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Section for External Relations

Youth involvement in social and civil dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean region

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For the attention of the study group members

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1. **Conclusions and recommendations**

2. **Background**

- 2.1 There is no internationally agreed definition of youth. For statistical purposes, most institutions define ‘young people’ as those aged between 15 and 24-30. The EESC notes that young people are a culturally, economically and politically heterogeneous group. An intersectional view of young people is crucial to avoid overlooking the diversity of their views, interests and problems.
- 2.2 The Euro-Mediterranean region is marked by people’s growing discontent with political institutions, exacerbated by perceived inadequacies of policymakers in addressing pressing societal concerns such as climate change, social cohesion and unemployment.
- 2.3 While many institutions and political organisations are built top-down and characterised by highly concentrated power structures, young people tend to engage in local bottom-up structures, mostly around issues that are considered ‘soft’ (e.g. climate and social justice, political participation, minority rights, animal rights) and are subordinated on the political agenda¹.
- 2.4 The socio-economic situation of young people in the Mediterranean region (henceforth referred to as the region) is characterised by high levels of unemployment and informal employment, as well as low wages and a lack of quality jobs. The region suffers from relatively high shares of youth who are not in employment, education or training (NEETs), reaching up to one third of the youth population.
- 2.5 The high number of school dropouts, especially young women, and the high unemployment rates for graduates in the region indicate a lack of quality in the public education systems, especially in rural areas, which fail to teach the necessary skills for the labour market. Furthermore, the share of highly skilled individuals among the migrating population from the Southern Mediterranean has increased in these countries, reaching 20% among migrant youth in 2017, suggesting a brain drain².
- 2.6 Marginalised groups, including women, people with disabilities, young people from rural areas and members of the LGBTQ+ community, face additional challenges in terms of representation, access to opportunities, the labour market and other areas.
- 2.7 The situation of youth representatives in the region is characterised by multiple security issues and other obstacles. The EESC points out that, to enable the structural involvement of youth representatives, the security of the participants, especially in the fields of human rights, climate justice and workers’ rights, has to be guaranteed.

¹ Based on the contributions of youth representatives during the 1st study group meeting and the Anna Lindh Foundation Youth Forum.

² [‘Trade, investment and employment in the Southern Mediterranean Countries. Thematic Report of the “Mainstreaming Employment into Trade and Investment in the Southern Neighbourhood” project’. International Labour Organization – Geneva: ILO, 2022 \(p. xvi\).](#)

3. Involving youth in participatory processes of social and civil dialogue

3.1 Social dialogue

3.1.1 The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines social dialogue as all types of negotiation, consultation or exchange of information between, or among, representatives of governments, employers and workers on issues of common interest relating to economic and social policy (see Annex).

3.1.2 Social dialogue plays a pivotal role in influencing economic, labour and social policies and in promoting convergences in living and working conditions. It is a valuable tool for fostering economic and social resilience, competitiveness and sustainable and inclusive growth, as underlined in EESC opinion SOC/764³. Consequently, the EESC emphasises the necessity of strengthening tripartite and bipartite social dialogue in order to promote resilient democracies, decent work and social justice.

3.1.3 The process of collective bargaining is a crucial tool of social dialogue that aims to guarantee decent working conditions and justice in the workplace. However, the need to confront new challenges, such as just transition, climate change and youth empowerment, places social dialogue in a pivotal political position, extending beyond wage bargaining. Given that these challenges particularly affect youth, it is vital to ensure that young people play a significant role in social dialogue. Consequently, encouraging young people to join social partner organisations is a priority in establishing inclusive social dialogue structures.

3.2 Social dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean

3.2.1 ‘In the region, workers’ organizations such as trade unions face difficulties [...] especially in connection with membership, freedom of association, and effectiveness in defending their rights and asserting their demands. Many governments in the MENA⁴ region impose restrictions on the freedom of association⁵.’ While national social dialogue frameworks often ensure the provision of tripartite social dialogue, sectoral and bipartite dialogue structures at company level are very limited. Trade union density and collective bargaining coverage remain relatively low.

3.2.2 The EESC stresses the importance of fully implementing the key ILO Conventions on social dialogue, in particular ILO C098⁶, ILO C135⁷, ILO C087⁸ and ILO C154⁹.

3 [EESC SOC/764 – Strengthening social dialogue.](#)

4 Middle East and North Africa.

5 [‘The future of work: Trade unions in transformation’, *International Journal of Labour Research*, 2019, Vol. 9, Issue 1-2 \(p. 226\).](#)

6 [ILO C098 – Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 \(No 98\).](#)

7 [ILO C135 – Workers’ Representatives Convention, 1971 \(No 135\).](#)

8 [ILO C087 – Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 \(No 87\).](#)

9 [ILO C154 – Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 \(No 154\).](#)

3.2.3 In order to build resilient and successful social dialogue structures, promoting social dialogue as a cornerstone of the societal framework is essential. The EESC welcomes initiatives such as the South Mediterranean Social Dialogue ([SOLiD](#)), which promotes interregional exchanges of good practices and legal and structural social dialogue frameworks.

3.3 Civil dialogue

3.3.1 Though no universal definition of civil dialogue has been adopted by any European or international institution, it is widely recognised as a key component of the work of civil society organisations (CSOs) in ensuring that citizens' voices are heard in decision-making processes.

3.3.2 The decline of traditional participative mechanisms, impacting youth in particular, points to the urgent need to invest more in civil dialogue with a view to modernising and enhancing participation tools.

3.3.3 Civil dialogue fosters civic engagement and collaboration among diverse stakeholders through two interrelated dimensions: 1) the dialogue among organisations representing civil society. This serves as a platform for exchanging views and sharing expertise concerning policies and their societal impact. 2) The structured dialogue between CSOs and governmental and intergovernmental institutions. This ensures that the voices of various societal groups are heard and considered in policymaking processes.

3.3.4 Civil dialogue is key to fostering transparency, accountability and inclusivity in public governance, enhancing the legitimacy and effectiveness of policies and legislative initiatives.

3.4 Civil dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean region

3.4.1 Civil dialogue is crucial for addressing citizens' frustrations while legitimising policies, since it can be an effective mechanism to bridge the gap between citizens and decision-makers.

