for consultations and cooperation are establishes and functioning between parties including biannual summits with extensive sectoral cooperation agendas, HR dialogue, Cooperation formats between the EU and Ukraine are quite diverse. Of course, they, akin Georgia, have *the association institutions*. The format of their visa dialogue entails an annual meeting with the Ministers of Justice and Internal Affairs (we do not have this obligation), as well as a bilateral meeting between the Foreign Ministers twice per year. Ukrainian government has meetings with the European Union twice a year at the level of political directors; meeting also occur with Working Group on Eastern Europe (COEST) of the Council of the EU, *Working Group on the OSCE and the Council of Europe* of the Council of the EU, *Political and Security Committee (PSC)* of the EU (*quarterly), Disarmament and Arms Control Group* and *Working Group on Conventional Arms Export (COARM)* twice per year.[[7]](#footnote-7)

**Georgia** since March 2017 together with Ukraine has obtained a short term visa free travel to EU for its citizens, which was an important opening in terms of the freedom of movement and with the AA (inn force since 2016) and other flanking and sectoral agreements like – Open Air, Protection of Geographical Indications, memorandums in the area of CSDP like on exchange of classified information, participation of Georgia in EU peacekeeping operation provides for a solid institutional/political framework for deep cooperation. Many variety of formats support cooperation between Georgia, including, those bilateral formats known as the association institutions.*[[8]](#footnote-8)*   It has been 11 years since the dialogue in human rights domain was initiated, the format of a visa liberalization dialogue is active since 2012. In 2017, the EU and Georgia have established a high-level cooperation dialogue on strategic security issues, it will be held annually at the level of the Foreign Minister/Deputy Minister (Georgian side) and leadership of the External Action Service (EU side). At the same time, Georgian high ranking officials regularly hold meetings with the working groups of the Council of the European Union. In 2018 Sectoral Dialogue on the Highest Level was initiated. In general Georgia’s is considered as a most active reformer among Eastern partnership states and undoubtedly is recognized as a country with high EU aspirations.

Recent developments in **Moldova** caused many doubts regarding the choice of the country’s citizens, but its geographical proximity to the EU provides favourable conditions for Moldova’s further integration. After all Moldova’s trade with EU, notably its exports raises quickly (see Table 1). From 2008 to 2018 its exports to EU almost tripled in comparison to 2008 and there was a 55% growth for the previous two years. After the ban established by Russia on Moldova’s wine products in 2013 the country has expanded its sales to EU and quickly recovered from the loses opening new and larger market. Notwithstanding to the fact that Moldova permanently faces raising of Euroscepticism, pro-Russian sentiments or corruption scandals its economic integration with EU continues and takes force. Moldova has almost same institutional structures regulating relations with the EU as Georgia and continues socializing within the Eastern partnership. Its special relations with Romania also contributes to the strengthening ties with the EU.

**Possibilities and limitations of EaP**

Certainly, the EaP opens much possibilities for functional integration, starting form DCFTA (for those who signed it), and sectoral cooperation and even integration in certain sectors. Trade in services has also been liberalised at certain level under CEPA with Armenia. Other countries have also possibilities to enjoy GSP preferences in trade in goods. Indeed, Azerbaijan and Belarus, having such a possibility not yet satisfy the conditions. Accesses to EU agencies and programs, provided by EaP (and by AA even more) very wide in some cases in education and science, environment, standardisation and accreditation, police and law enforcement, border management, food safety, etc. is important to tailor national policies in EU manner and become part of the EU created systems in the mentioned fields. Strong integration with EU’s security policy including CSDP is also a possibility. Using full advantages of EaP the countries have almost unlimited access to EU assistance as regards to the advice and consultations on the domestic reform. Considerable financial resources are also allocated to support institutional and economic development of partner countries. Despite of this is obvious that, EU and its budget cannot afford the task of total transformation of the Eastern Europe and major effort should come from governments and societies of partner states.

