



Unmasking the far right anti-worker agenda

About the EESC Workers' Group

The Workers' Group comprises representatives from national trade unions, confederations and sectoral federations. Its members represent over 80 trade union organisations – the vast majority of them affiliated to the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) or its sectoral federations.

It is firmly committed to the enlargement and strengthening of the EU, as an area of prosperity, freedom and democracy, mutual support, solidarity and social cohesion, and aims to ensure that workers can play a real part in European policy-making.

Author:

Stefan Moragues Benito

June 2024



Unmasking the far-right anti-worker agenda

Executive summary

Far-right parties are gaining significant traction in Europe, potentially becoming the third or fourth-largest group in the European Parliament after the upcoming European elections. This shift presents a critical threat to the rights and freedoms of millions of workers across the continent. Despite their claims of representing the 'common worker', the voting patterns of these parties reveal a starkly different reality.

Our new study highlights the consistent pattern of opposing or abstaining from key legislative initiatives designed to protect and improve workers' lives. **On average, Identity and Democracy (ID) voted against or abstained on pro-worker laws 64% of the time, while European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) did so 73% of the time.** This makes them the groups most frequently voting against workers' interests compared to other parliamentary groups.

To assess the impact of far-right parties on workers' rights, the EESC Workers' Group has selected eight key votes in the European Parliament based on their potential to significantly affect workers' lives, addressing issues such as corporate accountability, in-work poverty, minimum wages, gender pay gap, financial aid for vulnerable households, working conditions for platform workers, and taxation of multinational corporations.

Key Findings:

Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive: Far-right parties overwhelmingly voted against or abstained on measures aimed at holding companies accountable for maintaining fair labor practices across their supply chains. **No less than 94% of ID voted against, as well as 93% of ECR.**

Resolution to Reduce In-Work Poverty: Both ID and ECR displayed significant opposition to a resolution designed to combat in-work poverty. ID voted 62% against, with 37% abstentions, while ECR showed 57% abstentions and 30% opposition. **Only 1% of ID's MEPs and 13% of ECR MEPs voted in favor of this resolution.**

Adequate Minimum Wages Directive: When given the chance to ensure adequate minimum wages, essential for decent working and living conditions, ID and ECR again predominantly voted

against or abstained, **with 69% of ID voting against and 2% abstaining, while 36% of ECR voted against and 45% abstained.**

EU Pay Transparency Directive: When the EU tried to tackle the gender pay gap, ID and ECR's votes were again telling. ID voted 26% against and abstained at 34%, while 29% of ECR voted against the Directive and 67% abstained. **Only 4% of ECR's MEPs voted in favor of the Directive.**

Just Transition Fund: ID showed minimal support for helping regions and workers transition to a net-zero carbon economy. **ID voted 30% against and abstained at 33%,** while ECR showed a more mixed response with 13% against and 11% abstentions.

Social Climate Fund: Measures to support vulnerable households in energy or transport poverty faced significant opposition from ID, with 63% of votes against; and ECR voting 22% against and 52% abstentions. **Only 37% of ID's MEPs voted in favor, while 100% of the Green, S&D, and EPP voted in favor of the legislation.**

Platform Work Directive: While legislation aimed at improving working conditions for platform workers was widely supported by all groups, ID and ECR displayed the biggest opposition as well as a significant number of abstentions, with ID voting only 68% in favor and ECR only 65%. **In comparison, the Greens and the Left voted 100% in favor, the S&D 96%, and EPP 93%**

Minimum Taxation for Multinational Corporations: In votes on establishing a minimum tax rate for multinational companies, ID and ECR were once again largely unsupportive. **Only 38% of ID voted in favour and only 27% of ECR.**

This analysis highlights the dissonance between the far-right's rhetoric and their actual legislative actions, revealing an agenda that significantly undermines worker rights and protections. While many far-right politicians present themselves as defending the true interests of the people and protecting them from the excesses of capitalism, the facts reveal that this is just part of a populist strategy, and that is not subsequently translated into measures that actually improve workers' working and living conditions. When facing a choice between workers and collective bargaining rights or power, the far right is always ready to betray their social promises to access government.

Unmasking the far rights' anti-worker agenda.

Table of Contents

Executive summary	3
Abstract	6
Introduction.....	6
The far right and Trade Unions.....	7
Trade Unions' pose an existential threat for the far right	7
How the far right undermines Social Dialogue and Trade Unions	9
Far right towards labour and welfare policy	11
1- The ambivalence of the far right to pro-worker policy and social welfare.....	12
2- Welfare Chauvinism	14
3 - Far right in the parliament: Voting patterns.....	15
Methodology	16
1 - Logic	16
2 - Data Selection	17
3 - Results.....	22
Conclusion	25
Bibliography	27
ANNEX 1 – Individual Votes.....	30
Annex 2 -Aggregated Votes.....	38

Abstract

Polls and media outlets are predicting that far right parties will achieve their highest number of Members of the European Parliament (EP) since its first legislature. Even if there is great variation in social and labour policy among far right parties, some attitudes are consistent among them: they reject a universalist perspective towards labour and social rights, and they support welfare programmes only when it can propel them to government.

Far- right parties' attitude towards labour law is better understood alongside their relations with Trade Unions, characterised by their differences and incompatibility.

The voting record of the far right Members of the European Parliament shows that they blockade legislative initiatives to further labour rights, collective bargaining and universal welfare. The votes of the members in the far right Euro-groups are blocking initiatives that European Trade Unions place at the top of their agenda. Therefore, a Parliament with an enlarged far right presence could prevent key social policy from being approved.

Introduction

Far right political parties are predicted by pollsters (Europe Elects, 2024; Ipsos & EuroNews, 2024) and media outlets (Welt.de, 2024; R. Suanzes, 2023) to make great gains in both the European and national elections that will take place across Europe in 2024.

The European Parliamentary elections of 2019 resulted in the Parliament with most far right Eurosceptic Members of the European Parliament (MEP). The poll aggregator Europe Elects, in its March 2024 edition, predicted that the openly Eurosceptic far right Identity and Democracy (ID) Parliamentary Group would rise to 78 MEPs, from the 59 where it is currently

standing. The same poll aggregator foresaw a growth from 68 to 78 MEPs for the conservative European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) party¹.