3.4.2 Civil dialogue practices vary widely across countries, reflecting diverse political contexts, historical legacies, cultural norms and societal structures. The absence of common standards for civil dialogue practices and of a comprehensive regulatory framework contributes to significant variation in engagement practices across institutions. This leads to fragmentation, inconsistency and informality in civil dialogue.

3.4.3 Historical approaches to civil society participation have primarily focused on consultation rather than fostering genuine dialogue, raising concerns regarding inclusivity, accountability and transparency. Many dialogue opportunities are still one-off events, resulting in discontinuity and inconsistency. While sectoral dialogue occurs with some frequency, transversal dialogue is irregular and lacks structured processes.

3.4.4 The general context of a shrinking space for civil society is undermining the autonomy and effectiveness of CSOs, constraining their ability to advocate change¹⁰. Civil dialogue

¹⁰ European Parliament, ['Report on the shrinking space for civil society in Europe'](#) (2022).

mechanisms face obstacles to their effective implementation as legal frameworks regulating civil society often impose restrictions on freedom of association, expression and assembly.

3.4.5 The proliferation of digital technologies, particularly among the younger generations, is transforming the landscape of civil dialogue in the region. Social media platforms, online forums and digital communication tools have provided new avenues for young people, but also present challenges related to misinformation, online harassment and digital divides, which need to be addressed to ensure inclusive and constructive dialogue structures¹¹.

4. **Requirements and current challenges in the Mediterranean region for institutional participatory processes from a youth perspective**

4.1 Social and civil dialogue structures are a cornerstone of democratic participation. CSOs, including social partners, encounter challenges in accessing and participating in decision-making processes. The EESC stresses the need to promote good governance, through effective, fair and transparent public administration, a more decisive fight against corruption and equal access to justice¹². Furthermore, there is a need to support democratic processes that go beyond elections, as well as an enabling environment characterised by civic freedom, transparency, accessibility to information and opportunities for participatory processes to be meaningful.

4.2 The EESC points out that, despite their enormous potential, young people often face significant barriers and remain excluded from participatory processes. Low participation rates among young people and a lack of young leaders in high positions are additional obstacles to the integration of youth interests into decision-making processes. Phenomena of tokenism still occur, creating a situation where youth are invited as secondary actors, with a minimum impact on the decision-making process.

4.3 Young people often perceive social and civil dialogue structures as too institutionalised. Perceptions of preformulated institutional agendas and a lack of capacity to structurally integrate young people into organisational frameworks and adequately reflect youth interests prevent active youth participation.

4.4 Socio-cultural frameworks and practices can be an obstacle to young people's active engagement in participatory dialogue structures. Perceptions of traditional power and leadership structures and prejudices against young people, especially young women, are significant barriers to the engagement of young people in the region.

4.5 Adequate research on youth is an important prerequisite for identifying challenges and including their interests in participatory processes. The current lack of data on youth issues in the region is a major challenge that perpetuates the underrepresentation of youth interests in various policy areas.

¹¹ See the Euromesco policy brief [Youth deliberation and participation in the Euro-Mediterranean region](#) (2023).

¹² [EESC REX/540 – Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood – A new Agenda for the Mediterranean.](#)

- 4.6 The engagement of young people in social and civil dialogue initiatives is also limited by logistical and mobility factors, transportation and infrastructure shortages. Sufficient economic, social and educational resources are a precondition for structural youth involvement. In view of the often precarious situation of young people in the region, the EESC stresses the need for effective support mechanisms for them.
- 4.7 The EESC draws special attention to the specific needs of marginalised young women and men (e.g. NEETs, young women, LGBTQ+ people, disabled young people) and emphasises the importance of equal opportunities for young people in rural and urban areas.

5. **Recommendations**

5.1 Common recommendations

- 5.1.1 The involvement of young people in all stages of the policymaking process, from decision-making to the implementation of policies, is a crucial element in effective youth policies and requires the establishment of long-term and rotating dialogue frameworks in policymaking. The EESC calls for balanced and inclusive selection procedures to prevent the overrepresentation of privileged groups. It is essential to implement effective monitoring, evaluation and feedback mechanisms. The EESC's implementation of the EU Youth Test can provide guidance.
- 5.1.2 Capacity-building measures for the inclusion of young people in social and civil dialogue structures are an important step in placing them at the centre of organisational set-ups. This includes promoting a culture of cooperation instead of competition, embracing respectful conflict and managing potential disagreements. Furthermore, the EESC recommends acknowledging young people as experts in their respective fields.
- 5.1.3 The use of new forms of communication, in particular digital tools, and the creation of new narratives are crucial to reaching young people. Involving young people in the design of dialogue spaces, settings and institutional frameworks is crucial for the creation of structures based on intergenerational equality. Non-conventional forms of in-person communication, such as artistic or sporting events and community structures, should be used for involving young people in the political discourse.
- 5.1.4 Interconnecting youth work is an important step in promoting the (inter-)regional exchange of ideas, cultures and cooperation practices across this diverse region and among this heterogeneous group. By supporting regional youth networks, CSOs, including social partners, can benefit from finding new cooperation partners and recruiting young members. As stated in EESC opinion REX/566¹³, it is of utmost importance to strengthen the involvement of young people in the EU's external relations. The EESC therefore reiterates its recommendation to promote cooperation between youth organisations and EU delegations and to raise awareness of youth policies in their daily work. Moreover, the problem of visa issues must be addressed.