There is growing worry in EU and in partner states that the Eastern Partnership has exhausted its possibilities and is slowly being eroded.[[9]](#footnote-9) Indeed the EU’s institutions still hope that the format can be used to lessen Russia’s damaging influence on the region, to spread and strengthen democracy and to support reforms that encourage the introduction of European norms. This reason justifies the fact that the EU does not refuse to sign less (than AA) ambitious agreements with countries do not aspiring deep integration as with Armenia and Azerbaijan for example. The EU’s strategy calls for such agreements to help maintain the possibility of exercising a normative influence on these countries, but in order to do so, the EU itself seemingly needs to maintain the Eastern Partnership in its existing format, i.e. offer all six partner countries equal approach and equal opportunities. The idea of dividing the Eastern Partnership into two separate formats with different aims and different speeds of rapprochement with the EU is being opposed in Brussels as well as in other European capitals.

Most probably this opposition springs from the fear that if the Eastern Partnership was divided, those countries which do not aspire to become EU members (Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia) might distance themselves from Brussels even more, and that this process would further reduce their already low levels of ambition for reform. Obviously this triggers certain disappointment of three associated countries, which despite well observed differences are still considered within outdated regional conceptions, and their possibilities in terms of European integration are as limited as those of the countries of the less ambitious partner countries. A traditional answer to such complaints is that there is a bilateral dimension, including the association agreement, which enables a differentiation, and that various levels of co-operation can be applied to countries which show more progress than others.

Having regard of the EU’s attitude Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia could develop an efficient trilateral cooperation on European Integration among themselves and attempt to being guided by EU in this, even though there is no any encouragement from side of EU institutions – no any program, project works to stimulate deepening of trilateral ties between the mentioned EU “aspirant” countries.

So, **the strongest limitation of the Eastern Partnership** is absence of the European Perspective for any, even strongly motivated and well performing states. This diminishes the support for Europeanisation related reforms and make difficult consolidation among societies in EaP countries. It provides the Eurosceptic and populist forces in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova or other countries to seed and grow doubts in minds of people regarding the rationality of the “sacrifice” that countries make to continue the pursuing non-realistic idea of EU accession.[[10]](#footnote-10) It is also limited in establishing new type of sub-regional forms of cooperation, lacks the possibility to change and improve established forms of cooperation.

The Eastern Partnership format needs to be reformed, but in order to maintain existing policies it is presumably not recommended at this stage to simply divide it in two, as doing so would underline the fact that the countries of the second category might become of less interest to the EU. It is therefore important to maintain the 1+6 format, but additional mechanisms should be created within it in order to deepen co-operation between the EU and the EaP’s three leading (associated) countries. **In order to realistically carry out its declared principle of differentiation, the Eastern Partnership’s format needs to be modified. The way the author sees the changes in EaP format is described in the position paper referred below.**[[11]](#footnote-11)Basic idea is to **create differentiated panels** according to following criteria – aspiration/ambition and progress in reforms/approximation. The differentiated panels accordingly can treat more specific and targeted issues, relevant to the level of fulfilment of the mentioned criteria by participating countries. Obviously there can be created a **separate “association panel**”, which includes only those countries, which have signed the AA agreement and which we also call Newly Associated States (NAS). Other type of panels, can treat legal approximation and institutional changes, which may concern any the mentioned states, or some of them, who committed to do it.

**Need for a Trilateral Initiative of NAS**

The NAS countries are very similar in many ways. Being historical part of the Russian and later soviet Empires culturally they all represent part of the Black Sea region, Post-soviet states, Eastern Europe. Politically they are parliamentary republics, building democratic states and have strong and stable European aspirations. They (only three among EaPs) signed association agreements with EU and openly demonstrate their ambitions to join the Union. All three of them have numerous similar challenges on their way of democratization and European integration - deficiencies of the governance, poor economic performance and poverty, social inequalities, competitiveness of the industries, energy dependency, etc. They suffer from the loss of the control over considerable parts of their territories because of Russian provocations and intervention in internal conflicts, in some cases, as a result of direct aggression and continuous occupation of territories. At this stage Russia is employing hybrid tactics to destabilise and weaken the mentioned states, provoke distrust within the groups of their population towards institutions and the chosen European orientation. All three of them experienced pressure and negative influence from Russia – brutal involvement in internal conflicts (as in Moldova and Georgia), acts of direct aggression, with consecutive continuous occupation of the part of their territories (Georgia since 2008 and Ukraine since 2014). In all occasions along with the coercive action using conventional military means, Russia has recurred to the hybrid tactics of using mercenaries and civilian groups to support/camouflage actions by military force, cyber-attacks to disrupt functioning of government institutions or critical infrastructure, propaganda and disinformation to weaken internal support of the states, penetration of anti-western and antireform ideas into the different social groups to weaken support for the Europeanisation process and European and Euro- Atlantic aspirations.