Due to the ambivalent and sometimes hostile attitudes of European far right parties to universal welfare and labour representation, a conservative coalition at the European level holds the potential to blockade social policy. In this paper, we argue that the far right is consistent throughout Europe in eroding workers' rights, collective bargaining and social progress, and that the same strategies that parties are using to blockade social progress in national legislative chambers is already being deployed in the European Parliament.

While far right parties currently are a minority block without any easy alliance to fully block progressive initiatives, a shift in the parliament's composition could propel the Far right to the next stage of campaign against social policy in Europe. If the Parliaments composition shifts as the polls foresee, the chamber would tilt rightwards enough to allow far right alliances with the least moderate wings of the centre-right political families.

By comparing the votes of the different European political families to the legislative initiatives that further Trade Union objectives, we illustrate the potential difficulties that labour and social policy might face in the upcoming legislature, if the far right upsurge materializes. We look at a series of votes of high importance to the European Organised Labour movement, and find how MEPs of different political families have voted, as well as looking at an aggregated data set to find out which political groups have been most consistently opposed to labour legislation.

The far right and Trade Unions

Trade Unions' pose an existential threat for the far right

Unionisation at the workplace and independent Trade Unions pose a threat to the far right, by their very nature. This is because "Us vs Them" dynamics based upon nativist lines are usually incompatible with worker representation, and because collective bargaining is based upon

¹ The final configuration of the political groups is still unclear however, as seen in the recent case of ID expelling the german AfD party. (<https://www.politico.eu/article/far-right-identity-and-democracy-group-expels-alternative-for-germany/>)

reasonable compromise, while populist far right rhetoric hinges upon antagonising its political enemies.

Workers' rights are represented collectively and uniformly for workers, often in workplaces environments. Representatives give up in identarian splits among the represented, to bring forth a univocal position to negotiations, which aim to grant equal rights to all of the benefitting workers. For this reason, attempts at driving a wedge among workers based on ethnicity tends to fall flat to Trade Unions. Unionisation of the workplace is potentially a unifying force open to humans coming from diverse backgrounds, who find their interests aligned in the struggle for labour rights. (Bieling, 2023).

Instead, Trade Unions build bridges among workers within similar labour contexts to better perform their role of representing and negotiating conditions. For Trade Unions to be effective, they have to embrace a universalist approach to rights and justice that disregards identarian divisions. Not only are Trade Unions at the vanguard of detecting and denouncing existing inequalities affecting migrant workers, but indeed the efforts to broaden their base and unionise migrants have reinforced their capacity to act and better working conditions.

Collective bargaining is a process of negotiation between two parts with opposing interests, which ends satisfactorily only when a workable compromise is agreed upon both parts. Naturally then, negotiations of collective bargaining require the capacity to understand the two initially antagonistic positions and reach a mutually beneficial synthesis. Far right parties however, base their worldview on antagonistic divisions that cannot reach a reasonable compromise (Mudde & Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 2017). As concluded by the 5th UNIEuropa conference, "Collective bargaining is an antidote to populism" (2021); it forces bargaining parts to carefully consider and understand opposing interests and to compose compromise which is acceptable and mutually beneficial.

Certain surveys (Mosimann, Rennwald, & Zimmermann, 2019; Arndt & Rennwald, 2016) show that Trade Union members are significantly less likely to hold Far right views or to be affiliated with the Far right, which further cements the idea that being involved in Union activities of worker representation and collective bargaining prevents citizens from holding antagonising and nativist views on politics and rights (Leonardi & Carrieri, 2020).

How the far right undermines Social Dialogue and Trade Unions

Far right parties across Europe undermine Trade Unions through at least four different strategies: by publicly questioning the value of organised labour in policy-making and in the workplace, by defunding existing social dialogue institutions once in government, and by establishing parallel politically loyal Trade Unions. Finally, far right parties can deter or block legislation in the legislative chambers, with this paper focusing on this last strategy, and its potential to obstruct social or labour policy in the European Parliament.

Members of far right parties decry established Trade Unions as "cosmopolitan elite" and as conspiring against "the people" (Canovan, 1997; Mudde, 2007). Parties frame Trade Unions and their historical achievements as elite insiders, as consenters to a decline of the standards of living of the majority. They are tapping onto the worries of a decline in quality of life and impoverishment, and blaming all their political enemies as part of an "elite". As mentioned above, there are structural reasons as to why the worldviews of Trade Unions and the populist nativist clash. They present foreign agents or "Radical Islam" as the source of the economic woes of an electorate living through the decline of welfare society (Keune & Pochet, 2023; Waddington, Müller, & Vandaele, 2023).

When Emmanuel Macron visited Trade Union representatives during a strike at a closing manufacturing plant in France, Marine Le Pen, leading figure of the French Rassemblement National, made her public appearance among the striking workers. The following quote taps onto the antagonism that the far right presents, where traditional leftwing rhetoric is used, but also where an attempt of socio-cultural identification happens, as she depicts herself as part of the 'honest working man' of the people (Ostiguy, 2017):

“Everyone knows what side Emmanuel Macron is on – he is on the side of the corporations. I am on the workers’ side, here in the car park, not in restaurants in Amiens. [...] He’s showing disdain for workers, so I’ve come to see them.”

(Marine Le Pen, as per Angelique Chrisafis in TheGuardian.com, 2017)

By waging consistent media warfare against established Trade Unions and re-framing economic problems as ethnic or identitarian problems, far right parties are contesting the working principles and worldview necessary for organised workers to achieve better collective bargaining. The identification process seen above is used to gather support among workers without necessarily proposing concrete policy measures. Le Pen's factory visit played a double role, as presenting established negotiating Trade Unions and the President of the Republic as alienated from the "honest working men", and posing herself as close to the demands of the protesting workers, even if the far right politician belongs to the establishment herself and elsewhere, the party is imposing fiscal restraint and worsening conditions (Van Leeuwen & Halleck Vega, 2021).