¹³ [EESC REX/566 – Youth Action Plan in EU External Action.](#)

- 5.1.5 The EESC stresses the need to involve representatives of vulnerable groups in participatory processes (young women, LGBTQ+ people, disabled young people, NEETs) and calls for additional efforts to establish accessible structures in order to enable diverse representation in social and civil dialogue. There is also a need to design special support programmes that reach out to vulnerable groups. One possibility is to increase youth budgets at local level, to support local communities and provide financial support for youth mobility.
- 5.1.6 The EESC notes that public education systems should strengthen the promotion of participatory engagement and create supportive ecosystems for the acquisition of appropriate skill sets (e.g. political and digital literacy) so that young people can engage confidently in institutional participatory processes. Civil society and social partner organisations can support young people by providing capacity-building workshops as part of their educational programmes and therefore creating easily accessible contact points for them.
- 5.2 Recommendations regarding youth in social dialogue
- 5.2.1 The EESC recommends that national social partner organisations establish youth action plans. These action plans should serve as roadmaps, with specific actions to create a more inclusive organisational framework for youth participation in social dialogue organisations.
- 5.2.2 The EESC stresses the importance of social dialogue structures at company level. Workers' councils are a necessary tool to make companies more resilient, economically successful and able to create decent jobs, as well as to promote democracy in the world of work (see SOC/746¹⁴).
- 5.2.3 The inclusion of young workers in social dialogue structures at company level is crucial. Encouraging young people to participate in democratic processes at the workplace supports youth engagement and helps them to gain skills and experience in representing their interests. Mentoring programmes provide an opportunity to tailor youth participation policies and support the development of young leaders.
- 5.2.4 Establishing youth-oriented representative structures at company level is an effective way of structurally embedding youth participation in social dialogue structures. The EESC highlights the Youth Trust Council (YTC)¹⁵ in Austria. The YTC represents the economic, social, health and cultural interests of young employees and apprentices in companies. Every company with five or more young workers is obliged to facilitate the democratic election of the YTC by the Youth Assembly. The members of the YTC have special rights (freedom of instruction, prohibition of restrictions and discrimination, protection against dismissal, educational exemption) and duties (duty of confidentiality) guaranteed by law in order to effectively represent the interests of young employees. The legitimisation of young workers through elections strengthens their credibility at work.

¹⁴ [EESC SOC/746 – Democracy at work.](#)

¹⁵ <https://www.oegi.at/content/dam/oegi/downloads/dokumente/20220915%20H2JVR%20Brosch%C3%BCre%20WEB.pdf> (only in German).

5.2.5 The EESC emphasises the importance of measures to promote active participation in the labour market and the provision of quality public services, such as good-quality and affordable childcare and long-term care, to encourage young female employment. The EESC also recommends prioritising social rights through the development of national charters of social rights.

5.2.6 The EESC underlines the importance of research activities focusing on young people in the labour market. Cooperation between universities, research institutes and vocational education and training (VET) programmes in the region must be strengthened. Local, long-term and rotating field research to learn about and from local youth structures can be useful in gathering the necessary knowledge for the successful integration of young people's interests in social dialogue structures.

5.3 Recommendations regarding youth in civil dialogue

5.3.1 There is a need to establish common standards for civil dialogue practices and a comprehensive regulatory framework, in order to provide structured mechanisms for engagement. There is also a need to establish specific support structures, dedicated teams and contact points within institutions that can facilitate regular and structured dialogue with CSOs.

5.3.2 Invest in upskilling initiatives enabling civil servants and policymakers to increase their capacity to handle civil dialogue with civil society.

5.3.3 Increase investment in digital infrastructure as digital technologies can provide new avenues for civic dialogue, and address the limited access to the internet that young people suffer from. Increase investment in digital literacy in order to increase the digital competences of young people so that they can express their views, organise campaigns and connect with like-minded individuals across borders.

5.3.4 Strengthen capacity-building schemes for young CSO representatives, focusing on political literacy, advocacy and democratic processes to enable civil society actors to more effectively influence policy outcomes. Promote structured reforms ensuring legal protections for civil society and enhancing safe spaces for dialogue.

5.3.5 Increase investment in cultivating a culture of civil dialogue and participation in schools and universities, including by streamlining the process for CSOs to implement civic projects in schools, reducing government intervention and scrutiny.

5.3.6 Establishing local advisor committees with youth representatives or youth councils can increase civil discourse at local level.

5.3.7 Provide clearer and more transparent selection criteria on how young people are selected by state authorities to participate in civil dialogue processes, giving both leaders of recognised youth associations and young representatives of grassroots movements equal opportunities to engage in civic dialogue processes.

5.3.8 Foster an intergenerational dialogue that enables a change of the narrative about youth, providing more space and legitimacy for their contributions on an equal footing with the older generations.

This annex for the opinion REX/583 provides additional information regarding youth involvement in social and civil dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The focus of the opinion shall be the youth involvement in social and civil dialogue in the Southern Neighbourhood of the EU (Southern and Eastern Mediterranean). The examples of social and civil dialogue structures in the EU member states serve as an important input in the analysis this topic. Nevertheless, the output of the opinion shall remain focused on the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region.

1. Background information

- 1.1 Youth engagement is increasingly recognised as a crucial component of participatory dialogue structures, as young people are a significant demographic group (around 45% of the population in the Southern Mediterranean is under the age of 25; more than half (55%) of the population in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is under the age of 30) with unique perspectives, energy and innovative ideas.
- 1.2 The involvement of young people and the strengthening of dialogue structures and cooperation with civil society organisations, including social partners, abroad, are among the priorities of EESC President Röpke's manifesto¹⁶. The EESC is committed to structurally involving young people, their representatives and interests in its work, as evidenced by the adoption of several youth-related opinions. This own-initiative opinion is being drawn up in a process with the active participation of youth representatives from the EUROMED region, paving the way for the future work of the EESC and, in particular, the EUROMED Follow-up Committee.
- 1.3 The EESC supports the EU's commitment to promote the development of effective youth policies, facilitating young people's access to vocational training and their participation in democratic processes. In recent years, youth has been at the centre of EU policy-making with the adoption of the EU Youth Strategy 2019-2027¹⁷, the European Year of Youth 2022¹⁸, the European Year of Skills 2023¹⁹, the Youth Action Plan (YAP) in EU External Action 2022 – 2027²⁰ to name the most prominent ones.
- 1.4 The Euro-Mediterranean region faces a number of challenges, including the climate crisis, high unemployment (particularly among young people), as well as a just-, digital- and energy transition to a sustainable and inclusive economy. In 2021, the European Union adopted a new strategy for the cooperation with the Southern Neighbourhood in form of the Joint Statement 'New Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood – A New Agenda for the Mediterranean'²¹ focusing on the rule of law, human and fundamental rights, equality, democracy and good

¹⁶ [EESC President, STAND UP FOR DEMOCRACY / SPEAK UP FOR EUROPE.](#)

¹⁷ [European Union, 'Engaging, Connecting and Empowering young people: a new EU Youth Strategy'.](#)

¹⁸ [European Union, 'The European Year of Youth 2022'.](#)

¹⁹ [European Union, 'European Year of Skills 2023'.](#)

²⁰ [European Union, 'Youth Action Plan \(YAP\) in EU external action 2022 – 2027'.](#)

²¹ [European Union, 'Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood – A new Agenda for the Mediterranean'.](#)

governance as cornerstones of inclusive and prosperous societies. The strategy also focuses on young people, women and disadvantaged groups and underlines the importance of civil society organisations and social partners, emphasising the importance of empowering young people and the strong involvement of social partners and civil society organisations in laying the foundations for decent jobs, respect for social and labour rights, fair and inclusive growth and long-term sustainability.