The perspective drawn by AAs signed with EU (2014) to be fully employed the NAS should undergo through important reform, bring its trade related legislation and regulatory policies in line with the EU they continue active cooperation within multilateral platforms of the Eastern Partnership. Since late 2013 - early 2014 Russia started open and intensive geopolitical competition with the EU, after trying to block Ukraine’s association and successfully pulling of Armenia’s from signing the AA with EU. In 2015 Russia practically forced Armenia to join Eurasian Economic Union (EEAU) and closed for this country a possibility for deeper bilateral economic interaction with the EU. Indeed, none of the three NAS countries have made any steps for joining the EEAU and stay firmly on the way of functional integration with the EU. The DCFTA’s substantial part of Each association agreement are quite similar in terms of FTA regimes, approximation objectives and institutional action needed to reform regulatory environment in the countries. The three NAS countries have practically got same conditions in trade in goods and services with EU as western Balkan (WB) states, who are largely recognised as potential and actual candidates for EU membership. Indeed, the NAS countries have not established similar intraregional area and Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova trade with each other based on the 1994 CIS FTA bilateral agreements. The mentioned agreements are not Deep and Comprehensive and do not stipulate removal of Non Trade Barriers (TBT, SPS, others) among themselves. The association agreements not recognise *diagonal cumulation* of rules of origin between the three countries, when they trade with the EU. All the three countries are cooperating among wider regional formats like GUAM[[12]](#footnote-12) and BSEC[[13]](#footnote-13), but none of the mentioned formats are concentrated on the aims of integrating with the EU.

European aspirations of the NAS cannot be fully realised without strong and contentious emphasis on their democratic development. **Democracy and Rule of Law** is essential for joining the EU under the article 49 of the TEU, which refers to art.2 of the same treaty as regards to the “respect for political values” for those who want to be members of the Union. Full fledge democracy is also essential for the country who aspires also functional integration with the EU, as far as any institutional arrangement with the European Union contains “political provisions” establishing respective bounding obligations in this respect. Monitoring of the development of Democratic Institutions in NAS are subject of careful observance within the Council of Europe, OSCE, UN and other international and regional institutions, indeed Association Agreements put special emphasis and establish very detailed demands and obligations in this respect. The agreements embrace all issues from the division and execution of the political, decentralisation of the power, efficiency and impartiality of justice system, transparency of law enforcement and security structures, anticorruption and good governance, accountability of the governments, etc. Again NAS countries have largely similar agendas for tackling problems related to all mentioned spheres, which they overcome with variant success. There is **no extensive cooperation, nor arrangements for mutual obligations among NAS countries to help each other to overcome problems and make higher progress** in the mentioned areas.

NAS countries have grave problems with their territorial integrity, triggered by Russian support for separatism and session of the ethnic minority populated regions. In all cases there is Russian military presence in such regions and in some cases the active military engagement, aggression and occupation of the territories. This fact reduces the **resilience of** all three states and makes them vulnerable politically and economically, reduces their attractiveness for investments, for their memberships in European and Euro-Atlantic structures. But resilience of the mentioned states is further challenged by **hybrid tactics** used by Russia intensively for last few years. This is demonstrated in numerous cases: organised propaganda campaigns, aimed to reduce trust in political systems and democratic development, seed scepticism towards European of Euro- Atlantic integration; intensified cyber-attacks and raised cyber threats aimed to hack the classified and important information for governmental sites, to create disruptions in functioning of electronic and communication systems supporting the functioning of critical infrastructure, financing and encouraging the anti-western political parties, NGO, media and other groups, infiltrating into different official structures, social groups with the agents of influence, etc. The mentioned tactics aim at disestablishing NAS countries and reduce their chances for further democratisation and interaction with European structures. The EU’s Global Security Strategy (2016) stressed the importance of supporting and strengthening the resilience of EU partners in the neighbourhood, as this becomes important for the resilience, security and success of the EU itself. Actually, facing same problems and having similar objectives Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia has not yet started any exchange and dialogue on this matters.