This hostile attitude towards collective bargaining and Trade Unions translates also to the behaviour of the parties when in executive power. The alliances forged by far right parties tend to be with political parties which consent to the erosion of social dialogue, usually forming coalitions with liberal parties, centre parties or right-wing parties. When reaching executive power through coalition with other parties, they become consenters to the erosion of social dialogue and trade union representation. When achieving majorities ample enough to become governing parties, the attacks upon Trade Unions become more open, and social provisions based upon equality through work are diminished or cut (Röth, Afonso, & Spies, 2017).

The Swedish government agreement signed in 2022 between the Swedish liberal, Christian democrat, right and far right parties prominently features corporate, worker and pension tax cuts, reductions on employment benefits and reductions on subsidies for households to deal with the energy crisis (Prime Ministers' Office, 2022). Although at the time of writing still remains in provisional form, the broad coalition agreement for a Dutch government lead by the populist far right "Party for Freedom" features similar tax reductions and restructuring of unspecified executive power services (Kabinetsformatie, 2024).

Finally, there is a history of establishing non-independent Trade Unions which follow closely party lines. While these far right Trade Unions rarely achieve a high degree of penetration or coverage, the capacity for the far right to either establish aligned Trade Unions or to support fringe ones aligning closely with their political aims should not be underestimated (Kim, Greef, & Schroeder, 2022).

It is the case with the Spanish "Solidaridad" Union, which is headed by a VOX deputy and erased any form of internal democracy, or of the "Solidarity" Union, closely tied with the British National Party.

These Unions tend to be fringe ones, with small coverage and often times are excluded from umbrella confederations of Unions or from chambers of social dialogue. In certain cases, such as with the now defunct "Syndicats de Front National", they were outlawed due to their lack of political independence.

However, establishing parallel Trade Unions to compete and share spaces with established Trade Unions serves too as a strategy to wear out and challenge the position of independent Trade Unions, while competing for available resources and the loyalty of workers.

The strategies employed by far right organisations for undermining Trade Unions and Worker representation are many, including through rhetorical defamation, hostile policy-making and parallel Unions.

Far right towards labour and welfare policy

The euro-crisis that followed the 2008 financial crash weakened Trade Unions and collective bargaining across Europe. It also prompted confrontation between the EU institutions and the labour movement across Europe (Müller & Platzer, 2016; European Commission, 2012). Far right parties are emerging in a context where public solidarity institutions find themselves in crisis, after a decade of austerity policy implemented by compliant parties and restructuring programmes (Keune & Pochet, 2023). Budgetary cuts have left the institutions that granted security to workers and citizens in precarious conditions, and the milestone agreements that are the legacy of trade unions weakened (Stöss, 2017). In the face of institutions that no longer can guarantee stable lives, material wellbeing and full employment, trust in public institutions is falling.

At the same time, social dialogue and the mechanisms to support it are constantly jeopardised and called into question by far right parties hostile to social dialogue. For example, in the Spanish region of Castilla Leon, the OIT denounced last year a dramatic backsliding in the quality of social dialogue, as the far right VOX party withheld the budget for dispute-settling

bodies (ILO, 2023). In Finland, the coalition government which is headed by Petteri Orpo, within which the far right populist party of True Finns is included has proposed a comprehensive proposal for reforming work policy in the country, which among others, would allow for collective agreements to be overridden by legislation, restrict the right to strike and worsen the conditions of temporary workers (IndustriAll, 2023).

This push for de-regulation of labour markets and moderation of wage-setting instruments across Europe has eroded significantly Social Dialogue across Europe, and left Unions handicapped in their acting capacity (Waddington, Müller, & Vandaele, 2023; Tricart, 2020). Social welfare and social dialogue are currently standing at a precarious footing, and budgetary cuts mean that parties in government are faced with choices about which public programmes to support and which to cut.

The current far right arises now amidst welfare institutions in crisis, after a decade of austerity which plummeted trust in national and European institutions (Biten, Kuhn, & Brug, 2022). As a response to precarious welfare, they consent to further cuts when in government and advocate nativist welfare, tailored to their electorate. Instead of social dialogue, in most cases they demand the dismantling of Trade Unions and the political party as the sole interlocutor for workers.

1- The ambivalence of the far right to pro-worker policy and social welfare.

Ambivalence and electoral calculations are the prevailing trait of the European far right towards labour policy and social welfare policy. Across far right parties in Europe, there is variation on party lines regarding the desirable scope of the welfare state and the role of Trade Unions as social interlocutors. Consistent attitudes can better be unveiled by looking at the specific national political scenarios in which parties operate, and how parties form their political stances.

Far right parties appeal to voters that are sceptical of established decision-making institutions such as traditional parties and social partners, but not of social welfare. Therefore, to ensure electoral gains they must appeal to this voter base, but change their party line to take part in

government with centrist and right-wing parties. Within these coalitions, the far right becomes a consenter to fiscal restraint and attacks to Trade Unions.

Alfonso's 2015 study of far right parties in Switzerland, The Netherlands and Austria showed that far right parties shifted their attitudes towards cuts in pension allowances during election time, during coalition-making and when in government. Before elections and during campaigning period, parties were supportive of strong social welfare and pensions. When negotiating coalitions with other parties, the studied parties blurred their positions on welfare. Finally, far right parties that reached government through coalition faced loss of votes when enacting anti-worker policy and cuts in welfare, and so they either kept their position blurred or de-stabilize their coalition by refusing to enact the cuts (Alfonso, 2015).

Far right parties hold ambiguous positions regarding welfare state reforms, and conceal their positions when implementing cuts to bargaining power or welfare to save governing coalitions. Politicians then face the choice of either "betraying" their coalition or "betraying" their voters, by either consenting to welfare cuts or breaking government by calling for nativist social welfare. Party position on labour policy and social welfare is highly dependent on internal calculations to attract voters or to hold office.

This ambiguity and double-faced attitude to welfare is supported by further studies by Rathgeb and Klitgaard (2022), who found that far right parties hold different stances towards Trade Unions and Collective bargaining based on opportunistic calculations: when social-democratic parties and Trade Unions have strong organisational ties, far right parties will virulently attack the authority of Trade Unions, trying to undermine the institutional power of Unions as they also claim to represent working class voters. However, when the ties between social-democratic parties and Trade Unions are looser, far right parties forego firm attacks on Unions and instead become consenters of the erosion of their power. Relations with Trade Unions are defined then not by party support to labour policy and better collective bargaining, but by the potential political gain from attacking social-democratic parties.