- 1.5 The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) has committed to fostering cooperation on the regional level in accordance with the ‘5th Ministerial Declaration on Employment and Labour’²² from 2022. The Declaration and the corresponding Joint Statement²³ of the social partners of the UfM place a particular focus on the employment and employability of the most vulnerable groups, with a particular emphasis on youth and women. Furthermore, the ministers promote social dialogue, both tripartite and bipartite, freedom of association and collective bargaining, including the involvement of social partners in the design, implementation and monitoring of economic and social policies. They also highlight the importance of the civil society.
- 1.6 The ‘UfM Youth Strategy 2030: Euro-Mediterranean Youth Towards a Common Goal’²⁴ brings together 42 UfM Member States with different horizons to agree on common actions for youth in the Euro-Mediterranean region. It is also a clear response to the urgent needs and obstacles faced by youth in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The strategy identifies six priority areas (climate and energy; environment and water; urban and rural development; economic development; education and training; social inclusion and participation) and key actions. In 2023, the UfM launched the ‘UfM Youth Agenda: Call for Action’²⁵ as part of the implementation of the ‘UfM Youth Strategy’, reflecting consultation processes involving the UfM National Youth Focal Points and Working Groups. The aim of the UfM Youth Agenda is to provide a flexible tool for addressing youth-related issues and implementing youth policies among UfM Member States and other entities at regional level. Once published, the UfM will organise virtual meetings with youth-led and youth-oriented civil society organisations (CSOs) on participation in decision-making processes, as well as capacity-building workshops.

2. **Requirements and current challenges in the Mediterranean region for institutional participatory processes from a youth perspective**

- 2.1 Youth engagement frequently occurs in informal structures within communities. Public institutions frequently overlook these structures, and this kind of youth work is often underfunded and underappreciated. EU institutions lack the necessary instruments to reach local levels, especially in the Southern Mediterranean region. Furthermore, it should be noted that the

²² [Union for the Mediterranean, '5th Ministerial Declaration on Employment and Labour' \(2022\).](#)

²³ [Social partners of the Union for the Mediterranean, 'JOINT STATEMENT - Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Union for the Mediterranean on employment and labour'.](#)

²⁴ [Union for the Mediterranean, 'UfM Youth Strategy 2030'.](#)

²⁵ [Union for the Mediterranean, 'UfM Youth Agenda'.](#)

widespread distrust of communities regarding institutions perceived as ‘foreign’ represents an additional obstacle.²⁶

- 2.2 It is of the utmost importance to acknowledge the various modes of communication and forms of political activism commonly employed by young people, including disengagement and boycott of institutionalised structures, as well as rejection of formal forms of political activism. However, it is crucial to differentiate between political apathy and political disillusionment.²⁷
- 2.3 The region is particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The development of vocational training and education programmes that facilitate rapid and effective upskilling to enable communities to adapt to environmental changes is of paramount importance. This is in line with the recommendations set out in EESC REX/540²⁸ and the 5th UfM Social Dialogue Forum²⁹. With regard to the digital transition, the region is facing a number of challenges, including the emergence of new forms of work (in particular, platform work), a lack of digital literacy and potential inaccessibility to adequate technology.
- 2.4 An ILO study³⁰ about the socio-economic situation in the Southern Mediterranean Neighbourhood. concludes that, overall, economic growth in the region has been lower than its potential over the past decade. The Southern Mediterranean Countries’ labour market outcomes are characterized by a low labour force participation rate, especially for women and youth, high levels of unemployment and informality, and low levels of quality job creation. Moreover, the female labour force participation rate is one of the lowest globally, on average lower than other countries within the same or a lower income category. Similarly, for youth (15–29 years), the labour force participation rate is much lower than the rate for their older peers. The significant share of women and youth not participating in economic activities and not looking to be economically active hints at the difficulties that women and youth face to participate fully in their countries’ economies. The region suffers from relatively high shares of youth not in employment, education or training (NEET). Youth unemployment rates in the region are one of the highest globally. The unemployment rate has increased with the increase in levels of educational attainment, suggesting significant skill mismatches in the countries in the region. Unemployment has increased in particular for graduates and educated youth in the region, including for Tunisia and Jordan. The tertiary graduates’ unemployment is particularly problematic for the region indicating low returns of investment in education which might influence future generations’ choices. Graduate unemployment reflects the absence of structural transformation and therefore the incapacity of the economies to create quality jobs for its educated youth. The high levels of youth unemployment and the lack of economic dynamism led to significant migration, including an undocumented one, and brain drain levels in most countries in the region.

²⁶ Based on the contributions of youth representatives during the 1st study group and the Anna Lindh Foundation Youth Forum.

²⁷ Based on the contributions of youth representatives during the 1st study group and the Anna Lindh Foundation Youth Forum.

²⁸ [EESC REX/540 – Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood – A new Agenda for the Mediterranean.](#)

²⁹ [Union for the Mediterranean, 'Social Partners of the Mediterranean region discuss regional social dialogue realities and prospects' \(2023\).](#)

³⁰ [International Labour Organisation, 'Trade, investment and employment in the Southern Mediterranean Countries. Thematic Report of the "Mainstreaming Employment into Trade and Investment in the Southern Neighbourhood" project' \(2022\).](#)

2.5 According to the SAHWE project³¹ and their Youth Survey from 2016, the most significant issues perceived by young people in the Southern Mediterranean are employment, living standards and the economic situation. The paper from Leonie Backeberg & Jochen Tholen (2017)³² provides further insights, analysing the insecurities and lack of opportunities that have prevented young people from becoming independent and fully integrated members of society. This process, commonly referred to as social exclusion, is the focus of the paper, which offers insights into the challenges faced by youth in Arab Mediterranean countries.