**Areas of cooperation among NAS**

As Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova represent best performer countries among EUs Eastern Partners, have signed and implement AA/DCFTAs with the EU, represent same region of the Black Sea and face similar problems and challenges with internal reform, experience same type of external pressures, aspire EU memberships and attempt to advance with the functional integration with the EU it is reasonable and demanding they to establish an exclusive format for cooperation and exchange of experience, mutual support of common objectives.

Such practice is widely used by countries, aspiring EU membership at different times, like Vicegrad 4, Baltic Council, RCC[[14]](#footnote-14) and CEFTA[[15]](#footnote-15) in Balkans. All these formats have been created to mutually reinforce European integration work, develop closer cooperation and integration among “EU aspirant” countries of a particular region. The formats helped to open markets of the mentioned countries to each other, facilitate people’s mobility, consultations on the governmental and parliamentary levels, including on issues related to the reforms in the scope of European integration, consider and support projects of infrastructural connectivity, carry on consultations on issues of democratic development, international and regional security, sectorial cooperation, so on. In all above mentioned cases, the creation of regional cooperation formats have been highly supported by EU and have importantly contributed in the consolidation of the European integration process.

Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova are countries of the same, Black Sea region. Practically all Black Sea littoral states (with the exception of Russia) are members of the EU, candidate countries, or those aspiring of EU membership. Since Russia is reluctant to promote European values in the region and neither Azerbaijan is motivated to conduct political or trade related reforms, no one from the two international regional organisations – BSEC or GUAM can serve as a regional tool for reinforcing the European Integration work, nor to be a platform for deeper economic integration between the countries of the regions, which would finally lead towards their integration with the EU. Rumania and Bulgaria are already members of the Union and Turkey is a candidate, which already has a customs union with EU. Therefore, Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia are the three countries who need to establish a regional format for cooperation on European Integration issues. The format would consolidate efforts of the mentioned countries to further adopt European values, establish deeper economic cooperation/integration among three of them, with the possibility of developing sectoral cooperation and mutually beneficial regional projects. Not least important is closer cooperation of the mentioned countries on security related issues. In this regards, joint efforts to respond raising hybrid threats can become also very important.

While arguments for the creation of the trilateral regional format of cooperation it is important to having into consideration not to copy existing models of cooperation, as they serve different concrete objectives. V4 and Baltic Council was primarily tasked to increase chances for the member states to accede the European Union and the cooperation in Balkans is primarily to overcome the divisions and competition between the states in the region, obviously with their following integration into the EU structures. In case of NAS, the integration should aim at the construction of a “regional block” of countries with similar aspirations, priorities and challenges. As far as EU is not planning to create a special format of cooperation (nor inside of EaP) with the mentioned three countries, NAS “will have to begin establishing such an area between each other (as the Višegrad group of countries did).”[[16]](#footnote-16) For this aim the mentioned countries should also develop connectivity, transport and communication infrastructure, good cooperation in the sphere of culture, education and science, cooperation between businesses in different industries. Integration of NAS countries will build up an attractive common market, with common institutions able to negotiate in the future the creation of an economic area with EU, similar to European Economic Area (EEA) created between EU and EFTA[[17]](#footnote-17). Establishment of such an area between Eastern Neighbours EU (EEA+) as a concept was proposed by European Parliament commissioned policy paper in 2005[[18]](#footnote-18).