The alliances that the far right can construct are systematically on the detriment of labour legislation and the welfare state. Social Democratic parties, which are the most likely to have deeply grained ties with Labour organisations are rarely coalition partners with the far right. More often, coalitions involving the far right parties have been alongside right or liberal parties,

as consenters of the erosion of Trade Union institutionalization and workers' bargaining power (Rathgeb & Klitgaard, 2022). Indeed, the far right forms coalitions only with those parties that might be more detached from organised labour, and are eager to implement fiscal restraint and to recede workers' rights.

2- Welfare Chauvinism

Downplaying socio-economic relations is at the core of the far right parties political and discursive agenda. Instead, they emphasize the construction of "Insider-Outsider" dichotomies. Rather than focusing on an economic axis of conflict, far right parties are emphasising a cultural divide that creates outsiders and insiders, largely upon nativist lines (Hix, Whitaker, & Zapryanova, 2023; Oesch & Rennwald, 2018). By constructing an In-group and an Out-group which largely rests upon conceptions of the "autochthonous" and the "allochthonous", far right parties portray themselves as legitimate representatives of the "autochthonous" in-group, which is proclaimed as more deserving of rights and state resources than the "allochthonous" out-group (Mudde & Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 2017).

This constructed division of society, is then reflected on the institutional arrangements and policy positions sported by the far right parties, particularly in regards to the scope that welfare should adopt in assisting vulnerable groups in society. Bieling (2023) states that parties have in the recent years focused more sharply in ethnical divisions and their positions have been radicalised:

"Most Radical Populist Right parties tend to strengthen the distributional aspects of the welfare state in order to implement a nativist, migrant-excluding practice that instead benefits their own clientele. In return, the social investment welfare state services that are accessible to all and have egalitarian effects, such as active labour market policies, education and other social infrastructures, are neglected or cut."

(Bieling, 2023, p. 7)

3 - Far right in the parliament: Voting patterns

European far right political parties achieved their highest number of representatives to the European Parliament at the 2019 European Elections. While some far right parties joined the European Conservatives and Reformists group, others formed a new political family called Identity and Democracy and others are as non-attached. Currently, an agreement among the centre, left, green and centre-right political groups prevented the ID group from chairing legislative committees, and from successfully putting forth legislative proposals. The ECR group is regarded as a more "respectable" political family and takes part in committees and negotiations as the rest of the groups.

The groups that sit on the right of the European People's Party (EPP) in the European Parliament are deeply divided, and since the 2019 elections have struggled to form a coherent block. Their divisions concern matters of clashing international allegiances, ideologies, degrees of extremism and clashes of personality (Balas, 2023).

Although the parties are divided amongst them, they are still dividing the Parliament into two camps. Far right parties are holding positions that are regarded as increasingly irreconcilable with those of the social-democratic parties. A series of surveys and interviews of MEPs conducted between 2000 and 2015 recorded individual MEPs attitudes towards different policy topics, finding longitudinal changes in attitudes from members along the ideological spectrum (Hix, Whitaker, & Zapryanova, 2023). Researchers found policy positions are becoming increasingly polarised and one dimensional, in other words, MEPs are increasingly becoming divided into two groups that hold opinions and beliefs that are difficult to bridge. Rather than being divided solely on economic, socio-cultural or integration issues, Researchers find that European politics are increasingly divided in two camps, which they name "traditional-authoritarian-nationalist" on the one hand and "green-alternative-liberal" on the other, and these camps diverge in issues of economic policy, EU integration and socio-cultural policy. Those parties on the "traditional-authoritarian-nationalist" extreme of the axis, among which the far right parties sit squarely, are adopting increasingly negative views on employment policy, intervention in the economy and social safety nets, as well as in policy regarding economic integration of the EU. According to Hix, Whitaker and Zapryanova, from the year 2000 until 2015, there increasingly exist only two opposing camps in the EU Parliament, with

one supporting conservative social policy, free market, deregulation, fiscal constraint. and nationalist policies, and the other camp protecting social welfare, employment policy, an economy under control, green policy and EU integration (2023). They conclude that the EPP sits squarely in the middle of this cleavage.

Methodology

By analysing publicly available data on Roll Call Voting and splitting it by political families, we come to find statistically significant patterns in blocking legislation aligned with the European Trade Union goals. Legislative initiatives have been selected insofar as they aligned with the European Economic and Social Committee Workers' Group priorities, and available European Parliament voting data has been codified and structured to conduct analysis on multiple dossiers.

The gathered roll-call votes have then been scrutinised individually and in relation with each other, revealing which parties are supporting labour policy, which ones aren't, and where there is division.

Then, the data is regarded in an aggregated format. By aggregating the voting data of multiple dossiers and splitting it by Euro-groups, we can assess and test the significance of the voting patterns, and draw conclusions on whether any particular groups are consistent in their opposition.

1 - Logic

The study consists on a quantitative analysis of Roll Call Vote from multiple votes in the European Parliament Plenary Sessions. The logic of the study is that, if MEPs from a Eurogroup are consistently reject the legislative initiatives meant to better working conditions, empower unionisation, protect collective bargaining and create safety nets for workers, then they will not support or propose such policy during the upcoming legislature. If the upcoming legislature contains an expanded presence of the far right, this political block could effectively blockade pieces of legislation essential for social progress, or propose own initiative reports with the aim of curtailing existing arrangements.

Therefore, we compare how parties voted to recent legislative initiatives that would impact European workers. We do this by gathering the data on how parties have voted for relevant legislation and splitting the results of the roll-call votes by political families.

While parties can reject individual pieces of legislation for contingent reasons, patterns can be outlined by comparing voting positions to multiple policies. For that reason, we look at aggregated data for the votes of 8 dossiers and statistically assess whether there is any significant relation between political families and support or rejection of legislative initiatives supporting workers and Trade Union priorities.

2 - Data Selection

To draw meaningful results about how the reactionary euro-groups vote to labour policy, we first decided which legislative initiatives were bound to have a meaningful impact in European labour policy. The dossiers chosen have all reached the final stage of the legislative process, that is they have been voted in plenary after successful negotiations with the European Council to either be rejected or approved, or (in the case of the "Resolution on reducing inequalities with special focus on in-work poverty") they have been adopted by the parliament.