The paper identifies three interlinked types of exclusion:

a) Economic Exclusion:

In the dominant public sector, which offers the most employment opportunities, positions are predominantly held by older individuals. Consequently, young people are unable to gain access to these roles, leading to employment in the informal sector. This sector is particularly significant in the Southern Mediterranean. While it provides a source of income for many, it is a vulnerable form of employment that lacks social security services and representation through workers' representatives (social dialogue). The high formal female unemployment rate is a particularly problematic issue, and it appears to be a structural problem in the region. The reasons for this are numerous, including the highly segmented nature of the labour market, the limited mobility of female workers, and the reluctance of companies to compensate maternity leave.

b) Exclusion from social services:

Due to the prevalence of informal employment in the region, access to social security services is severely limited. Historically, social security was provided by family structures. However, with the rural exodus and fast urbanisation, the current system of state provision is insufficient to cover social security, excepting countries with high access to raw materials, such as Algeria. Therefore, the establishment of an efficient state protection system is necessary.

c) Exclusion from civil/political life:

Most regional policy regimes are characterised by a lack of transparency, a weak judiciary, a powerful security apparatus and a lack of opportunities to influence political decision-making. This ultimately results in a lack of confidence in political institutions, employers, the education system and the legal system, which in turn leads to the exclusion of young people from political life.

³¹ [Researching Arab Mediterranean Youth: Towards a New Social Contract \(SAHWA\) | SAHWA | Project | News & Multimedia | FP7 | CORDIS | European Commission \(europa.eu\).](#)

³² "The Frustrated Generation: Youth Exclusion in Arab Mediterranean Societies," published in the Journal of Youth Studies.

3. Involving youth in participatory processes of social and civil dialogue

The basis for a thriving and stable democracy, open and inclusive society, just and prosperous economy is a strong participatory democracy covering strong social and civil dialogue structures.

3.1 Social Dialogue

3.1.1 Social dialogue is defined by the ILO³³ as all types of negotiation, consultation or simply exchange of information between, or among, representatives of governments, employers and workers, on issues of common interest relating to economic and social policy. It can exist as a tripartite process, with the government as an official party to the dialogue or it may consist of bipartite relations between workers and management (or trade unions and employers' organizations), with or without indirect government involvement. Social dialogue processes can be informal or institutionalised, and often it is a combination of the two. It can take place at the national, regional or at enterprise level. It can be inter-professional, sectoral or a combination of these.

3.1.2 The primary objectives of social dialogue are to discuss significant economic and social matters, to encourage effective governance, to stimulate economic growth and to maintain social and industrial harmony, by establishing balanced power relations between employees and employers. Social dialogue facilitates the formation of consensus and encourages democratic involvement. It is noteworthy that social dialogue is not a "right" in itself, but rather a process that occurs when fundamental rights to organise and collectively bargain are exercised including Article 12 "Freedom of assembly and of association" and Article 28 "Right of collective bargaining and action" of the Charter of Fundamental rights of the EU³⁴. One of the main functions of social dialogue, in particular collective bargaining, is to contribute to shaping the business environment and managing changes in working life. This is achieved by providing information, anticipation, participation and facilitation, which in turn builds up mutual trust between social partners.

3.1.3 Studies suggest that social dialogue has contributed over a number of years to economic stability, prosperity and the long-run success of businesses, as well as plays a key role in supporting the transition to democratic, more equitable and sustainable political and economic systems in low- and middle-income countries³⁵.

3.2 Social dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean region

Social dialogue in EU

3.2.1 A common characteristic of countries with strong social dialogue and high collective bargaining coverage is the dominance of sectoral collective bargaining agreements, as well as the effective

33 [ILO, Social Dialogue definition.](#)

34 [European Union, Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union.](#)

35 [Social Dialogue and Economic Performance in CONDITIONS OF WORK AND EMPLOYMENT SERIES 2017.](#)

recognition of the role of social partners by the state through the institutional inclusion of social partners in policymaking.

3.2.2 There are currently eight EU countries where collective bargaining coverage exceeds 80%. Two different systems predominate. On the one hand, the **Gent system** in the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden) and Belgium, which is based on state-subsidised voluntary unemployment insurance administered by the trade unions, which acts as a strong incentive to join trade unions and strengthens social dialogue. On the other hand, the **chamber system** in Austria has the second highest collective bargaining coverage at 98%. This system is based on compulsory membership of all companies in the Chamber of Commerce, which ensures that all sectoral agreements signed by the Chamber cover all employees.

Social dialogue in Southern Mediterranean

3.2.3 According to the European Commission's Communication 'Strengthening Social Dialogue'³⁶, the promotion of international social dialogue is a key objective for the EU. the promotion of the international social dialogue is a core objective for the EU. *There are two main international social dialogue organisations in the region. BUSINESSMED³⁷ is the main regional representative of the private sector, representing the interests of 25 business confederations from countries that are members of the Union for the Mediterranean. The Arab Trade Union Confederation (ATUC)³⁸ represents the interests of workers in the region. Its main objectives include defending the rights and interests of the Arab working class and its trade union movement; securing the right to work and creating equal opportunities for all Arab workers; ensuring the right to organise and collective bargaining and strengthening tripartite dialogue; strengthening the right of working women to employment and equal rights and encouraging their participation in trade union work.*

3.2.4 Social dialogue in the Southern Mediterranean faces many challenges. While national institutions often ensure the provision of tripartite social dialogue at national level, sectoral or bipartite dialogue structures at company level are often very limited.

3.2.5 In Morocco, the backbone of the social dialogue is the tripartite social dialogue on the national level, with institutions such as the Council on Collective Bargaining, the Superior Council on the Promotion of Employment, and the Regional Council on the Promotion of Employment. Most of these bodies are under the leadership of public officials (such as the Ministry of Employment or regional governors), which is often criticized by trade unions. The level of unionisation is relatively low, with less than 10% of the workforce belonging to a union. This figure is higher in urban areas and in the public sector and public companies. There are five main trade unions. Sectoral social dialogue remains weak. At the company level, there is the possibility of electing employee delegates to represent workers' interests. For companies with at least 50 employees, the establishment of an enterprise committee with employer representatives and two employee representatives is mandatory. The economic structure, comprising a high

³⁶ [European Union, 'Strengthening social dialogue in the European Union: harnessing its full potential for managing fair transitions'.](#)

³⁷ <https://www.businessmed-umce.org/en/about>.