Actually the fact that Russia exposes itself as a common enemy of the mentioned three countries, trying to destabilise, weaken, reorient them from the European integration, discredit their political systems, etc., serves as an additional stimulus for cooperation and integration among NAS countries. The only way to raise their resilience against Russian attempts is to establish closer cooperation and exchange practices and knowledge, especially regarding the ongoing and possible hybrid tactics used against the mentioned states. Obviously this topic of cooperation on security issues can constitute one of pillars of the mentioned regional organisation. Indeed, it should not envisage mutual defence obligations, as none of the mentioned countries is ready to bear such a responsibility at the regional level and any triggered conflict can discredit the spirit of cooperation.

**Establishing a Regional Organisation**

Political development of all three states is also an important area for cooperation of mentioned actors. Parliamentary trilateral cooperation has already been initiated and it is necessary to establish similar fora for the governments. If the trilateral regional cooperation format/organisation is created democratic development and alignments to the European standards in NAS will become one of the major subjects. NAS will work not only on the promotion of committed political reforms under CoE or their AAs with the EU within the area, but also discuss and try to support the European values, peace, stability and security in the wider region (especially within EaP partner states) by adopting common declarations (sometimes aligning with EU declarations collectively) and joint actions.

The mentioned three spheres – a) democratic development, b) trade and economic cooperation and c) security/resilience/hybrid can constitute main initial (not exhaustively) pillars upon which the regional integration between NAS countries can be built. Promotion of such thinking among the official structures of the mentioned states is an important task and civil society organisations and think tanks need to make first effort in exploring possibilities and readiness, modalities and reasonability of creation of such format/formats between NAS countries. The initiative/regional cooperation/organisation can be called GUM, GMU or UGM from the first letters of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia or just NASC (NAS Cooperation). EU can consider support to such initiative as a supplement to its Eastern Partnership policy and establish a special format for cooperation with NAS, which will include the issues of resilience, democracy and common trade area at the beginning. Later, the, when the European Perspective will be granted the full-fledged EU Integration will become a main subject of coopetition between NASC and EU.

1. See ‘Eastern Partnership’, EEAS, Brussels, 19 October 2016, available at [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/419/eastern-partnership\_en] [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *L’Union pour la Méditerranée*. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. See ‘Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit’ 8435/09 (Presse 78), Brussels, 7 May 2009,p. 10, available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/107589.pdf ]. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See: <https://eap-csf.eu/> [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. See: <https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/belarus/15975/belarus-and-eu_en> [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. ‘Persecution of human rights defenders in Azerbaijan—European Parliament resolution of 18 September 2014 on the persecution of human rights defenders in Azerbaijan’ (2014/2832(RSP)—2016/C 234/01), available at [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014IP0022&from=EN]. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. ##  See: Kakha Gogolashvili. The Highest Level Sectoral Dialogue between Georgia and the European Union. 2019 / 01 / 22 Available at: <https://www.gfsis.org/blog/view/919>

 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Includes: Association Council, Association Committee, Association Parliamentary Committee, Subcommittees (trade and sustainable development, sanitary and phytosanitary issues, geographical names, justice, freedom, and security etc.) [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Hushcha, M., ‘From Prague to Riga: Has the EU’s Eastern Partnership Been a Failure?’, E-International Relations, 14 April 2017, available at [http://www.e-ir.info/2017/04/14/from-prague-to-riga-has-the-eus-eastern-partnership-been-a-failure/]. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Well known rhetoric of nationalist-conservative parties in Georgia or pro-Russian parties in Ukraine and Moldova. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. See Gogolashvili, K., ‘Position Paper 4: Georgia’, in Hett, F., Kikić, S., and Meuser, S. (eds),*Reassessing the European Neighbourhood Policy: The Eastern Dimension,* Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, June 2015, p. 18, available at [http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/11483.pdf]. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. GUAM – “Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan” is a regional cooperation organization [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Black Sea Economic Cooperation – a Regional international organization involving (as full members) 12 countries of the Wider Black Sea Region [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Regional Cooperation Council [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Central European Free Trade Area [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Kakha Gogolashvili. Georgia-EU Relations and Future Perspectives. Policy Paper. GCSD. Tbilisi. 2017. P.42 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. European Free Trade Association [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2007/381360/EXPO-AFET\_NT(2007)381360\_EN.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-18)