The data used is the result of votes to a series of specific dossiers relevant for the workers' group.

- The legislative initiatives in all cases are intended to advance workers' rights, or the rights of vulnerable workers across the EU. They are aligned with the priorities that the EESC's Workers' Group for the 2023-2025 period (EESC, 2024), and represent meaningful positive proposals for EU workers' rights, according to the EESC's Workers' Group.
- The chosen initiatives have taken place after UK Members of the European Parliament left the legislative chamber, the first Plenary Session with a reduced Parliament taking place in February 2020. The period was chosen as the upcoming legislature will not include MEPs from the UK, so the composition after the departure better responds to

the upcoming one. This also limits the regarded initiatives to recent ones, and to the current European political families.

- The dossiers chosen all have publicly available data on roll-call voting during Parliament plenary sessions. The votes here are all at the stage of their final vote in plenary before adoption, and therefore highly compatible among each other.

	Procedure	Full Title	Vote Date
1	2020/0006(COD)	Proposal for a regulation establishing the Just Transition Fund	18-05-2021
2	2019/2188(INI)	Resolution on reducing inequalities with a special focus on in-work poverty	09-02-2021
3	2020/0310(COD)	Proposal for a directive on the adequate minimum wages in the European Union	14-09-2022
4	2021/0206(COD)	Proposal for a regulation establishing a Social Climate Fund	18-04-2023
5	2021/0433(CNS)	Proposal for a directive on ensuring a global minimum level of taxation for	19-05-2022
6	2021/0050(COD)	Resolution on the proposal for a directive to strengthen the application of the	30-03-2023
7	2021/0414(COD)	Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving working	24-04-2024
8	2022/0051(COD)	Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence and amending Directive (EU)	24-04-2024

Figure 1: Table of dossiers aligning with workers' group priorities

The table here presented displays the final sample of dossiers aligning with the priorities of the workers' group, during the mentioned period, for which records of the votes are available online. These legislative initiatives form a representative sample of the Parliamentary activity related with Workers' Group priorities, as labour rights, fair working conditions and a future for European workers.

The data has been provided for the most part by the "HowTheyVote.eu " project, which is funded by the German Federal Ministry of Research and Education. It specifically focuses on data regarding Plenary Votes, and thus provides specific data on Roll Call Votes. This project offers data in a format that is interoperable, and because the data are specific, the databases

were easy to work with. The data provided by this project lies under the Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 ([howtheyvote.eu](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), 2024).

Data from the Roll Call Votes of the Dossiers listed was gathered from the aggregating projects. The data gathered was coded, so that it illustrates each parliamentarians' voting direction and political family, and to make it compatible with the data from the other 9 votes studied.

A look at the individual votes arranged by European political families already appeared to show that inter-group variation of the votes could be significant indeed, labour issues are proving to be amongst the most polarising policy topics in the last legislature, coherent with the conclusions of Hix et al. (2023).

The following graphs provide examples of the outcomes of roll call voting for two of the selected dossiers (Figures 2 and 3). The detailed tables and bar-graphs can be found in the annex to this document. To visualize the parties' different voting strategies, the data shows what percentage of the MEPs affiliated with the groups at the time of the vote voted in favour of the initiative, against or abstained. The data then is organised by political parties. The tables show the percentage of votes cast against the initiative among the MEPs of each group, and the total percentage of votes cast in each direction. In the bar plots illustrating the descriptive tables, the bars represent votes for, against and abstentions. Figure 4 presents a table with a simple format where results of votes are classified as either:

- "For" in cases where there is at least 20% more votes in favour than against.
- "Against" in cases where there is at least 20% more votes against than in favour.
- "Mixed" for cases where the different between for and against votes is smaller than 20% in either direction.

6 - Equal Pay for Equal Work			
Group	FOR	AGAINST	ABSTENTION
ECR	4%	30%	67%
EPP	73%	22%	4%
Greens/EFA	100%	0%	0%
ID	40%	26%	34%
Non-attached	40%	50%	10%
Renew	85%	2%	13%
S&D	100%	0%	0%
The Left	90%	3%	6%
Total	73%	14%	13%




Figure 2: Voting record of EP political groups in the Equal Pay for Equal Work Directive (As % of party)

8 - Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence			
Group	FOR	AGAINST	ABSTENTION
ECR	5%	93%	2%
EPP	35%	59%	6%
Greens/EFA	100%	0%	0%
ID	4%	94%	2%
Non-attached	43%	49%	8%
Renew	79%	20%	1%
S&D	98%	1%	1%
The Left	88%	3%	9%
Total	60%	37%	3%




Figure 3: Voting record of EP political groups in the CSDDD Directive (As % of party)

Title	ID	ECR	Rest of
1 Regulation establishing the Just Transition Fund	Divided	For	
2 Reducing inequalities with a special focus on in-work poverty	Against		EPP against
3 Directive on the adequate minimum wages in the European Union	Against		
4 Regulation establishing a Social Climate Fund	Against	Divided	
5 Directive on ensuring a global minimum level of taxation for	For	Against	
6 Directive to strengthen the application of the principle of equal pay	Divided	Against	
7 Directive on improving working conditions in platform work	For		
8 Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence	Against		EPP against

Figure 4: Table with the groups' direction of votes per initiative

Once the data for the individual votes was extracted and processed into interoperable data, the results of the many votes were put together into a database holding the results of 8 votes together. Data for each MEP's direction of vote to each of the 8 initiatives was counted along each other, and means extracted for the percentage of votes to each direction. See figure 5.




Figure 5: Mean percentage calculated among all 8 votes' percentages.

3 - Results

Throughout the 8 dossiers presented in the methodology of this study, the two groups which host far right parties have been the least eager to support the initiatives, both groups being either against most of them or broken into competing factions within the groups. Both Identity and Democracy have voted against or refrained from voting in almost all of the initiatives.

As per the above, not all of the examined initiatives are the same, with some gathering decisive opposition from the two aforementioned political families and some highlighting the differences that are existing within the groups.