³⁸ <https://www.arabtradeunion.org/about-us>.

percentage of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and a strong informal economy, which accounts for 14% to 34% of the GDP. Consequently, social dialogue on a company level remains an exception, and collective agreements remain at a low level.

- 3.2.6 In Tunisia, the tripartite social dialogue is organised by the National Council for Social Dialogue. The scope of its activities is extensive, yet it lacks objective criteria to evaluate its efficiency, which makes it difficult to work effectively. Another criticism is that it is financed and administered by the Ministry of Social Affairs. Moreover, the council lacks legal personhood, thereby undermining its independence. With regard to the bipartite social dialogue, a system of dual employee representation is in place, comprising elected employee delegates (regulated by the Labour Code) and union organisations on company level (not included in the Labour Code). For companies with more than 40 permanent employees, the establishment of a Company Advisory Committee is mandatory. The committee is composed of representatives from both employers and employee representatives. Due to the prevalence of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and the lack of clarity regarding the jurisdiction of the bipartite social dialogue, as well as the limited resources available, social dialogue at the company level remains relatively underdeveloped. Trade unions, which are the primary contact points for workers, are relatively strong at the national level, but remain weak at the company level. The proportion of employees covered by collective bargaining agreements is relatively high in comparison to other countries in the region. However, these agreements are primarily focused on wage issues, with other aspects of work life being largely overlooked.
- 3.2.7 In Jordan, tripartite social dialogue is organised within the Tripartite Committee, whose main purpose is to discuss minimum wages at the national level and which has no official consultative role in other areas. The establishment of workers' organisations is controlled by the Labour Law, which regulates the establishment of new trade unions. A new union requires 50 founding members with Jordanian citizenship (40% of the workforce are foreign workers) and the approval of the tripartite committee. The General Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions is the main union in Jordan, with 17 sectoral unions. Its independence is questioned because it does not hold serious elections. Public sector unions are run as government departments, another sign of the lack of independence of workers' representation. The Federation of Independent Trade Unions is trying to gain recognition, but has been denied official recognition.
- 3.2.8 The situation for workers' rights in Egypt has deteriorated to such an extent that it was labelled one of the world's worst countries for workers in 2018 by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)³⁹. This was due to the intensification of state repression against independent trade unions, which included crackdowns on peaceful strikes and arbitrary arrests of union leaders.

³⁹ [ILO, "The future of work - Trade unions in transformation"](#).

3.3 Figures and Data




Figure 2: Unemployment rate in the Mediterranean region by age (Source: ILOSTAT)





Figure 1: Youth Unemployment rate (15-24) in the Mediterranean region by gender (Source: ILOSTAT)



Source: ILOSTAT.

Figure 3: Level of youth NEET in countries in the region between 2005 and 2019 (percentage)




Figure 4: Total number of youth not in employment, education or training (NEETs) by country (Source: ILOSTAT)




Figure 4: Share of youth not in employment, education or training (NEETs) in percent (%) by country (Source: ILOSTAT)

Data regarding social dialogue in the Mediterranean region

	Trade Union Density⁴⁰	Bargaining Coverage Rate⁴¹	ILO C098⁴²	ILO C135⁴³	ILO C087⁴⁴	ILO C154⁴⁵
Cyprus	43,3% (2016)	43,3% (2016)				
Malta	41,9% (2020)	41,8% (2012)				X
Tunisia	38,1% (2019)	62,9% (2019)				
Italy	32,5% (2019)	99,0% (2019)				X
Israel	25,1% (2017)	28,0% (2016)		X		X
Egypt	23,8% (2010)	3,5% (2008)				X
Occupied Palestinian Territory	21,3% (2018)	----				
Greece	19,0% (2014)	25,8% (2018)				
Portugal	15,3% (2016)	76,5% (2018)				X
Spain	12,4% (2019)	80,1% (2018)				
Morocco	10,9% (2019)	3,0% (2020)			X	
Turkey	9,8% (2019)	7,4% (2019)				X
Algeria	----	----				X
Jordan	----	----			X	X
Libya	----	----		X		X
Lebanon	----	----		X	X	X

Source: [ILOSTAT](#) Industrial Relations Data (IRdata)

40 Trade union density rate = Number of employee union members / Total number of employees.

41 Collective bargaining coverage rate = Number of employees covered by collective bargaining / Number of employees with the right to collective bargaining.

42 [ILO C098 - Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 \(No. 98\)](#).

43 [ILO C135 - Workers' Representatives Convention, 1971 \(No. 135\)](#).

44 [ILO C087 - Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 \(No. 87\)](#).

45 [ILO C154 - Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 \(No. 154\)](#).

3.4 Civil dialogue

3.4.1 Though no universal definition of civil society has been adopted by any European or international institution, CSOs are widely recognized as pivotal for ensuring that citizens' voices are heard in decision-making processes across the various dimension of the civil dialogue. Data shows that citizens have a high level of trust in civil society organisations: 87% of Europeans consider it important that civil society can operate freely and hold those in power accountable⁴⁶. Findings of the recent Eurobarometer also confirm that civil society participation is increasingly seen as an effective way to make citizens' voices heard by decision makers⁴⁷. Finally, the decline of traditional participative mechanisms, impacting in particular the youth, points to the urgency to invest more in civil dialogue with a view to modernise and enhance participation tools.⁴⁸

3.4.2 Civil dialogue is widely recognized as the cornerstone of participatory democracy, facilitating inclusive decision-making processes. In the perspective of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), civil dialogue encompasses two interrelated dimensions. The **dialogue among organizations** representing civil society and the **structured dialogue**⁴⁹ between civil society organizations and Governmental and intergovernmental institutions. The two-fold framework of civil dialogue reflects the EESC's recognition that: i) "Civil society organisations are the expression and result of a society's power to self-organise distinctly and independently from public institutions and the state"⁵⁰; ii) Trade unions and employers' organisations form an integral part of civil society; however, they are distinct from civil society organisations in their capacity as social partners"⁵¹.