The two groups were unified in their attempts to blockade three of the examined legislative initiatives, those being the "Resolution on in-work poverty" (procedure n. 2 on *figure 1*), the "Directive on the Adequate Minimum Wages" and the "Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence" (8). These legislative initiatives gathered the least favourable votes from the MEP's belonging in the ECR and ID political families. On the other hand, some of the issues were divisive between and within the two political families, and the "Directive ensuring a minimum level of taxation" (5) divided both groups, as the ECR rejected it while the majority of the ID group voted for it.

The two groups, however, were the least consistent in supporting EU legislation related to workers' rights, when compared to the rest of the parties in the hemicycle.

The European People's Party only showed division in their responses to the "Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence" (8), and voted against on the "Resolution on Reducing in-work poverty" (2).

Support for the EU social and labour legislative initiatives from Far right parties

Among the examined dossiers, in most of the cases the groups further in the right of the European Parliament placed themselves firmly against the legislations analysed. Some of the initiatives however, were received with positive votes.

A majority of the MEPs of the ECR and ID groups supported the vote for the "Directive on improving working conditions in platform work" (6), even if within both of the group's

disagreements remained (21 of the 61 ECR votes weren't in favour and 16 of the 50 ID votes weren't either).

Each one of the groups supported another one of the chosen initiatives each, with the ECR voting in favour of the "Regulation establishing the Just Transition Fund"(1), and the ID's support for the "Directive ensuring a global minimum level of taxation for multinational groups"(5).

These results are significantly different from most of the other parties, and place the ECR and ID political families as the least likely to support social and labour legislation among the political families of the European Parliament. Among the rest of the families in the parliament, the EPP unanimously supported 6 of the 8 initiatives and the rest of the parties supported all 8 of them.

The case of the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) and Greens/EFA groups is significant, as the MEP's in these groups showed minimal divisions: more than 94% of the MEPs from these groups voted in favour of all 8 of the initiatives, meaning that there is little inner disagreement within the groups when it comes to labour policy.

Division within the far right European political families

Some of the dossiers selected demonstrated to be divisive for the ID group, perhaps reinforcing the notion that far right political parties show division on the topic of social and labour policy based on national vote-seeking strategies. 3 of the 8 dossiers failed to bring together more than two thirds of the parliamentary group, with the vote for the "Regulation establishing a Social Climate Fund" fully polarising the group, where none of the 56 members that voted abstained, 21 of them voted in favour and 35 voted against. Polarising the group were also the "Regulation establishing the Just Transition Fund"(2) and the "Directive to strengthen the principle of equal pay for equal work"(6), where in both cases around 40% of them group members voted in favour, 30% against and the remainder abstained.

The ECR also appears as a divided group, as MEPs from the conservative group failed to find a common position for the "Regulation establishing a Social Climate Fund" (4), where 15 of the members supported the regulation, 13 rejected it and 30 abstained. The rest of the dossiers however, gathered more abstentions than any other group.

Among the rest of the groups, the EPP showed meaningful division during the vote for the "Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence"(8), as 55 members voted in favour and 91 rejected the Directive, with only 9 abstentions.

The ECR and ID groups' votes against labour policy and workers' rights.

The ECR was the EP group that showed disagreement to most of the initiatives proposing to further labour rights at the EU level. The ECR group failed to support, 5 of the 8 initiatives that had already reached the last stage of the legislative process, and that had already found consensus among the EP and the EU Council.

More MEPs in the ECR rejected the following initiatives than the ones that voted for them:

- 2 – Reducing inequalities with a special focus on in-work poverty.
 - 30% of votes against and 57% of abstentions.
- 3 – Directive on the adequate minimum wages in the European Union.
 - 36% of votes against and 45% of abstentions.
- 5 – Directive ensuring a minimum level of taxation for multinational groups.
 - 49% of votes against and 40% of abstentions.
- 6 – Directive to strengthen the principle of equal pay for equal work.
 - 30% of votes against and 67% abstentions.
- 8 – Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence.
 - 93% of votes against and 1% abstentions.

On the other hand, the ID group strongly rejected 4 of the 8 initiatives examined, gathering a strong majority of ID MEPs to vote against the initiatives:

- 2 – Reducing inequalities with a special focus on in-work poverty.
 - 61% of votes against and 37% of abstentions.
- 3 – Directive on the adequate minimum wages in the European Union.
 - 69% of votes against and 2% of abstentions.
- 4 – Proposal for a regulation establishing a Social Climate Fund
 - 63% of votes against.
- 8 – Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence.
 - 94% of votes against and 2% abstentions.

The two groups demonstrated rejection to the initiatives more than any other group, which can better be appreciated in the table showing the cumulative results per political family. An average of 36% of the members of the ECR group voted against the examined legislation, while an average of 49% of ID members did. When compared with the group showing the next highest average, the EPP, with an average of 13% of negative votes, the differences between the EPP and the far right become clear. Furthermore, if negative votes and abstentions are taken into account, the EPP failed to support only 23% of the labour legislation proposed in the EP, while the ID and ECR groups failed to support 65% and 73%, respectively.

Conclusion

When legislation intended to better working conditions, enhance collective bargaining and broaden welfare provisions for working people, reaches a vote in the European Parliament, the far right parties are the least likely to support it. The legislative dossiers examined, which the EESC's Worker's Group has unwaveringly supported, have largely been rejected by the far right European political groups or demonstrated their inner division.

Were the European Parliament to tilt rightwards as the election polls and news coverage suggests, reactionary majority coalitions would become possible in the legislature. Coalitions of the right, with the support of the hard right and the far right tend to have the weakest connections with Trade Unions, and enforce fiscal restriction when possible.

In this paper, three actions of the far right to undermine the capacity of organised labour towards social progress have been identified: they decry Trade Unions as enemies of common citizens and blame them of declining quality of life, they are establishing parallel non-independent Unions, and they are supporting or consenting to legislation that undermines and weakens social dialogue and universal workers' rights.

The far right supports social and labour policy only circumstantially, when it serves their calculations for executive political power. While Unions find their power in solidarity, worker unity and must act through negotiation, the far right exploits perceived differences and group identity to rally support. While parties in this family differ broadly on their stances towards social welfare and labour policy, their stances be supportive or negative depending on the potential it bears to attract votes or to form governing coalitions. And the far right coalesces only with parties advocating fiscal prudence. In the cases when these parties support social

welfare, it is not universal welfare that is granted either to all citizens or to all workers, but instead it is nativist welfare that excludes those out of the far rights' "in-group".

The European Parliament's 9th legislature has not been dominated by a single "Governing coalition", and the far right is spread over two different groups in the hemicycle, either isolated in the case of the ID group or on the side-lines, as the ECR group. But the role of majority maker has eluded the European reactionaries. The groups, however, have been politically active, rejecting EU policy which didn't align with their positions. The votes of the parties during the 9th legislature have been examined here, under the assumption that similar patterns will be deployed in the upcoming 10th legislature.

There is meaningful and timely academic disagreement regarding the positions that far right parties take in regards of universal welfare, labour rights and social dialogue. Looking into the data extracted from Parliament votes that the EESC's Workers' Group consider vital, the far right sticks out as the Parliament party least supportive of social progress, and labour policy appears to be a particularly divisive topic within and across both of the parties.

The findings of this simple analysis seem to confirm that the support that the far right shows for labour and welfare policy is ambivalent and generally adversarial to Trade Unions, although the small number of initiatives and the ample intra-party disagreement makes extracting wide conclusions difficult.

These parties however, demonstrate with their votes to these dossiers to be unreliable in supporting policy for workers and suspicious of social dialogue. At the same time they are voting against social and labour policy in the European Parliament, they are claiming at the national level to support sweeping social welfare when it will benefit their prospects towards government. These parties then are establishing coalitions for fiscal restraint and becoming consenters to the retrenchment of the welfare state and the weakening of collective bargaining and social dialogue.

Bibliography


- Alfonso, A. (2015). Choosing whom to betray: populist right-wing parties, welfare state reforms and the trade-off between office and votes. *European Political Science Review*, Volume 7, Supplement 2, 271 - 292.
- Armingeon, K., Porte, d. I., Caroline, H. E., & Sacchi, S. (2022, March 7). Voices from the past: economic and political vulnerabilities in the making of next generation EU. *Comparative European Politics*, 20, 144-165.
- Arndt, C., & Rennwald, L. (2016, July 21). Union members at the polls in diverse trade union landscapes. *European Journal of Political Research*, pp. 702-722.
- Balas, P. (2023). *The Far-Right in the European Parliament: Focus on the Current Legislature 2019-2022*. Brussels: Transform! Europe.
- Bieling, H.-J. (2023). Trade Unions and Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Challenges, Strategies, Experiences. *European Trade Union Dialogue*.
- Biten, M., Kuhn, T., & Brug, W. v. (2022). How does fiscal austerity affect trust in the European Union? Analyzing the role of responsibility attribution. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 1033-1050. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2022.2060282>
- Canovan, M. (1997, December 7). Trust the people! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy. *Political Studies*, pp. 2-16.
- Chrisafis, A. (2017, April 26). *Marine Le Pen springs surprise visit on Macron during picket line campaign trip*. Retrieved from TheGuardian.com: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/26/marine-le-pen-springs-surprise-visit-on-macron-during-picket-line-campaign-trip>
- EESC. (2024, January 17). *eesc.europa.eu*. Retrieved from Workers' Group Publishes Its Priorities for 2023-2025: <https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/news-media/news/workers-group-publishes-its-priorities-2023-2025>
- EESC. (2024, 01 17). *eesc.europa.eu*. Retrieved from Workers' Group Publishes Its Priorities for 2023-2025: <https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/news-media/news/workers-group-publishes-its-priorities-2023-2025>
- Europe Elects. (2024, March 31). EU Parliamentary Projection: The End of the Rise of the Right?
- European Commission. (2012). *Labour Market developments in Europe 2012, European Economy 5/2012*. Luxembourg: Publication Office of the European Union.
- Hix, S., Whitaker, R., & Zapryanova, G. (2023). The political space in the European parliament: Measuring MEPs' preferences amid the rise of Euroscepticism. *European Journal of Political Research*, Volume 63, Issue 1, 153 - 171.
- howtheyvote.eu*. (2024, May 27). Retrieved from How They Vote: <https://howtheyvote.eu/>
- ILO. (2023, March 10). Retrieved from Sindicatos y patronal de Castilla y León denuncian ante la OIT ante el deterioro del diálogo social en la región: <https://www.ilo.org/es/resource/news/sindicatos-y-patronal-de-castilla-y-leon-denuncian-ante-la-oit-ante-el>

- IndustriAll*. (2023, July 05). Retrieved from The Nordic model under attack in Finland: <https://news.industriall-europe.eu/Article/925>
- Ipsos & EuroNews. (2024, March). *Ipsos.com*. Retrieved from European Election Survey three months ahead of the June 2024 European Elections: <https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2024-03/ipsos-euronews-european-election-projection-parlement-rapport.pdf>
- Kabinetsformatie. (2024, May 16). *Hoofdlijnenakkoord tussen de fracties van PVV, VVD, NSC en BBB*. Retrieved from Kabinetsformatie Bureau Woordvoering kabinetsformatie: <https://www.kabinetsformatie2023.nl/documenten/publicaties/2024/05/16/hoofdlijnen-akkoord-tussen-de-fracties-van-pvv-vvd-nsc-en-bbb>
- Keune, M., & Pochet, P. (2023, May). The revival of Social Europe: is this time different? *Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research Quarterly of the ETUI Research Department*, 29(2), 173-185.
- Kim, S., Greef, S., & Schroeder, W. (2022). *The Far Right in the Workplace, A Six-Country Comparison*. Kassel: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Leonardi, S., & Carrieri, M. (2020). Populism and trade union internationalism: the case of Italy. *Transfer*, 26(3), pp. 273-288.
- Mosimann, N., Rennwald, L., & Zimmermann, A. (2019). The radical right, the labour movement and the competition for the workers' vote. *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 40(1), 65-90.
- Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist Radical Right parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press.
- Müller, T., & Platzer, H.-W. (2016). Gewerkschaften und Arbeitsbeziehungen im Europa der Krise, Strukturdaten und Entwicklungstrends im Vergleich. In *Gewerkschaften in der Eurokrise Nationaler Anpassungsdruck und europäische Strategien* (S. 10-45). Hamburg: VSA: Verlag.
- Oesch, D., & Rennwald, L. (2018). Electoral competition in Europe's new tripolar political space: Class voting for the left, centre-right and radical right. *European Journal of Political Research*, Volume 57, Issue 4, 783-807.
- Ostiguy, P. (2017). A Socio-Cultural approach to populism. In C. Rovira-Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. Ochoa Espejo, & P. Ostiguy, *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (pp. 73-97). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Prime Ministers' Office. (2022, november 3). *The Government's political priorities*. Retrieved from Government offices of Sweden: <https://www.government.se/articles/2022/11/the-governments-political-priorities/>
- R. Suanzes, P. (2023, July 15). *ElMundo.es*. Retrieved from El fin de los consensos históricos: lo que Europa se juega en las elecciones del 23J: <https://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2023/07/15/64b2c492fdddf9758b45c2.html>