3.4.3 Civil dialogue ensures that policies are informed by the perspectives and needs of diverse stakeholders by: i) providing a platform for stakeholders to identify emerging challenges and explore innovative solutions to address them; ii) fostering coordination and leveraging collective expertise to assess the impact of policies on different societal groups.

3.4.4 EESC delineates three essential components of EU civil dialogue:

a) Sectoral Dialogue:

- This component involves dialogue between civil society organizations (CSOs) and relevant authorities within both EU and national levels on specific policy areas. It aims to address issues pertinent to particular sectors such as environment, labour rights, consumer protection, and education.

⁴⁶ Civil Society Europe, [The impact of civil society organisations in Europe](#) (2019).

⁴⁷ Special Eurobarometer 500 (October-November 2020), [Future of Europe](#), p. 19.

⁴⁸ See for example European Commission, [Political Participation and EU Citizenship: Perceptions and Behaviours of Young People](#) (2016) and European Citizen Action Service (June 2015), [Co-deciding with Citizens: Towards Digital Democracy at EU Level](#).

⁴⁹ Structured Dialogue, as conceptualized by the EU, is an approach to engaging in a two-way communication with stakeholders in a planned, regular, and transparent manner. It goes beyond mere consultations ensuring a follow-up with continued feedback.

⁵⁰ European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion "[SOC/782 – Strengthening civil dialogue and participatory democracy in the EU: a path forward](#)" (2024).

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

- Sectoral dialogue allows CSOs to engage with policymakers, share expertise, provide input on legislative proposals, and contribute to policy-making processes. It facilitates collaboration and ensures that policies are informed by the perspectives and needs of diverse stakeholders.
 - Sectoral dialogue provides a platform for stakeholders to identify emerging challenges, explore innovative solutions, and assess the impact of policies on different societal groups. It enables stakeholders to work together towards the development of effective and equitable policies that address sector-specific needs
- b) Transversal Dialogue:
- Transversal dialogue refers to structured and regular exchanges between EU institutions or their national counterparts and civil society organizations on broader issues related to the development of the EU and its crosscutting policies.
 - Unlike sectoral dialogue, transversal dialogue focuses on overarching themes and policies that affect multiple sectors and have implications for various aspects of society. Examples include discussions on EU budget priorities, climate change mitigation strategies, and social inclusion initiatives.
 - This form of dialogue allows for comprehensive discussions on issues of common interest, fosters coordination among different stakeholders, and promotes coherence in EU policies across different policy areas.
- c) Horizontal Dialogue:
- Horizontal dialogue involves interactions among civil society organizations themselves regarding the development of EU policies and their crosscutting implications.
 - It provides a platform for CSOs to exchange information, coordinate actions, build alliances, and develop joint advocacy strategies. Horizontal dialogue enables CSOs to amplify their voices, leverage collective expertise and resources, and enhance their effectiveness in influencing EU decision-making processes.
 - This component emphasizes the importance of collaboration and solidarity among civil society actors to address shared challenges and advance common objectives within the European context.

3.4.5 These three components of civil dialogue serve two main purposes. Firstly, they facilitate engagement and collaboration among diverse groups, which fosters social cohesion and solidarity. Secondly, they provide opportunities for individuals and organizations to offer feedback and recommendations on policy proposals and their implementation strategies. This fosters transparency, accountability, and inclusivity in public governance, ultimately enhancing the legitimacy and effectiveness of policies and legislative initiatives.

3.5 Civil dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean region

Civil dialogue in the EU

3.5.1 Article 11 of the TEU emphasizes the need for an open, transparent, and regular dialogue between EU institutions and organized civil society. Especially in the current a context of growing disconnect between people and political institutions, exacerbated by perceived inadequacies in addressing pressing societal concerns such as climate change, social cohesion, and unemployment, civil dialogue emerges as a crucial mechanism for addressing citizen frustrations while legitimizing policies, bridging the gap between citizens and decision-makers.

3.5.2 However, for EU civil dialogue to be meaningful, an enabling environment characterized by civic

freedom, transparency ensuring and accessibility to information and opportunities is paramount⁵². Few key challenges and related recommendation can be highlighted on this regards⁵³:

- a) The absence of common standards for civil dialogue practices and a comprehensive regulatory framework, coupled with the lack of dedicated support structures, contributes to significant variation in engagement practices across institutions. This leads to fragmentation, inconsistency, and informality in civil dialogue, notably with institutions like the Council of the EU and the European Parliament.
 - Implementing civil dialogue frameworks, like the one for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), can provide structured mechanisms for engagement.
- b) Historical approaches to civil society participation have predominantly been instrumental, lacking inclusivity and fostering concerns regarding accountability and transparency. These approaches have primarily focused on consultation rather than fostering genuine dialogue.
 - Establishing dedicated teams or contact points within EU institutions, such as the Directorate-General TRADE's Transparency, Civil Society, and Communication team, can facilitate regular and structured dialogue with CSOs.
- c) While sectoral dialogue occurs with some frequency, transversal dialogue lacks regularity and structured processes. Many dialogue opportunities are one-off events, resulting in discontinuity and inconsistency. There has been a limited investment in cultivating a culture of civil dialogue and participation, both at the EU and national levels.
 - Regular evaluations of civil dialogue processes can help identify shortcomings and areas for improvement, leading to more effective and inclusive engagement practices.
- d) Civil society organizations (CSOs) encounter challenges in accessing and participating in decision-making processes, particularly concerning EU policies and legislation. This is exacerbated by a perceived imbalance between CSOs and private lobbies, wherein the latter often possess superior outreach and influence.
 - Formal or informal coalitions can enhance the collective impact of civil society engagement.

3.5.3 Despite the challenges faced in civil dialogue practices, there are promising opportunities emerging to enhance the situation. Among these opportunities are:

⁵² [The Code of Good Practice for Civil Participation in the Decision-Making Process](#) adopted by the Council of Europe (2009) summarises key principles and conditions which can act as a guide.

⁵³ European Civic Forum "[Towards an open, transparent, and structured EU civil dialogue](#)" (2021).