- Rathgeb, P., & Klitgaard, M. B. (2022). Protagonists or consenters: radical right parties and attacks on trade unions. *Journal of European Public Policy*, Volume 29, Number 7, 1049-1071.
- Röth, L., Afonso, A., & Spies, D. C. (2017, June 13). The impact of Populist Radical Right Parties on socio-economic policies. *European Political Science Review*, Volume 10, Issue 3, pp. 324-350.
- Stöss, R. (2017). *Trade Unions and Right-Wing Extremism in Europe*. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
- Tricart, J.-P. (2020). Once upon a time there was the European social dialogue. In B. Vanhercke, D. Ghailani, S. Spasova, & P. Pochet, *Social policy in the European Union 1999-2019: the long and winding road* (pp. 71-93). Brussels: ETUI.
- uni-europa.org. (2021, May 17). Retrieved from 5TH UNI EUROPA CONFERENCE – RESOLUTIONS: <https://www.uni-europa.org/news/5th-uni-europa-conference-resolutions/>
- Van Leeuwen, E., & Halleck Vega, S. (2021, April). Voting and the rise of populism: Spatial perspectives and applications across Europe. *Regional Science Policy & Practice*, 13(2), pp. 209-220.
- Waddington, J., Müller, T., & Vandaele, K. (2023). Trade Unions picking up the pieces from the neoliberal challenge. In *Trade unions in the European Union: Picking up the pieces of the neoliberal challenge; Work & Society, Vol. 86* (pp. 1093-1149). Peter Lang.
- Welt.de. (2024, March 20). *Welt.de*. Retrieved from Rekordergebnisse für Rechtsnationale – aber Pro-Europäer mit Mehrheit: <https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article250661419/Prognose-zur-Europawahl-Rekordergebnisse-fuer-Rechtsnationale.html?icid=search.product.onsitesearch>

ANNEX 1 – Individual Votes


1 - Just Transition Fund			
Groups	FOR	AGAINST	ABSTENTION
ID	37%	30%	33%
ECR	75%	13%	11%
EPP	100%	0%	0%
Renew	99%	0%	1%
S&D	100%	0%	0%
Greens/EFA	100%	0%	0%
The Left	95%	0%	5%
Non-attached	53%	14%	33%
Total	88%	5%	7%




2 - Reducing In-Work Poverty			
Group	FOR	AGAINST	ABSTENTION
ID	1%	61%	37%
ECR	13%	30%	57%
EPP	21%	15%	64%
Renew	62%	24%	14%
S&D	100%	0%	0%
Greens/EFA	94%	0%	6%
The Left	76%	0%	24%
Non-attached	81%	12%	8%
Total	53%	17%	30%




3 - Adequate Minimum Wages			
Group	FOR	AGAINST	ABSTENTION
ID	29%	69%	2%
ECR	19%	36%	45%
EPP	94%	4%	2%
Renew	78%	10%	12%
S&D	94%	6%	0%
Greens/EFA	97%	3%	0%
The Left	86%	8%	6%
Non-attached	80%	11%	9%
Total	79%	14%	7%




4 - Social Climate Fund			
Group	FOR	AGAINST	ABSTENTION
ID	38%	63%	0%
ECR	26%	22%	52%
EPP	96%	1%	3%
Renew	83%	11%	6%
S&D	99%	1%	0%
Greens/EFA	100%	0%	0%
The Left	91%	6%	3%
Non-attached	65%	30%	5%
Total	82%	12%	7%




5 - Minimum Level of Taxation			
Group	FOR	AGAINST	ABSTENTION
ID	71%	24%	5%
ECR	11%	49%	40%
EPP	99%	0%	1%
Renew	100%	0%	0%
S&D	99%	0%	1%
Greens/EFA	100%	0%	0%
The Left	76%	9%	15%
Non-attached	50%	6%	44%
Total	84%	8%	8%




6 - Equal Pay for Equal Work			
Group	FOR	AGAINST	ABSTENTION
ID	40%	26%	34%
ECR	4%	30%	67%
EPP	73%	22%	4%
Renew	85%	2%	13%
S&D	100%	0%	0%
Greens/EFA	100%	0%	0%
The Left	90%	3%	6%
Non-attached	40%	50%	10%
Total	73%	14%	13%



7 - Working Conditions on Platforms			
Group	FOR	AGAINST	ABSTENTION
ID	68%	28%	4%
ECR	66%	15%	20%
EPP	93%	6%	1%
Renew	79%	20%	1%
S&D	96%	0%	4%
Greens/EFA	100%	0%	0%
The Left	100%	0%	0%
Non-attached	84%	11%	5%
Total	87%	9%	4%



8 - Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence			
Group	FOR	AGAINST	ABSTENTION
ID	4%	94%	2%
ECR	5%	93%	2%
EPP	35%	59%	6%
Renew	79%	20%	1%
S&D	98%	1%	1%
Greens/EFA	100%	0%	0%
The Left	88%	3%	9%
Non-attached	43%	49%	8%
Total	60%	37%	3%



ANNEX 2 -Aggregated Votes

Mean Percentage of votes for all 8 legislative initiatives			
Group	Mean For	Mean Against	Mean Abstention
Greens/EFA	99%	0%	1%
S&D	98%	1%	1%
The Left	88%	4%	8%
Renew	83%	11%	6%
EPP	76%	13%	10%
Non-attached	62%	23%	15%
ID	36%	49%	15%
ECR	27%	36%	37%