- a) EU-UK Civil Society Forum: as part of the [Brexit Trade and Cooperation Agreement](#), efforts are being made to set up a structure that can permanently facilitate and coordinate civil dialogue at national level on EU issues
- b) EU Recovery Package: as explicitly mentioned in the [Regulation](#), CSOs' had the opportunity to participate in the drafting and implementation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plans (though some deficiencies and gaps within the process has been [reported](#))
- c) Malta Civil Society Fund: as initiatives promoted by Malta Council for the Volunteer Sector in partnership with the Ministry of Education and Employment, a [programme](#) has been launched in 2020 offering financial assistance and training opportunities for CSOs to strengthen their capacity and engagement in EU policymaking processes.

Civil dialogue in Southern Mediterranean

3.5.4 The Southern Mediterranean region presents a more complex and dynamic landscape for civil dialogue, marked by a combination of opportunities and challenges. Civil dialogue practices vary widely across countries in the Southern Mediterranean, reflecting diverse political contexts, historical legacies, and levels of civic development. Civic dialogue in the Mediterranean region is influenced also by cultural norms and social dynamics. Traditional values, religious beliefs, and societal structures influence the willingness of individuals and groups to engage in public discourse. In some cases, cultural factors may either facilitate or hinder open dialogue and collaboration between different segments of society. While some nations have established robust mechanisms for dialogue and engagement, others struggle with bureaucratic hurdles and limited space for civil society. Legal frameworks regulating civil society often impose arbitrary restrictions on freedom of association, expression, and assembly, constraining the ability of CSOs to operate independently and advocate for change. State-led co-optation of CSOs, selective funding, and censorship of independent voices undermine the autonomy and effectiveness of civil society organizations.

3.5.5 Efforts to promote regional cooperation and collaboration among CSOs in the Southern Mediterranean have faced challenges due to political tensions, security concerns, and resource constraints. Despite challenges, civil society in the Southern Mediterranean demonstrates resilience, creativity, and a strong commitment to democratic values and social change. New trends and emerging spaces represents promising elements for the development of the civil dialogue:

- a) The establishment of many grassroots movements leading initiatives such as multilateral forums, civil society networks, and cross-border partnerships are fostering dialogue, collaboration, and mutual understanding among countries in the region⁵⁴.
- b) Youth engagement is increasingly recognized as a crucial component of civic dialogue in the Mediterranean region. Young people represent a significant demographic group (around 45 % of the population in the region is below the age of 25) with unique perspectives, energy, and innovative ideas. Efforts to empower youth, promote their participation in decision-making processes, and address their concerns are being deployed ⁵⁵.

⁵⁴ See the research "[Bridging the sea: a Review of Mediterranean Civil Society](#)" (2021) developed within the framework of the EU-funded initiative "Med Dialogue".

⁵⁵ See the research "[Mapping Youth Civil Society Actors in Euro-Med](#)" (2021) developed within the framework of the EU-funded initiative "Majalat II".

- c) The proliferation of digital technologies has transformed the landscape of civic dialogue in the Mediterranean region. Social media platforms, online forums, and digital communication tools have provided new avenues for citizens to express their views, organize campaigns, and connect with like-minded individuals across borders. However, digital spaces also present challenges related to misinformation, online harassment, and digital divides that need to be addressed to ensure inclusive and constructive civic dialogue⁵⁶.

3.5.6 Structured reforms enhancing legal protections for civil society, robust investment in funding and a comprehensive capacity building scheme could effectively enable civil society actors to influence policy outcomes and address pressing social issues through civil dialogue. Those measures to support and empower civil society actors require sustained efforts from governments, regional organizations, and international partners. Two examples of the joint efforts between Institutions and CSOs to enhance civil dialogue in the region are:

- a) [The Med Dialogue for Rights and Equality](#) (MDRE) II is the second phase of an EU funded initiative that aims to increase the participation of civil society groups in policy-making processes in the South Mediterranean and facilitate constructive dialogues between the Southern Neighbourhood and EU institutions. The project seeks to improve the skills of civil society leaders, support EU-CSO structured dialogue processes, and improve the DG NEAR HQ's and EU Delegations' capacities to work with civil society. By providing technical coordination, facilitating synergies, and offering methodological support, the MDRE enhances the efficacy of regional dialogues.
- b) "[Majalat](#)": a regional platform launched in 2018 for civil society structured dialogue in the Arab region, enabling CSOs involvement also in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). With the support of the EU, a consortium of six Civil Society Organisations from the Euro-Mediterranean region created spaces for dialogue between CSOs, trade unions, social movements and academics from both shores of the Mediterranean and the EU. A second phase "Majalat-II" is currently running until 2025 as part of the Civil Society Facility for the Mediterranean and consist also of a sub-granting programme supporting actions to:
- develop policy papers, studies, reports that inform evidence-based recommendations to decision-makers in the region;
 - organise workshops/conferences/seminars/to increase the CSO participation in local/national/regional/ EU policy dialogues;
 - develop platforms and coalitions that can amplify advocacy messages and policy inputs as well as stimulate multi-stakeholder engagement.

3.5.7 Overall, the majority of CSOs in the Southern Mediterranean region envision the need for building the Mediterranean as an integrated common space. In this regard, many organisations are working in a transnational way to foster rights and influence common Mediterranean policies through advocating for common interests, rule of law, human rights, youth participation and the consolidation of CSO networks across the region⁵⁷.

Questions for the workshops in the first study group:

⁵⁶ See the Euromesco policy brief "[Youth deliberation and participation in the euro-mediterranean region](#)" (2023).

⁵⁷ "[Bridging the sea: a Review of Mediterranean Civil Society](#)" (2021).

3.6 Social dialogue workshop

These questions were the basis for the workshop in the first study group in which youth representatives from the Anna Lindh Foundation, Business Europe and ETUC, as well as a part of the EESC study group members have discussed the topic of the opinion and gave their input. The output was the basis for the first draft of the opinion.

- (1) What are the main challenges faced by the youth of the Euro-Mediterranean region when they try to get involved in the existing social dialogue structures?
- (2) What are the main challenges faced by the youth of the Euro-Mediterranean region when they try to get involved in the existing civil dialogue structures?
- (3) What actions should be taken to strengthen the voice of young people in existing social dialogue structures?
- (4) What can be done to include young people who are not participating in/are excluded from existing social dialogue structures?

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